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ABSTRACT
This project examined the affective consequences of expressing moral convictions
to an opposing majority. It was predicted that moral conviction would function as a
buffer to the common negative emotions that occur when speaking out against majority
opinion (e.g., fear; Asch, 1956; Berns, et al., 2005). It was also hypothesized that moral
conviction would enhance positive feelings among those who speak out (e.g., pride). Two
studies were conducting using two different research paradigms. Study 1 used a
normative influence paradigm modeled after Hornsey, Smith, and Begg (2007).
Participants’ opinions and strength of moral conviction about the target issue (torture of
suspected terrorists) were assessed. Participants, after being led to believe that the
majority of their fellow students held the opposing opinion, were asked if they would be
willing to have their opinion (with their full names) published in the school paper.
Results show that simply having high moral conviction about the issue was associated
with a feeling of strength – the effect of moral conviction on affect did not depend on
speaking out. Study 2 used a computer-based version of an Asch-type conformity
paradigm. The target issue was lowering the legal drinking age to 18. As in Study 1 there
was a main effect of moral conviction; however an increase in moral conviction was
associated with an increase in negative emotions after exposure to the normative
influence and no increase in positive emotions. The difference between the main effects
of moral conviction on affect found in the two studies is attributed to the
x

difference in target issues. Study 2 also revealed that attitude direction has significant
direct effects on affect.
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CHAPTER ONE
MORAL CONVICTION AND SPEAKING OUT
Expressing an unpopular opinion on social issues has real world implications.
When people speak out publicly to large audiences (through petitions, via a poll, writing
a letter to an editor) they can influence both actual and perceived public opinion. When
people speak out in smaller groups they can shift the perceived group norm. At the
individual level both speaking out and not speaking out carry both benefits and risks. To
remain silent may prevent rejection from the group but at a potential cost to one’s selfintegrity. On the other hand, expressing one’s unpopular opinion may lead to a positive
view of the self, but carries the risk of rejection (Schacter, 1951). When people don’t
express unpopular attitudes the potential consequences for society are public policies
based on inaccurate public opinions; the consequences for the individual may be feelings
of dissonance and inauthenticity. Because of these implications it is important to
understand what people experience emotionally when they express unpopular opinions.
Research suggests that attitudes held with moral conviction are more resistant to
majority group influence than attitudes not held with moral conviction (see Skitka, 2010
for a review). However even with moral convictions people frequently don’t speak out
when they are in the minority (Hornsey, Smith, & Begg, 2007). The study of moral
conviction is relatively new to the field of social psychology. Thus, there are some gaps
in the literature. The main goal of this project is help fill these gaps by examining the
1
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affective consequences of expressing moral convictions in the face of majority
opposition. A secondary goal is to further explore the differences between moral
conviction and other attitude characteristics with respect to predicting speaking out.
Attitude Characteristics
An attitude is a favorable or unfavorable orientation toward an object (Krosnick &
Smith, 1994). The strength of an attitude refers to the degree to which an attitude is
resistant to change and influences cognition and behavior (Krosnick & Smith). The
following characteristics are viewed variously as either indices or dimensions of attitude
strength or as separate constructs (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993):
Extremity is the degree to which an attitude deviates from a neutral midpoint on an
evaluative continuum that ranges from strongly negative to strongly positive; importance
is the subjective significance attached to a given attitude; certainty is the degree to which
people feel sure about their position on an issue; centrality refers to how much a given
attitude is rooted in people’s sense of identity; accessibility is the strength of the attitudeevaluation link in memory.
Moral conviction is defined as a strong and absolute belief that something is right
or wrong, moral or immoral (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Moral mandates are
strong attitudes (extreme, important, certain, and central) that are also held with strong
moral conviction (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Therefore, all moral mandates are strong
attitudes, but not all strong attitudes are moral mandates. Unlike attitudes that reflect
preferences or normative conventions moral mandates are: (a) perceived by the holder as
objective facts; (b) perceived to apply universally; and (c) emotionally laden and thus
carry motivational force (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis; Skitka, 2010).
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Research supports the conceptualization of moral conviction as a separate
construct from other attitude characteristics. Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005)
conducted four studies and found that strength of moral conviction predicted unique
variance beyond other indices of attitude strength (importance, certainty, and centrality)
on measures of interpersonal attraction and repulsion to attitudinally similar and
dissimilar others. Only attitude extremity consistently explained unique variance in
people’s reactions to attitudinally similar or dissimilar others. In another study moral
conviction explained significant unique variance in voting behavior, even when
controlling for strength of candidate preferences (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Other
researchers have found moral conviction to predict speaking-out intentions and speakingout behavior over and above attitude extremity (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hornsey, Smith, &
Begg, 2007).
Normative Social Influence
Within the field of psychology the study of normative social influence has
focused on conformity and resistance to conformity within small groups (e.g., Asch,
1956; Deutsch & Gerard 1955). Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) define conformity as “the
act of changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others.” People generally
conform for one of two reasons: they are using majority opinion as a source of
information (informational social influence); or they are motivated by social goals conforming can prevent possible ridicule and ostracism (normative social influence;
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 630). Decades of research has established that people
frequently conform to the majority opinion (Bond & Smith, 1996). Theoretically,
attitudes held with moral conviction should not be susceptible to informational social
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influence as such attitudes are by definition held with strong and absolute beliefs.
Therefore the focus in the present research is resistance to normative social influence.
Within the field of mass communication the focus is on opinion expression (as
opposed to conformity) with the normative influence defined as one’s perception of
public opinion climate (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). One of the leading theories on the
relationship between public opinion climate and opinion expression is Noelle-Neumann’s
(1974, 1993) spiral of silence theory. This theory holds that people are less likely to
speak out when they believe they hold a minority opinion (their beliefs based on their
intake and interpretation of mass media), this in turn increases perceptions of being in a
minority, theoretically leading to a self-reinforcing cycle of marginalization.
Speaking Out
People can demonstrate resistance to normative social influence in a number of
ways. The lowest risk way for people to resist is to simply not change their initial attitude
to conform to an opposing majority opinion. When this is done privately there is no risk
of rejection. More risky but potentially more satisfying is to express one’s true attitude
publicly (Aramovich, Lytle, & Skitka, 2010; Hornsey et al., 2003, 2007) to various size
audiences (small group of peers; larger group of peers; general public). Other ways to
express an unpopular opinion involve political action, some of which is private (e.g.,
voting) and some public (e.g., calling representatives; petition signing). To reduce
confusion the term “speaking out” will be used in the rest of this paper as shorthand for
“publicly sharing one’s true beliefs when faced with an opposing majority.”

5
Determinants of Speaking Out
Expressing minority opinions is a social behavior. There are numerous theories
regarding the determinants of social behavior. Haidt (2001) for example, states that the
emerging view is that most of our behaviors and judgments are made automatically (i.e.,
without intention, effort, or awareness of process). Strack and Deutsch (2004) argue that
that social behavior is the effect of the operation of two distinct systems of information
processing: a reflective system and an impulsive system. The impulsive system is always
operating and the reflective system comes into play under certain circumstances. Social
behaviors are profoundly influenced by numerous goals and need states (Griskevicius,
Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). Following are some known factors
that influence minority opinion expression. Some of these factors pull people in opposite
directions with respect to speaking out.
Need to belong/need to be similar. Affiliation is considered a fundamental
human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). One way people can increase the chances
of belonging is to go along with the group (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Thus
speaking out when the majority is in opposition carries great interpersonal risks
(Schacter, 1951). Research has found that simply being exposed to a normative influence
can have negative psychological effects. Even when minority opinion holders are not
required to voice their opinions in public, simply knowing of their minority status is
sufficient to elicit feelings of discomfort (termed ‘self-other dissonance’) and reduced
self-esteem (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998). This finding supports early sociophysiological
research: believing others hold the opposite opinion results in increased physiological
arousal; arousal that is subsequently reduced when participants conform (Back,
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Bogdonoff, Shaw, & Klein, 1963). Not only do people have a need to be similar but they
also have the opposing need to be unique. The need for personal uniqueness or
distinctiveness has been postulated to be a fundamental human need (Vignoles,
Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). According to Brewer’s (1991) optimal
distinctiveness theory, individuals strive for an optimal balance of assimilation and
distinction within social groups and situations. When people feel too similar to others
they are motivated to act in ways that individuate themselves from others (Maslach,
Stapp, & Santee, 1985). Related to the need for individuation is the need for uniqueness,
a psychological state in which individuals feel indistinguishable from others and are
motivated to act to reestablish a sense of uniqueness (Imhoff & Erb, 2009; Snyder &
Fromkin, 1980).
Moral courage. Moral courage can be defined as a “willingness to take a stand
in defense of principle or conviction even when others do not” (Miller, 2000 cited in
Skitka, 2011). Taking a stand (e.g., defying the majority) sometimes requires moral
courage as there are real risks associated with speaking out, including inconvenience,
unpopularity, ostracism, disapproval, derision, and even tangible harm such as loss of
employment (Kidder, 2005).
Moral outrage. Moral outrage is anger at perceived moral violations. It is
considered a motivating force that can provide the courage to act in the face of personal
risk. People are more willing to speak out against the majority when moral outrage is
elicited than when it is not (de Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels, 2002; Kayser,
Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2010).
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Self-consistency needs. According to self-affirmation theory people strive for
congruence between their personal moral values and their thoughts and behavior because
lack of congruence leads to feelings of dissonance (Steele, 1988). People are motivated to
be morally authentic, to have integrity (Stone et al., 1997). Self-consistency theories may
come more into play when a person must decide to conform or defy the majority on their
moral convictions as opposed to actively speaking out to promote their moral
convictions.
Value expression needs. Another explanation for resistance to group pressure is
that defending moral mandates may serve a value-expressive function (Hornsey, Smith,
& Begg, 2007). See also Herek (1986) for a detailed description of the value expressive
functions of attitudes.
Need to convert. According to Hornsey, Smith, & Begg (2007) the literature on
speaking out (including spiral of silence literature) assumes that one reason people speak
out is to persuade others to change their attitude to become more in line with the
speaker’s. Empirical tests of this assumption found no significant correlation between
need to convert and speaking out intentions or behavior (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hornsey et
al., 2007). Hornsey, Smith, & Begg (2007) conclude that it remains unknown what it is
about moral conviction that causes counter-conformity and is positively correlated overall
with speaking-out behaviors but it is not because those with strong moral conviction are
more committed to converting others.
Situational factors. Small group research has found several situational factors
that influence resistance to normative social influence including: unanimity; size of the
group; attractiveness of the group to the participant; group cohesion; and whether they
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are considered peers of the participant (Allen, 1965; Bond & Smith, 1996). Resistance to
normative social influence is increased when the group is not cohesive, not unanimous,
members are not peers of the participant, or members are viewed as unlikable by the
participant (Allen; Bond & Smith).
Within spiral of silence theory the reference group is the larger society. However,
some researchers (e.g., Oshagan, 1996) have found that under some conditions mass
media is not as important as intra-individual sources of social influence for predicting
opinion expression. Oshagan conducted an experiment that compared societal majority
influence to referent other (close friends) majority influence. Results suggest that when
reference and societal majority opinions are made equally salient, the more important
influence is one's reference group. Oshagan also found that individuals with extreme
opinions were unaffected by either type of social influence.
Other situational factors include: future opinion congruency (people are more
likely to express minority opinions if they perceive the majority is moving towards that
opinion compared to when people do not believe there will be future opinion congruency;
Ho & McLeod, 2008); and descriptive versus prescriptive norms. Morrison and Miller
(2008) define “descriptive deviants” as people who hold attitudes that differ from the
average group attitude in a direction consistent with the desirable group attitude (toward
the prescriptive norm); “prescriptive deviants” hold attitudes that differ from the average
group attitude in a direction inconsistent with the desirable group attitude (away from the
prescriptive norm). Morrison and Miller conducted three studies to test the hypothesis
that descriptive deviants are more willing to express their opinions than either
nondeviants or prescriptive deviants. Participants in studies 1 and 2 were assigned an
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opinion to express (not necessarily their own). Study 1 found that participants reported
more comfort in expressing descriptive deviant opinions because descriptive deviance
induced feelings of superior conformity (i.e., being "different but good"). Study 2 found
that descriptive deviants reported more pride after expressing their opinions, were rated
as more proud by an observer, and were more willing to publicize their opinions. In
Study 3 it was found that political bumper stickers with descriptive deviant messages
were displayed significantly more frequently than were those with prescriptive deviant
messages.
Individual Differences
In addition to situational factors, there are numerous individual difference factors
that determine the degree to which people speak out and defy normative social influence.
Personality traits particularly relevant to speaking out will be briefly reviewed. The
following are not intended to be exhaustive and some may conceptually overlap with
others.
Importance of morality. People differ in the importance morality holds in their
lives (Blasi, 1984; Walker & Frimer, 2007). People have also been found to differ in
justice sensibility, civil disobedience and resistance to group pressure (Kayser et al.,
2010). Centrality of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and ethical ideology
(Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker, 2008) have been found to be determinants of moral
behavior. Some participants may regard speaking out on moral convictions to be a moral
behavior and thus centrality of moral identity and type of ethical ideology may influence
speaking out behavior. These individual difference variables are theoretically precursors
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of moral conviction (as personality traits are viewed as background factors of attitudes;
Ajzen, 2005).
Need for uniqueness. Those with a high need for uniqueness tend to experience
positive emotions in a low similarity condition (i.e., when told they are different from
others on an attitude questionnaire), negative emotions in a high similarity condition (i.e.,
when told they are similar to others on an attitude questionnaire), and engage mostly in
changes toward dissimilarity relative to others (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). Conversely,
persons with a low need for uniqueness may experience positive emotions in a high
similarity condition, negative emotions in a low similarity condition, and may engage
mainly in changes toward similarity relative to others. Imhoff and Erb (2009) conducted
three studies and found that need for uniqueness motivates individuals to resist majority
influence. The Imhoff and Erb studies did not use a behavioral measure of resistance to
majority influence – participants simply reported their opinion post-manipulation of
majority/minority influence (on non-moral issues).
Hard core individuals. Within the context of spiral of silence theory it is
understood that there is not a simple relationship between opinion climate and opinion
expression (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Some people (the hardcore) choose to speak out
regardless of the climate of opinion (Matthes, Morrison, & Schemer, 2010; NoelleNeumann). Matthes et al. (2010) examined whether attitude certainty is a key variable in
identifying the hardcore. In three surveys they found that opinion climate only determines
opinion expression when individuals hold their attitudes with low or moderate attitude
certainty. No such effect was found for individuals with high attitude certainty. However,
they found that it was the issue specific variance in attitude certainty not the general
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tendency to hold opinions with certainty across several issues to be responsible for the
moderator effect they observed (Matthes et al., 2010).
Moral Conviction and Resistance to Normative Influence
Research has found that moral conviction provides protection against pressure to
conform to the majority (Aramovich, Lytle, & Skitka, 2012; Hornsey et al., 2003; Lytle,
Aramovich, & Skitka, 2009). This protection is likely due to the nature of moral
conviction: (a) Attitudes held with moral conviction are viewed by their holders as
objective facts (Skitka, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005) and people are more
likely to conform to majority opinion when the judgment is perceived as subjective as
opposed to objective (Griskevicius et al., 2006); (b) People have greater intolerance for
and prefer greater social distance from morally dissimilar others (Skitka, Bauman, &
Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). People are
less likely to want to conform to the opinion of people they dislike.
Hornsey, Majkut, Terry, and McKimmie (2003) conducted two experiments to
test the hypothesis that moral conviction protects against pressure to conform to group
norms. The target issues were gay law reform (Exp.1) and a government apology to
Australian Aborigines (Exp. 2). Participants were told that they were in either the
minority or majority relative to other students in their University in terms of their
attitudes. The dependent variables were private behavioral intentions (e.g., voting) and
public behavioral intentions (e.g., attend a rally in support of the issue). Moral conviction
was assessed with three items. Attitude extremity was assessed with one item. In both
experiments, it was found that participants with weak moral conviction on the issue
shifted toward the group norm on private behavioral intentions (conformity), whereas
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those with strong moral conviction were not affected by the group norm (nonconformity). With respect to public behavioral intentions, there was a trend among those
with a strong moral basis for their attitude towards counter-conformity (stronger
behavioral intentions for participants in the minority condition than in the majority
condition). Hornsey et al. (2003) conclude that having strong moral convictions about a
given issue does protect people from the usual pressures to conform to the majority
opinion. Moreover, the interaction between moral conviction and group norm remained
significant for both private intentions and for public intentions when attitude extremity
was added to the regression analyses, suggesting that the effects of moral conviction are
not an artifact of attitude strength (Hornsey et al., 2003).
Hornsey, Smith, and Begg (2007) extended Hornsey et al. (2003) by including a
measure of behavior as well as a measure of intentions. Participants indicated their
willingness to have their opinion, argument in support, and full name printed in the
school paper (1 = no desire at all; 6 = very strong desire). It was predicted that when
people have a strong moral conviction on an issue they will be more likely to act in
accordance with their moral conviction when they believe themselves to be in the
minority as opposed to the majority (counter-conformity). This hypothesis was based on
the spiral of silence assumption that people counter-conform in order to weaken the spiral
of silence by converting others to their cause. To test whether moral conviction had an
effect over and above attitude strength, attitude intensity (extremity) was assessed on a
four point scale. It was found that on intentions to speak out, participants with strong
moral conviction on the issue counter-conformed, whereas those with weak moral
conviction were not influenced by the group norm. On behaviors, however, no evidence
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for counter-conformity was found. In other words, there was no significant difference in
willingness to speak out in the minority support condition compared to the majority
support condition. As in Hornsey et al. (2003), moral conviction predicted behavior over
and above attitude intensity (extremity).
Lytle, Aramovich, and Skitka (2009) tested the hypothesis that people with strong
moral convictions about an issue would be more resistant to group influence than people
with weaker moral convictions. The target issue was the use of stress techniques on
suspected terrorists (“torture”). Participants all opposed torture. Moral conviction was
assessed with two items. Other indices of attitude strength (extremity, certainty, and
importance) were also assessed. Participants (who had previously provided their attitude
on torture) were led to believe they were interacting with a group of other participants
over the computer prior to meeting them in person. In actuality participants were
receiving pre-programmed responses that made it appear the other participants supported
torture. Conformity was operationalized as a change in attitude from opposing to
supporting torture. Results indicate that moral convictions do enable people to resist
pressure from the group to conform. Only attitude extremity was a stronger predictor of
conformity.
To summarize, recent research has found that attitudes held with moral conviction
are more resistant to social influence compared to attitudes held without moral
conviction. Little research however has examined how people feel after expressing their
moral convictions.
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Affect and Emotions
A common framework in the emotions field proposes that affective experiences
are best characterized by two main dimensions: arousal (sleepy-activated) and valence
(pleasure-displeasure). The dimension of valence ranges from highly positive to highly
negative, whereas the dimension of arousal ranges from calming or soothing to exciting
or agitating (Russell, 2003). In addition core affect can also be classified as free-floating
(mood) or associated with a cause (Russell).
Other researchers have further classified emotions based on whether they are
basic or not. Basic emotions are those that are biologically based, shared with other
animals, universally experienced, and identifiable by facial expressions (Ekman et al.,
1987). While there is considerable disagreement among researchers on what emotions
should be included in the category of basic emotions - anger, fear, disgust, sadness,
happiness, and surprise – are those that are most commonly considered to be basic (Tracy
& Robins, 2007). Other emotions such as: amusement, contempt, contentment,
embarrassment, excitement, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, satisfaction, sensory
pleasure, and shame are variously defined as either basic or secondary emotions (Ekman
et al.). Parrot (2001) has developed the most nuanced classification scheme. He
identified over 100 emotions and conceptualized them as a tree structured list. For
example, Parrot views “guilt” (along with regret, remorse, and shame) as a tertiary
emotion within the secondary emotion category of “shame,” with shame fitting into the
primary emotion category of “sadness.”
A special class of emotions is “self-conscious emotions.” These emotions are
evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation. They include shame, guilt, embarrassment,
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and pride (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Self-conscious emotions show weaker
evidence of universality compared to basic emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Selfconscious emotions have been found to drive people to behave in moral, socially
appropriate ways (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek; Tracy & Robins, 2004).
In addition two other types of affect are relevant to the present research. One is
cognitive dissonance. When one contradicts what one believes or has stated earlier,
dissonance or a sense of hypocrisy can be aroused (Steele, 1988; Stone et al., 1997). This
is typically described as “being uncomfortable” or “uneasy” (uneasiness is considered a
tertiary emotion in Parrot’s list within the primary category of “fear” and the secondary
category of “nervousness”). Another type of affect can be aroused by expressing - or
considering expressing - a minority opinion is the specific fear of social rejection or
isolation (Bond & Smith, 1996). Parrot lists such feelings within the secondary category
of “neglect” which falls into the primary category of “sadness.”
Affective Consequences of Speaking Out vs. Conforming
The literature on the affective consequences of nonconformity is sparse as well as
mixed. According to distinctiveness theories and affiliation theories both speaking out
and conforming can have both negative and positive affective consequences. Conforming
may arouse feelings of safety and belonging (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) but may also
lead to feelings of dissonance or inauthenticity (Steele, 1988; Stone et al., 1997).
Speaking out may lead to a sense of strength and pride (Aramovich, Lytle, & Skitka,
2010; Morrison & Miller, 2008) but could also arouse fears of isolation or social rejection
(Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998). Guilt stemming from the discrepancy between what one
does and what one ought to do is another possible consequence of conforming.
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Theoretically, if participants adhere to the Western norm of individuality participants
should believe they “ought” to express their convictions even in the face of majority
opposition (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). If one
does not speak out then according to self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), there will
be a gap between the perceived “actual self” and “ought self” and this gap can lead to
negative feelings (e.g., guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness).
One of the few tests of post-nonconformity affect was conducted by Berns et al.
(2005). A variation of Asch’s study was conducted while participants’ brain activity was
monitored by an fMRI scanner. When participants were in a normative influence
condition and gave the correct answer despite group pressure, the area of the brain
associated with negative emotions and the area devoted to modulating social behavior
were active. Berns et al. conclude people feel negative emotions when standing up to the
group. This finding supports early sociophysiological research - believing others hold the
opposite opinion results in increased physiological arousal; arousal that is subsequently
reduced when participants conform (Back, Bogdonoff, Shaw & Klein, 1963). The Berns
study concerned matters of perception and results may have been different if participants
were non-conforming on moral issues.
Aramovich, Lytle, and Skitka (2010) hypothesized that nonconforming on
important, self-relevant issues (connected to a person’s identity), in addition to being
associated with negative emotions, may be also be self-affirming and associated with
positive, agentic emotions. This was tested using a computer-based version of an Aschtype conformity paradigm. The target issue was torture of suspected terrorists. Positive
and negative affect were assessed following the normative influence and sharing of
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opinions. Expectations for the (ostensible) upcoming face-to-to face meeting with the
group were also assessed. Results revealed that when the issue is self-relevant,
nonconformity (operationalized as maintaining one’s stance on the issue in the face of
majority opposition) is associated with positive (both basic and self-conscious) emotions,
but also with negative expectations for continued interaction with the group. Both
conformers and non-conformers reported similar levels of negative emotions when
sharing their opinion with the group. Aramovich et al. conclude that when the issue is
self-relevant and important to the individual, the decision to affirm the self and feel good
may out-weigh the costs associated with nonconformity.
Morrison and Miller (2008) examined the affective consequences of minority
opinion expression when the speaker’s opinion was different from the average opinion
(descriptive norm) but in the direction of the prescriptive norm. They found pride was
experienced by descriptive deviants but not by prescriptive deviants (those who held
opinions different from the average in a direction away from the ideal).
Two studies were planned to examine the affective consequences of speaking out.
Study 1 examines speaking out to a larger group and Study 2 examines speaking out in a
small group context. For both studies it was generally predicted that (a) people will be
more likely to express minority opinions if they are held with moral conviction; (b)
expressing minority opinions held with moral conviction will arouse both positive (e.g.,
pride and strength) and negative affect (e.g., fear of isolation); and (c) not expressing
one’s moral convictions will arouse both positive (e.g., safety) and negative affect (e.g.,
dissonance; guilt). See Figure 1 below for an overall conceptual scheme of the predicted
antecedents and consequences of speaking out.
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Figure 1. Overall Conceptual Scheme

CHAPTER TWO
STUDY 1 OVERVIEW
While there are no issues that are universally viewed as “moral” (Wright, Cullum,
& Schwab, 2008), the target issue for Study 1 is one that many people do believe is a
moral issue: the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important
information (“torture”). Additionally, this issue has successfully been used to examine
moral conviction in several other studies regarding moral conviction (e.g., Lytle,
Aramovich, & Skitka, 2009). In this study participants were led to believe that they held
the minority attitude among their peers (fellow undergraduates at their university) toward
torture of suspected terrorists. In spiral of silence terms participants were provided
information on the opinion climate of the school. Speaking out was operationalized as
participants’ willingness to have their names along with their attitude toward torture
published in the school paper. It was expected based on prior research (Hornsey, Smith,
& Begg, 2007) that approximately one third of participants would speak out in the
present study. In Study 1 speaking out served as a dependent variable for the first stage
of analysis and in the second stage of analysis as a quasi-independent variable. The
following was predicted:
Stage 1 Hypotheses: Associations between Attitudes and Speaking Out
The following set of hypotheses concerns the relations between moral conviction,
attitude extremity, attitude certainty, and speaking-out.
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Hypothesis 1: Moral conviction will be significantly positively correlated with
speaking out.
Hypothesis 2: Attitude extremity will be significantly positively correlated with
speaking out.
Hypothesis 3: Attitude certainty will be significantly positively correlated with
speaking out.
Some prior research suggests moral conviction, certainty, and extremity should
independently predict speaking out (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), but other
research suggests that moral conviction, certainty, and extremity might be causally
related (e.g., moral conviction might increase certainty or extremity; Kaiser & Scheuthle,
2003, Kaiser, 2006). For example, Kaiser & Scheuthle (2003) tried to replicate research
that supports a moral extension of the theory of planned behavior (e.g., Manstead, 2000)
using conservationism as the target behavior. They found that adding moral norms to the
model did not improve the theory of planned behavior (TPB). As well, the correlation
between attitude and moral norms was extremely high (r = .92) leading Kaiser and
Scheuthle to conclude that moral concepts are significant antecedents of attitude, rather
than of intention, within the TPB.
Matthes, Morrison, and Schemer (2010) made a similar argument in their recent
challenge of Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) proposition that the spiral of silence only works
for moral issues. Matthes et al. speculate that individuals get deeply invested in issues
that have a moral element. This leads to high attitude certainty, and it is this high
certainty that leads to speaking out and this speaking out eventually weakens a spiral of
silence.
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Preliminary analyses of the correlations and potential causal relations between
moral conviction, extremity, and certainty will be examined. If it is found that moral
conviction is independent of both certainty and extremity, then the following is predicted:
Hypothesis 4: Moral conviction will predict unique variance beyond attitude
certainty and extremity on the measure of speaking out. In other words, when certainty
and extremity are controlled for in a hierarchical regression analysis, there will be a
statistically significant change in R² when moral conviction is added to the model. If the
preliminary analyses suggest that moral conviction is correlated with or causally related
to either of these other two variables, then hypothesis 4 would not be considered
appropriate.
Stage 2 Hypotheses: Predicting Affect
For the following hypotheses speaking out is treated as a quasi-independent
variable. Pride, strength, fear, and guilt are the dependent variables. It is expected that
moral conviction will moderate the effect of speaking out on these affective responses.
Hypothesis 5a: There will be a significant main effect of speaking out on pride
such that an increase in speaking out will be associated with increased pride. No main
effect of moral conviction is predicted.
Hypothesis 5b: There will be a significant moral conviction x speaking out
interaction predicting pride. Among participants high in speaking out, those high in
moral conviction will have higher pride scores compared to participants low in moral
conviction. Among participants low in speaking out, no difference is predicted between
participants high in moral conviction and participants low in moral conviction on
strength.
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Hypothesis 6a: There will be a main effect of speaking out on strength such that
increased speaking out will be associated with an increase in strength. No main effect of
moral conviction is predicted.
Hypothesis 6b: There will be a significant moral conviction x speaking out
interaction predicting strength. Among participants high in speaking out those high in
moral conviction will have greater strength compared to participants low in moral
conviction. Among participants low in speaking out, no difference is predicted between
participants high in moral conviction and participants low in moral conviction on
strength.
Hypothesis 7a: There will be a main effect of speaking out on guilt such that
increased speaking out will be associated with a decrease in guilt (no discrepancy
between what one does and what one ought to do). No main effect of moral conviction is
predicted.
Hypothesis 7b: Among participants low in speaking out those high in moral
conviction will have greater guilt compared to participants low in moral conviction.
Among participants high in speaking out, no difference is predicted between participants
high in moral conviction and participants low in moral conviction on guilt.
Expressing a minority opinion carries social risks. Having moral conviction about
the opinion being expressed reduces concerns about social rejection as people tend to not
seek the approval of morally dissimilar others (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka &
Bauman, 2008; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). Therefore, the following is expected.
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Hypothesis 8a: There will be a main effect of speaking out on fear of social
rejection (“fear”); increased speaking out will be associated with increased fear. No main
effect of moral conviction is predicted.
Hypothesis 8b: There will be a significant moral conviction x speaking out
interaction predicting fear. Among participants high in speaking out those high in moral
conviction will have lower fear compared to participants low in moral conviction. Among
participants low in speaking out, no difference is predicted between participants high in
moral conviction and participants low in moral conviction on fear.

CHAPTER THREE
STUDY 1 METHODOLOGY
Method
Study one consisted of two stages. For stage one a correlational research design
was used to examine the variables associated with speaking-out behavior. The predictor
variables were: moral conviction, attitude certainty, and attitude extremity. In stage two a
quasi-experimental design was used to examine post-behavior affect. Speaking out
served as a quasi-independent variable (participants self-select whether they speak out or
not). The dependent variables were: pride, guilt, strength, authenticity, and fear.
Participants
Participants (N = 150) were undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course who agreed to participate in return for one credit toward their course's
research participation requirement.
Procedure
Participants who signed up for the study were provided a link to an online survey.
After consenting to participate they were taken to the survey where they completed a
need for uniqueness measure as well as number of trait measures not used for hypothesis
testing (centrality of moral identity, ethical ideology, fear of negative evaluation, and
political ideology). Since simply responding to these measures could prime these
considerations participants were asked to complete three filler tasks (example: sentence
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unscrambling task) designed to reduce any priming of moral issues and to camouflage the
purpose of the study. Participants then completed an attitudes and moral conviction
questionnaire. The final issue on the questionnaire was the target issue (torture of
suspected terrorists). Only those with an opinion on torture (those who chose any
response option other than “uncertain”) continued with the survey. The other participants
were taken to a debriefing page and exited the survey.
Continuing participants were then asked to: (a) complete the measures of moral
conviction and degree of certainty regarding their attitude toward torture; and (b) list
three reasons to support their opinion. Those who opposed torture were presented with
(fake) information that Loyola students are strongly in favor of torture. Those who
supported torture were presented with (fake) information that Loyola students are
strongly opposed to torture.
Participants were then offered the opportunity to publicly share their position on
torture. They were given a cover story that the university newspaper (the Loyola
Phoenix) was seeking student opinions on the issue of torture and terrorism for an
upcoming article and has asked the psychology department for assistance. Participants
indicated their willingness for their opinion and supportive statements on the torture issue
- along with their full name and major - to be published (See Appendix A for exact
wording). Participants then completed the affect measures.
To check the majority influence induction participants were asked to report what
they were told earlier in the study about (a) the percentage of Loyola students that
support torture and (b) whether that statistic overestimates or underestimates support for
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torture. Participants were fully debriefed as to the true purpose of the study, thanked and
instructed to exit the survey.
Measures
Attitude certainty and extremity. The questionnaire consisted of seven issues
expected to elicit strong opinions from a college population. For each issue participants
were asked “To what extent do you oppose or support [the issue]? Response options were
on a seven point scale: -3 (strongly oppose) to +3 (strongly support) with “uncertain” as
the middle option. This item assessed both attitude direction and extremity (extremity
scores were computed by folding the attitude score over at its midpoint and coding
increasing distance from the midpoint as more extreme). This was followed with one item
to check attitude certainty (“How certain are you about your attitude?”).
Moral conviction. Following Lytle, Aramovich, and Skitka (2009) moral
conviction for each issue was assessed with two items1: To what extent does your stance
on [the issue] reflect your core moral values and convictions (1 = not at all; 5 =
extremely)? To what extent does your stance on [the issue] reflect your fundamental
beliefs about right and wrong (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely)? The last issue on the
questionnaire was the target issue (torture of suspected terrorists). Responses were
summed for the torture issue with higher scores representing greater moral conviction
about the issue (α = .92).

1

See Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, 2010 for a review on measuring moral conviction. Thus far selfreport measures have been employed. Sometimes one item (e.g., “To what extent does your stance on [the
issue] reflect your core moral values and convictions?”) is used (Mullen & Skitka, 2006); Mullen & Nadler
(2008) used four items.
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Need for uniqueness. The Need for Uniqueness Scale (NFU; Snyder & Fromkin,
1977) is a 32-item, self-report instrument. Items are measured on a 5-point scale, ranging
from 1 (Strong Disagreement) to 5 (Strong Agreement). Responses are summed. The
NFU loads on three factors: lack of concern for others reactions to one’s different ideas
and behaviors; desire to not always follow rules; and the need to defend one's beliefs
(Snyder & Fromkin). For the present study the scale was shortened to 16 items (all factor
3 items are retained) and the items were summed (α = .74).
Moral identity. The ten-item Aquino and Reed (2002) moral identity instrument
was used to assess the self-importance of an individual’s moral identity. The instrument
lists nine traits that are examples of those a moral person might have (e.g.,
compassionate, honest), followed by a number of questions about how these
characteristics relate to the participant's self (α = .86).
Ethical ideology. Ethical ideology was assessed with the eighteen-item Integrity
Scale (Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker, 2008). Sample items include "The true test of
character is a willingness to stand by one's principles, no matter what price one has to
pay," "If one believes something is right, one must stand by it, even if it means losing
friends or missing out on profitable opportunities." Each item is measured with a sevenpoint scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree). Scores were summed such that
higher scores represent a greater degree of a principled ideology, and lower scores reflect
a greater degree of an expedient ideology (α = .82).
Fear of negative evaluation. Fear of negative evaluation was assessed using six
items from Watson and Friend’s (1969) 30- item scale. According to Shoemaker, Breen,
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and Stamper (2000) these items best represent the trait fear of social isolation construct.
Items were summed to form an overall score of fear of negative evaluation (α = .86).
Speaking out. Speaking out was assessed using a method similar to Hornsey et
al. (2007). Participants were asked to indicate their willingness for their arguments in
support of their opinion on torture along with their full name and major to be published
(on a scale from 1 - no desire at all to 5 - very strong desire). This measure of speakingout behavior was used as it eliminates practical constraints (e.g., lack of time or
opportunity). Since participants will have already written their arguments, engaging in
the behavior takes no more effort, time, or resources than not engaging in the behavior.
Hornsey et al. found that 36% (Exp. 1) and 32% (Exp. 2) of participants (University of
Queensland undergraduate students) were willing to have their opinion, full name, and
department published in the school paper (published online and distributed throughout
Queensland). See Appendix A for exact wording.
Affect. Pride, strength, fear, authenticity, and guilt were assessed using a
modified version of an instrument used by Aramovich, Lytle, and Skitka (2010). This
instrument consists of a list of emotional adjectives (e.g., guilty, scared). Items were
added from the literature on self-conscious emotions (e.g., pride and guilt; Tangney,
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy, & Robins, 2004). Participants were instructed to
indicate to what extent they felt these emotions when deciding to have their opinions
shared with the school paper (Appendix A). Response options were on a 5-point scale (1=
not at all to 5= extremely = 1).

CHAPTER FOUR
STUDY 1 RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Data Cleanup
One hundred forty-seven participants completed the survey. The data were
screened for univariate outliers. One case was two standard deviations below the mean on
the moral identity measure. Since moral identity is one of the control variables not used
for present analysis the case was not discarded. No other univariate outliers were
detected. After looking at the distribution of missing values in the composite measures
(the control trait variables), any case with more than one missing value was discarded.
For cases with only one missing value, the missing value was replaced with the mean of
the non-missing responses for that case on the items within that scale.
Twenty-seven participants did not have an attitude toward torture (endorsed the
“undecided” response option) and their responses were discarded. Twenty-five
participants incorrectly recalled the information in the majority norm induction and were
also excluded from further analysis. Of the remaining 94 respondents, the majority of
participants (N = 70) indicated opposition to torture and the minority (N = 24) indicated
support for torture of suspected terrorists.
New Variable Created: Subjective Minority Status
Participants who indicated they support torture were told that 85% of their fellow
29

30
students oppose torture. Participants who indicated they oppose torture were told that
85% of their fellow students support torture. To check the effectiveness of the norm
induction participants were asked: “How accurate do you believe that statistic about
Loyola students’ attitudes toward torture to be?” and given three response options: (a) I
believe it is accurate; (b) I believe it underestimates support for torture; and (c) I believe
it overestimates support for torture. Using their responses a new variable was created:
subjective minority status (SMS).
If participants opposed to torture endorsed (a) or (b) they were deemed to hold
subjective minority status. If they chose (c) they were deemed to not have SMS (although
they might since it is unknown to what degree they believed the statistic to be an
overestimation of support for torture; e.g., they could believe that 75% of their fellow
students support torture.)
Participants who supported torture who endorsed (a) or (c) were deemed to hold
subjective minority status. If they chose (b) they were considered not to have SMS
(although they might since it is unknown to what degree they believe the statistic
underestimates support for torture; e.g., they could believe that 25% of their fellow
students support torture.)
SMS was coded 0 for “unknown”; and 1 for “yes.” To summarize, “yes” means
the participant believed he/she holds the minority opinion regarding torture. “Unknown”
means the participant may or may not have believed he/she holds the minority opinion
regarding torture. The results of the subjective norm induction are presented in Table 1.
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Overall, 27 participants (28.7%) were considered to have SMS and 67 participants
(71.3%) were considered unknown with respect to SMS.
Table 1. Subjective Minority Status, Study 1
Attitude / Social
Norm Induction

How accurate do you believe
Frequency
that statistic to be?

Support torture
(N = 24).
Told that 85%
oppose.

Accurate

14
(58.3%)

Yes

14
(58.3%)

It underestimates support for
torture

10
(41.7%)

Unknown

10
(41.7%)

Yes

13
(18.6%)

Unknown

57
(81.4%)

Unknown

67
(71.3%)

Yes

27
(28.7%)

Accurate

Oppose torture
(N = 70).
Told that 85%
support.

Subjective Minority
Status

It underestimates support for
torture
It overestimates support for
torture

9
(12.9%)
4
(5.7%)
57
(81.4%)

Total (N = 94)

Stage 1 Results: Attitudes and Speaking out
Descriptive Statistics
The majority of participants were unwilling to speak out: 44.7% “very
unwilling”; 19.1% “somewhat unwilling”; 16% “unsure”; 14.9% “somewhat willing”;
and 5.3% “very willing.” The frequencies histogram showed the distribution of speaking
out to be highly positively skewed. Extreme values for skewness are values greater than
+3 or less than -3 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). In this case the value for skewness was
.493 indicating extreme skewness.
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The means and standard deviations of the predictor variables and speaking out are
presented in Table 2. Independent sample t-tests were conducted to compare the support
torture participants and the oppose torture participants on speaking out and on the
predictor variables. The t-tests revealed statistically significant differences between the
two groups on the majority of the variables (Table 2). Importantly, there is a significant
difference in speaking out for participants who support torture (M = 1.58, SD = .97) and
participants who oppose torture (M = 2.37, SD = 1.33); t(54.45) = 3.09, p = .008.
Because of these differences it was decided to conduct hypothesis testing using only
those participants who oppose torture (N = 70).
Table 2. Comparison of Variables by Direction (Support/Oppose Torture), Study 1
Variable

t-Testsa

Means
Support

Oppose

Total

df

Moral Conviction

5.63

8.03

7.41

-5.20***

92

Extremity

1.63

2.33

2.15

-4.07***

92

Certainty

3.46

3.89

3.78

-1.77

88

Speaking outa

1.58

2.37

2.17

-3.09**

54.45

Subjective Minority Statusa

.58

.19

.29

3.52**

33.05

Note. aLevene’s test for equality of variances is significant, therefore the “equal variances not assumed”
row from t-test is shown.*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Hypothesis Testing
As seen in Table 3 the correlation between speaking out and moral conviction was
positive but not statistically significant. Importantly moral conviction was highly
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correlated with both extremity (r = .62, p < .001) and certainty (r = .79, p <.001).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that moral conviction would predict unique variance beyond
attitude certainty and extremity on the measure of speaking out. However, because of the
high correlations between moral conviction, certainty and extremity testing hypothesis 4
is not considered appropriate.1
Table 3. Correlations Between Predictor Variables and Speaking Out, Study 1
Extremity

Certainty

Moral
conviction

Extremity

1

Certainty

.67**

1

Moral conviction

.62**

.79**

1

.17

.19

.17

Speaking out
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Stage 2 Results: Predicting Affect
Descriptive Statistics
In stage two the predictive value of moral conviction and speaking out on
affective states were examined. The dependent variables were created by summing
participants’ responses to the affective states checklist. The internal consistency of each
scale was also checked.
Fear: “reluctant,” “afraid”, “nervous”, and “embarrassed” were summed (α = .83).
Strength: “weak” was reverse coded and summed with “strong”, “powerful”, and

1

In spite of these concerns a hierarchal regression analysis was conducted to test H4. Certainty and
Extremity were entered at step one and MC was entered at step two. The block containing extremity and
certainty did not account for any significant variance in speaking-out, R2 =.038, F(2, 63) = 1.24, ns. The
addition of moral conviction in block 2 did not improve prediction, R2 change = .003, F(1,62) = .178, ns).
Contrary to prediction moral conviction did not explain unique variance in speaking-out.
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“assertive” (α = .77). Pride: The pride scale consists of one item (“proud”). Guilt:
“guilty” and “ashamed” were summed (α = .76). Authenticity: “fake” (reverse coded) and
“authentic” were summed. This scale had extremely low reliability (α = .15) and was not
used in hypothesis testing.
The distributions of the scales were examined. The ratio of each scale’s skewness
to its standard error was calculated as was the ratio of each scale’s kurtosis to its standard
error. Strength and pride were normally distributed. Guilt and fear were significantly
positively skewed.
Hypothesis Testing
For Hypotheses 5-8 four separate regression analyses were conducted to examine
the main and interactive effects of moral conviction and speaking out on: pride, strength,
guilt, and fear. Speaking out (centered) and moral conviction (centered) were entered in
step 1 (Aiken & West, 1991). The speaking out by moral conviction interaction term
(based on centered scores) was entered in step 2 (see Table 4).
Table 4. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Moral Conviction (MC), Study 1
SO

MC

SO x MC

Pride

.20†

.07

.02

Strength

.86**

.56*

.02

Guilt

-.13

-.04

.04

Fear

-.53

-.01

.14

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.
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Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported. The main effect of speaking out on
pride did not reach significance B = 20, t = 1.84, p = .069, although the zero-order
correlation between pride and speaking out was significant, r = .24, p = .023. The
speaking out by moral conviction term predicting pride was not significant.
Hypothesis 6a was supported. There was a significant main effect of speaking out
on strength, B = .86, t = 2.93, p = .005. There was also a significant main effect of moral
conviction on strength, B = .56, t =.265, p = .010. Hypothesis 6b however, was not
supported; the interaction between speaking out and moral conviction on strength was not
significant.
Hypotheses 7a and 7b were not supported. No significant main effect of speaking
out on guilt was found. The speaking out by moral conviction term predicting guilt was
not significant. Hypotheses 8a and 8b were similarly not supported. There was neither a
significant main effect of speaking out on fear nor was the interaction term significant.
Additional Analyses
Subjective Minority Status
Subjective minority status (SMS) was examined as a predictor variable because
the normative influence manipulation was unexpectedly ineffective (and difficult to
interpret as described above). The following three-step regression analysis was
conducted for each affect variable. Speaking out, moral conviction, and SMS were
entered at step 1, all three pairs of two-way interaction terms (SO x MC, SO x SMS, SMS
x MC) were entered at step 2 and the three-way interaction term (SO x MC x SMS) was
entered at step 3. Summaries of these regressions are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. Three-Way Interactions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out,
Subjective Minority Status, and Moral Conviction, Study 1
Pride

Guilt

Strength

Fear

Speak out (SO)

.21†

-.11

.87**

-.48

Moral conviction (MC)

.08

-.02

.57

.04

Subjective Minority Status (SMS)

.24

.55

.36

1.46

SO x MC

.03

.06

.03

.15

SO x SMS

.03

1.18**

-.47

1.86†

MC x SMS

-.06

.51**

-.55

1.03†

SO x MC x SMS

-.27

-.04

-.42

-.17

Note. N = 70. All variables centered at their means except for SMS (coded 0, 1). † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01,
*** < .001.
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. The threeway interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 3.

Pride. Results from this three step regression revealed that SMS did not interact
with speaking out or moral conviction to predict pride in the two-way interactions (Table
5). The three-way interaction was also non-significant.
Strength. Results revealed that SMS did not interact with speaking out or moral
conviction to predict strength in the two-way interactions. The three-way interaction was
also non-significant. There were however significant main effects of moral conviction, B
= .57, t = 2.64, p = .010, and speaking out on strength, B = .87, t = 2.93, p = .005
Fear. As can be seen in Table 5 the regression revealed that SMS did not interact
with moral conviction or speaking out to predict fear in the two-way interactions. The
three-way interaction was also non-significant.
Guilt. The three-way interaction (SMS x MC x SO) on guilt was not significant.
However, there was a significant SMS x SO interaction, B = 1.18, t = 3.54, p =.001; for
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participants with SMS speaking out was associated with an increase in guilt; for
participants without SMS the speaking out was associated with a non-significant decrease
in guilt (Figure 2). There was also a significant SMS x MC interaction, B = .51, t = 2.88,
p =.005. Simple slopes tests revealed that increased moral conviction was associated
with increased guilt for those with SMS, B = .40, t = 2.53, p = .010. For those without
SMS, there was a non-significant negative association between moral conviction and
guilt (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Interaction between subjective minority status (SMS) and speaking
out (SO) on guilt, Study 1.

Figure 3. Interaction between subjective minority status (SMS) and moral conviction
(MC) on guilt, Study 1.
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Need for Uniqueness
While not included in the original set of hypotheses, the significant correlation
between the control variable need for uniqueness and speaking out (r = .36, p = .002)
called for further investigation. It was decided to test whether moral conviction enhances
the effect of need for uniqueness on speaking out. A moderated regression analysis was
conducted. As expected, based on earlier analyses, the main effect of moral conviction
predicting speaking out was not significant. However, there was a significant main effect
of need for uniqueness predicting speaking out, B = .05, t = 3.06, p = .003. There was
also a significant need for uniqueness x moral conviction interaction on speaking out, B =
.02, t = 2.23, p = .029. The simple slopes tests revealed that for participants with high
need for uniqueness moral conviction was positively associated with speaking out, B =
.29, t = 2.53, p = .014. However, for those with low need for uniqueness, there was a
non–significant negative relation between moral conviction and speaking out, B = -.05, t
= -.46, p = .650. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. Interaction between need for uniqueness (NFU) and moral conviction (MC) on
speaking out, Study 1.

CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY 1 DISCUSSION
Study 1 examined the relations between moral conviction, speaking out and postspeaking-out affect. Hypotheses 1-3 predicted significant positive correlations between
speaking out and moral conviction, certainty, and extremity. While the correlations were
positive they did not reach statistical significance. These results do not fit with prior
research or theory. Possible explanations include the nature of the speaking-out option
(names and opinions published), and the weakness of the normative influence induction.
Study 2 should correct for those issues.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that moral conviction would predict unique variance
beyond attitude certainty and extremity on the measure of speaking out. This was not
supported. While the model did not meet the several of the required assumptions of
multiple regression the larger concern is theoretical. Moral conviction was strongly
correlated with indices of attitude strength (most strongly with attitude certainty). This
implies that moral conviction may not be a construct unique from certainty but rather a
characteristic that ‘breeds” certainty. This finding lends support to some recent research
(see Kaiser & Scheuthle, 2003; Matthes, Morrison, & Schemer, 2010). Based on the
present findings it may not be appropriate in Study 2 to control for extremity and
certainty when using moral conviction to predict affect.
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For Hypotheses 5-8 four separate regression analyses were conducted to examine
the main and interactive effects of moral conviction and speaking out on: pride, guilt,
strength, and fear.
As predicted, a main effect was found for speaking out on strength. This suggests
that the act of speaking out by agreeing to have one’s minority opinion published is
associated with a sense of strength. Study 2 should further examine this finding by
measuring strength prior to speaking out as well as after. This will allow for conclusions
to be drawn regarding direction of causality. Contrary to predictions no main effects were
found for speaking out on pride, guilt, or fear. There was however, a significant
correlation between speaking out and pride.
While not predicted there was a significant main effect of moral conviction on
strength. This suggests that simply having the minority status of one’s moral convictions
made salient (through the normative influence induction) is enough to elicit a feeling of
strength.
In this study the effects of speaking out on the affect variables were not
moderated by moral conviction. This could be due to methodology. The way speaking
out was operationalized is somewhat problematic. People may have numerous reasons
other than those identified earlier in this paper (e.g., fear of isolation) for not wanting to
express their moral convictions via publication (e.g., privacy concerns). Participants were
asked to allow their full names to be published along with their opinion – accessible
indefinitely to future employers, etc.
As described above subjective minority status (SMS) was examined as an
additional predictor variable. A three-way moderated regression analysis (speaking out x

41
moral conviction x SMS) was conducted for each affect variable. While the three-way
interaction was not significant the two-way interaction between SMS and moral
conviction on guilt was significant. However, the pattern of the interaction was the
opposite of what was expected - for participants with subjective minority status, high
moral conviction was associated with increased guilt. For those without SMS, there was
no relation at all between moral conviction and guilt. This suggests that participants felt
guilty for holding moral convictions different from their peers. This may be due to the
way guilt was measured – guilty and ashamed were combined to form the guilt scale.
Higgins (1987) suggests that shame involves feeling that one has been lowered in the
esteem of others, whereas guilt involves feeling that one has broken one's own standards
and rules. It is possible that the sense of shame was aroused when people were made to
feel different from those they value (other Loyola students). The measure of guilt in
study 2 should be subjected to a factor analysis to test whether guilt and shame can be
considered the same construct for purposes of this project.
There was also a significant subjective minority status x speaking out interaction
predicting guilt. For participants with subjective minority status, speaking out was
positively associated with guilt. For those without subjective minority status, there was
no relation at all between speaking out and guilt. This suggests that participants felt guilty
for publicly proclaiming their opinion when they believed their opinion was in the
minority. This fits somewhat with prior research that found that when minority opinion
holders publicly voice their opinions feelings of discomfort and reduced self-esteem are
elicited (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998). Study 2 should include a “psychological
discomfort” measure to specifically tap dissonance in order to better distinguish between
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feelings of guilt and the discomfort brought about by self-other disagreement (and
intrapersonal dissonance).
Limitations of Study 1
The majority of participants in Study 1 were not willing to speak out by having
their full name and opinion published (76% either unwilling to speak out or unsure; 24%
somewhat or very willing to speak out). This is significantly lower than the percentages
found by Hornsey et al. (2007; Study 1: 65% little desire to have their opinion published;
35% some desire; Study 2: 68% - little desire; 32% some desire). This could be due to a
variety of differences between the Hornsey studies and the present study including the
different populations sampled (Australian vs. American students) or study administration
(lab-based versus online) to name a few.
Priming concerns: It is possible that the act of measuring “moral identity,” “fear
of negative evaluation,” etc. before participants completed the speaking out and affect
measures may have primed these considerations and produced response patterns that
would otherwise not have emerged. In order to mitigate this risk, participants completed
filler tasks between these individual difference measures and the speaking-out measure.
To further address this concern Study 2 will be designed to collect data at two time
points. All the trait measures can then be collected at Time 1 so priming will not be a
concern when behavior and affect are measured at Time 2.
Normative influence induction. Perhaps the most important problem with Study 1
is the weakness of the normative influence induction. The majority of participants did not
believe what they were told in the normative influence induction (that 85% of fellow
students support torture). The manipulation may simply not have been strong enough to
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overcome participants’ perceptions of their fellow students’ attitudes. The manipulation
check itself was also problematic (see detailed discussion above regarding subjective
minority status).

CHAPTER SIX
STUDY 2 OVERVIEW
Study 2 expands on Study 1 in several ways: speaking out is operationalized
differently; the affect measures include more items to better assess each affect variable
(e.g., distinguishing between general fear and fear of isolation; adding a measure of
dissonance); and the methodology was changed in several ways. Study 1 was conducted
at one time point. Participants shared their attitudes toward torture along with brief
supportive statements, were exposed to a normative influence, were asked if they would
be willing to have their attitudes and supporting statements published along with their full
name, and finally completed affect measures. Study 2 took place at two time points.
Attitude toward the target issue, moral conviction, pretest affect, and selected personality
traits was assessed at Time 1. In addition, religious conviction regarding the issue was
included. The normative influence, the speaking-out opportunity, and the assessment of
posttest affect took place at Time 2.
Reference Group
Study 1 examined the consequences of speaking out to a large group of peers
(guided in many ways by spiral of silence theory) whereas Study 2 examines the affective
consequences of speaking out in a small group. Normative pressure has been found to be
most powerful in small groups comprised of peers of the participant where the other
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group members are unanimous in their opposing opinion (Allen, 1965; Bond & Smith,
1996).
Operationalization of Speaking Out
In Study 1 participants were asked to rate their willingness to speak out by sharing
(via publication in the school paper) the opinion they had just provided regarding torture.
They were not given the option to change their opinion toward or against the group norm.
In Study 2 opinions were assessed at two time points allowing for change to be measured.
At Time 1 participants provided their attitude privately. Time 1 participants who did not
have an attitude (indicated “uncertain” on attitude measure) were not called back for
Time 2. At Time 2 participants were asked to share their opinions publicly to a small
group after the normative influence. Participants were also given the option to remain
silent (“prefer not to share my opinion”). The silence option was included as it is an
option available in real life. Speaking out was operationalized as maintaining one’s Time
1 stance on the issue at Time 2. Participants who switched sides or moved to “uncertain”
(the middle option on the oppose-support attitude measure) at Time 2 were considered to
have conformed. The term speaking out was reserved for those participants who did not
abandon their stance on the issue. This terminology is in line with how other researchers
have operationalized speaking out when using a similar conformity paradigm (e.g., Lytle,
Aramovich, & Skitka, 2009; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2010). Additionally the
psychological experience of completely abandoning one’s stance is likely to be quite
different from merely weakening one’s opinion in the direction of the group norm. To
take one example, a juror who initially votes guilty and changes her vote to not guilty
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after negotiations to conform with the majority likely experiences a stronger set of
emotional consequences than if she told the other jurors that she is not as sure as she was
at the beginning of negotiations but she still votes guilty. In this study speaking out is
considered qualitatively different from conforming.
The importance of including silence as a response option was noted earlier in the
discussion on the affective consequences of simple exposure to a normative influence. In
particular dissonance can be aroused in one of two ways: self-other inconsistency (Matz
& Wood, 2005 citing Heider's 1958 balance theory) and intrapersonal inconsistency
(Festinger 1957, cited in Matz & Wood). Matz & Wood tested whether attitude
heterogeneity in groups is experienced as dissonance. Participants were presented with
other group members’ attitudes on a controversial issue and then reported their emotions
on a self-report measure of dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994). They found that
participants in a group with others who disagreed reported more psychological
discomfort than those in a group with others who agree – even when told they would not
be asked to interact with the dissenting group.
To prepare for Study 2 pilot testing was conducted to identify an appropriate
target issue (e.g., one with a more normal distribution of moral conviction scores),
ascertain the believability of the computer-based normative influence, and determine if
the proposed research paradigm would result in a sufficient number of speak out versus
conform participants necessary to test the hypotheses.
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Pilot Test 1
Study 1 found that the issue of torture of suspected terrorists did not provide
adequate variation in moral conviction scores. Pilot Test 1 was conducted to identify an
issue with greater variation in moral conviction and one that is not so closely tied to
religion. Three criteria were used to assess possible target issues:
1. The correlations between moral conviction and other indices of attitude strength
(extremity and certainty) should be lower than those found for torture (in order to
examine the unique influence of moral conviction on the dependent variables). The
results of Study 1 found that for torture the correlations between moral conviction and
certainty (r = .79); and moral conviction and extremity (r = .62) were moderately strong.
Moral conviction should also not be highly correlated with issue-specific religious
conviction.
2. The issue should have greater variability in moral conviction than torture (SD = 1.85).
3. The moral conviction scores for torture were extremely skewed (79% high moral
conviction). High is defined as scores of 7-10; low 6 and below (6 = not sure). Moral
conviction scores should be more evenly distributed between high and low.
Participants and Procedures
Participants (N = 42) were recruited from a psychology 101 course in the spring
of 2012 and completed a brief anonymous paper and pencil survey. As compensation for
their time participants were entered into a raffle for one of four $30.00 bank cards. The
survey took less than ten minutes to complete. The survey assessed attitudes toward
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animal rights . Four different animal rights issue statements were presented (treatment of
1

pets; farm animals; medical testing to save human lives; product testing) and participants
were asked to indicate the extent to which they opposed or supported the issue (-3 to +3).
For each issue moral conviction (two items), religious conviction (one item), and
certainty (one item) was assessed. Extremity was assessed by folding over the attitude
direction score.
Results
Of the four animal rights issues “using animals for medical testing” had the most
normal distribution of moral conviction scores (the other three were extremely skewed).
For that issue, the correlations between moral conviction and extremity (r = .31); and
certainty (r = .24) were lower than the correlations found for torture. Additionally the
correlation between moral conviction and religious conviction was weak (r = .25). With
respect to the other criteria the standard deviation of moral conviction was the same as
torture and the distribution of low/ high moral conviction scores was 22% to 78% (same
as torture).
Although the Pilot Test 1 data for the animal rights issue did not immediately
discount the possibility of using this issue in the main analyses, it was also clear that this
issue did meet all of the desired criteria. Since Study 1 had already considered the desired
criteria with regard to a number of issues, it was reexamined for additional potential
target issues. The “lowering the legal drinking age to 18” issue from Study1 met all the
criteria. The standard deviation of moral conviction was 2.46 (> torture). The distribution
1

The animal rights issue was chosen as national polling indicates that it is a controversial issue and one that
many view as a moral issue (Saad, 2011). For example, 38% of respondents stated that medical testing on
animals was “morally wrong” whereas 55% indicated it was “moral acceptable” (Saad).
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of low/ high moral conviction scores was 57% to 43% (more evenly distributed than the
torture issue). Additionally, the correlations between moral conviction and extremity (r =
.31); and moral conviction and certainty (r = .24) were lower than those found for the
torture issue.
Pilot Test 2
Pilot Test 2 was conducted in the summer of 2012 to (a) test the believability of
the computer-based conformity paradigm; (b) test the variability of responses to the speak
out options (to ensure there will be a sufficient number of participants who “speak out”
versus “remain silent” or “conform”); and (c) examine the distribution of moral
conviction scores for the two potential target issues. Based on the results of Pilot Test 1
and Study 1 two possible target issues were identified: Lowering the legal drinking age
to 18 (Study 1); and medical testing on animals (Pilot Test 1).
Participants and Procedures
Participants (N = 17) were students at a Midwestern university. Recruitment was
conducted via flyers posted on campus. Each participant received a $15.00 gift card in
exchange for participation. Participants reported to a laboratory in groups of two to four.
The sessions were run by one experimenter. Participants were told that they would
complete a number of brief surveys; participate in an online chat with a group of four
other participants to share opinions regarding a social issue; and then meet their group
face-to-face for a brief discussion about the issue. Participants completed a number of
surveys in which the items regarding the two target issues were embedded to assess Time
1 attitudes. Filler tasks were then completed (designed to mask the purpose of the study).
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The program then instructed participants to enter a chat room. The program
randomly assigned participants to either the lowering the legal drinking age chat room or
the animal rights chat room. 2 Participants introduced themselves to the group by
entering a username of their choice. The program informed participants that they would
share their opinions in a randomly determined order. However participants always shared
their opinion last after viewing four other group members who indicated that they held
the opposite opinion on the target issue. The opinions of the other members were
displayed on the computer screen at 10 to 11 second intervals. After viewing the other
members’ opinions, participants were asked to share their own opinion, using the same 7point scale used to assess their Time 1 attitude (strongly oppose, moderately oppose,
slightly oppose, uncertain, slightly support, moderately support, and strongly support).
There was also a radio-button labeled “prefer not to share.” They were then instructed to
log out of the group discussion. The next page on the website was a manipulation check.
Participants were then debriefed.
Results
As in Pilot Study 1 “lowering the legal drinking age” was superior to animal
testing with respect to distribution of the attitude scores (Figure 5). The distribution of
moral conviction scores for the animal rights issue was significantly negatively skewed
(82.4% high moral conviction) compared to lowering the drinking age (58.8% high moral

2

Four versions of the fake chat room were created. Participants assigned to the drinking age issue who
supported the issue earlier in the survey were sent to a chat room where the group members all opposed
lowering the drinking age; those who opposed the issue were sent to a chat room where the group members
all supported it. Participants assigned to the animal rights issue who indicated support were sent to a chat
room where the group members all opposed the issue; those who opposed animal rights were sent to a chat
room where the group members all supported animal rights.

51
conviction). High was defined as scores of 7-10; low 6 and below (possible scores: 2-10).
Moral conviction scores should be more evenly distributed between high and low.

Figure 5. Histograms showing mean moral conviction scores for “lowering the drinking
age” and “medical testing on animals” for Pilot Test 1.
Across both issues the majority of participants spoke out by maintaining their
original position (70.6%); 17.6% moved toward the norm but did not switch sides. One
participant counter-conformed (moved further away from norm). One person conformed
by switching sides. No one opted for the silent (prefer not to say) option. In the animal
testing issue one participant conformed, seven spoke out and one counter-conformed. In
the lowering the drinking age issue, three participants moved toward the norm but did not
switch sides and five spoke out.
To test for believability a number of manipulation check questions were
administered. The first was “What do you think this study was about?” The majority
guessed that the study was about “how people react to the opinions of others.”
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When asked “Did you know the interaction was not with other participants
DURING the online interaction?” six participants (35.3%) said “yes” and eleven (64.7%)
indicated “no.” Upon follow up “What made you suspect that the online interaction was
not real?” participants indicated the timing of the other respondents answers in the chat
was too orderly and too fast. They also believed that the “chat” would allow for further
interaction with their group members and when that did not happen they became
suspicious. Conversations with participants after the study also highlighted problems with
the usernames of the fake participants not being believable.
Based on the results of these pilot tests, it was decided to use lowering the legal
drinking age as target issue in the main study; have usernames for the chat room consist
of participant initials plus month and day of birth; to increase and stagger the response
times of the fake group members in the chat room; and to inform participants in advance
that the chat room would not be a normal chat room as there would not be an opportunity
to freely expand on their responses to the posed questions (See Appendix C for research
protocol).
Stage 1 Hypotheses: Regarding Speaking Out
For the first set of hypotheses speaking out is the dependent variable:
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that people high in moral conviction will be more
likely to speak out and less likely to conform or stay silent compared to participants low
in moral conviction.
Hypothesis 2: It is predicted that people high in need for uniqueness will be more
likely to speak out and less likely to conform or stay silent compared to participants low
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in need for uniqueness.
Stage 2 Hypotheses: Predicting Affect
For the second set of hypotheses speaking out is treated as a predictor variable,
the dependent variables are: fear, dissonance, guilt, fear of isolation, communication
apprehension, self-assurance, and safety. Moral conviction is treated as a moderator
variable.
Hypotheses 3-7 (Main Effects)
Significant main effects of speaking out on affect are expected. Specifically, it is
expected that speaking out will have both positive (e.g., increased self-assurance) and
negative (e.g., fear of isolation) consequences. Table 6 presents the specific main effects
of speaking out that are hypothesized.
Table 6. Predicted Main Effects of Speaking Out, Study 2
Hypothesis

Affective Response

Direction of Main Effect

H3

Fear

Positive

H4

Fear of isolation

Positive

H5

Communication apprehension

Positive

H6

Self-assurance

Positive

H7

Safety

Negative

Dissonance and guilt are more complicated as these affective states can be
aroused by both conforming and non-conforming. Self-other dissonance (aroused by nonconforming or simple exposure to a dissenting group) and intrapersonal dissonance
(conforming) are both experienced as psychological discomfort (Pool, Wood, & Leck,
1998). As seen in Study 1 guilt can also be aroused by both speaking out (going against
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the group) and conforming or remaining silent (not following the Western norms of
independence and speaking one’s mind). Thus, no main effects of speaking out on
dissonance or guilt are hypothesized.
Hypotheses 8-12 (Interactions)
It is predicted that moral conviction will moderate the effects of speaking out such
that moral conviction will buffer the predicted negative emotional consequences and
enhance the predicted positive emotional consequences of speaking out. The following
interactions are predicted:
Hypothesis 8: It is predicted that the main effect of speaking out on the three
types of fear reactions (fear, fear of isolation, and communication apprehension) depends
on level of moral conviction. For participants both high and low in moral conviction it is
expected that speaking out will be associated with an increase in fear reactions, however
a spreading interaction is predicted such that this effect will be stronger for participants
with low moral conviction than for participants with high moral conviction; moral
conviction is expected to function as a buffer for the fears commonly associated with
speaking out.
Hypothesis 9: An interaction between speaking out and moral conviction
predicting dissonance is expected. Based on research by Matz & Wood (2005) it is
expected that self-other dissonance (aroused when going against the group) may be a
stronger predictor of dissonant feelings than intrapersonal dissonance (aroused when
going against oneself). No main effect of speaking out on dissonance was predicted
because these two sources of dissonance are expected to cancel each other out across
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levels of moral conviction. The following crossover interaction is predicted:
Hypothesis 9a: Among participants high in moral conviction those who conform
will experience more dissonance than those who are silent but less dissonance than those
who speak out. This prediction assumes that when one denies one’s moral convictions
(by refusing to speak or by actively denying one’s true beliefs) intrapersonal dissonance
will be aroused to a greater extent than the self-other dissonance most people experience
when going against the group norm.
Hypothesis 9b: Among participants low in moral conviction those who speak out
will experience more dissonance than those who are silent and those who are silent will
experience more dissonance than those who conform. Concerns about intrapersonal
consistency are likely to be less of a concern when one’s attitude is not held with moral
conviction. Thus, self-other dissonance is more likely to be aroused for the low moral
conviction group.
Hypothesis 10: No main effect of speaking out on guilt was predicted since, as
noted earlier, guilt can be aroused by both speaking out (going against the group) and
conforming or remaining silent (not speaking one’s mind). However a crossover
interaction is expected between speaking out and moral conviction predicting guilt. This
is based on the assumption that when moral conviction is high the type of guilt aroused
by not speaking one’s mind will trump any guilt that may be aroused by going against the
group. Specifically it is predicted that for participants with high moral conviction those
who speak out will have lower guilt than those who conform or stay silent (“not speaking
one’s mind” guilt will be aroused in this condition). However, for participants with low
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moral conviction those who speak out will have more guilt than those who conform or
stay silent (“going against the group” guilt will be aroused in this condition). The
predicted interaction is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Predicted interaction between speaking out and moral conviction on guilt, Study
2.
Hypothesis 11: A positive relation between speaking out and self-assurance is
predicted for participants both high and low in moral conviction. However, a spreading
interaction is predicted such that the positive relation will be stronger for those with high
moral conviction than for those with low in moral conviction. In other words moral
conviction is expected to enhance feelings of self-assurance when people speak out.
Hypothesis 12: A spreading interaction between moral conviction and speaking
out predicting safety is hypothesized. It is predicted that for participants both high and
low in moral conviction there will negative relation between speaking out and sense of
safety. However, this effect is expected to be stronger for participants low in moral
conviction than for participants high in moral conviction. In other words, moral
conviction is expected to confer some degree of protection against the decrease in sense
of safety people tend to feel when speaking out.

CHAPTER SEVEN
STUDY 2 METHODOLOGY
Method
Data were collected at two time points. At Time 1 participants completed an
online attitude survey. Baseline affect levels were also assessed for control purposes.
Participants were called back no less than two weeks later for Time 2. The minimum
delay of two weeks was important to ensure that participants did not simply remember
their Time 1 responses and re-report at Time 2. At Time 2 participants were subjected to
a normative influence manipulation; provided (or not) their attitude toward lowering the
drinking age, and completed the measures of affect.
Research Design
The predictor and moderator variables (speaking out and moral conviction) were
measured, not manipulated, and so the research design is considered a 2 (moral
conviction: high; low) x 3 (speaking out: speak out; conform; silent) between subjects
quasi-experiment. The dependent variables are: fear; dissonance; fear of isolation; safety;
communication apprehension; self-assurance; and guilt1
Calculating Sample Size
Before recruitment the minimum sample size for multiple regressions was
calculated. The desired number of participants was calculated based on two rules-of1

Three additional variables were created later for additional investigation: overall positive; overall negative
and net positive affect.
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thumb described by Green (1991). For testing an overall multiple regression model Green
suggests the-rule of thumb of N ≥ 50 +8k where k is the number of predictors. In this case
there were two predictor variables (speaking out and moral conviction), three control
variables (extremity, certainty, pretest affect), and one interaction term (speaking out x
moral conviction). This yields N > 98.
To test the significance of each predictor Green’s second rule of thumb was used:
104 + k. This yields N >110. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend using at least the
larger of the two rules of thumb calculations. In this case the first rule of thumb yields the
larger number: N > 110. This minimum number should have enough power to detect a
medium effect size (Tabachnick & Fidell). It is noted however that greater N is needed if
there are violations of the regression assumptions, high correlations between predictor
variables (as expected between the attitude variables), or if the ability to detect a weaker
effect size is desired (Tabachnick & Fidell).
Time 1 Participants and Procedure
Participants (N = 175) were undergraduates at a Midwestern university.
Recruitment was conducted via an online posting and participants received credit toward
their Psychology 101 experiment requirement. Participants were emailed a link to a
survey (See Appendix B for Time 1 and Time 2 data collection materials). The survey
first requested that participants enter their initials, month and day of birth as a username
that would subsequently be used to link their Time 1 and Time 2 responses. They were
then directed to complete the following:
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Time 1 Measures
Attitudes. The items used to assess attitudes about the target issue were
embedded in a questionnaire that contained five issues in order to mask the issue of
interest (Appendix B). Participants’ position on the target issue was assessed with one
item, “Do you oppose or support lowering the legal drinking age to 18?” Response
options were on a 7-point scale anchored by strongly oppose (-3) to strongly support
(+3). The middle option was uncertain (0). For each issue attitude extremity, attitude
certainty, religious conviction, and moral conviction were assessed.
Certainty was assessed with, “How certain are you about your attitude?”
Participants responded on a 5-point scale anchored by not at all (1) to extremely (5) with
higher scores indicating higher levels of attitude certainty (M = 3.24, SD =1.06).
Issue-specific religious conviction (Morgan, Skitka & Wisneski, 2010) was
assessed with one item, “To what extent is your attitude about lowering the legal drinking
age related to your religious beliefs?” Responses were on a 5-point scale anchored by not
at all (1) to extremely (5). Higher scores indicate higher levels of religious conviction
about the issue (M = 1.79, SD = 1.27).
Extremity was determined by folding over attitude position scores such that all
negative scores were transformed to positive. Scores on extremity ranged from 1-3 with
higher scores indicating higher levels of attitude extremity (M = 1.98, SD = .75).
Moral conviction was initially assessed with two items, “To what extent does
your attitude about lowering the legal drinking age to 18 reflect your core moral values
and convictions?” and “To what extent is your attitude about lowering the legal drinking
age deeply connected to beliefs about fundamental questions of 'right' and 'wrong'?”
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Responses were on a 5-point scale anchored by not at all (1) to extremely (5). The two
items were moderately correlated (r = .62, p < .001) and were averaged to create a single
measure of moral conviction (M = 2.80, SD =1.07, α = .76)1. Since the correlation
between the items was lower than found in Study 1 (r = .89) each item was also examined
separately. The individual items and the averaged moral conviction measure had similar
correlations with speaking out: core moral values and convictions, r = .14; right and
wrong, r = .12; averaged moral conviction, r = .15. However, to fully examine any
differences between the individual items and the averaged moral conviction measure
hypothesis testing was conducted with all three measures of moral conviction. The “core
moral values and convictions” item, but not the “right and wrong” item, was found to be
a superior predictor (a greater number of significant main and interactive effects were
found in the regressions conducted with that item than in the regressions conducted with
the two-item measure and the right and wrong item). See Appendix D for a summary of
these results. Based on these findings for all analyses moral conviction was measured
with the single item, “core moral values and conviction.”
Need for uniqueness. The modified Need for Uniqueness Scale (Snyder &
Fromkin, 1977). This is the same instrument used in Study 1. Items were averaged with
higher scores indicating higher level of need for uniqueness (M = 4.55, SD = .49, α =
.77).
Affect measures. To better assess the effect of the normative influence induction
on the affective consequences of speaking out, the same affect measures were completed
1

The items were initially averaged to be consistent with Study 1 and with previous research (Aramovich,
Lytle & Skitka, 2012; Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2010; and Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka, 2009). However,
those studies had higher inter-item correlations (r = .89; r =.75; r =.82; r =.82. respectively).
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at Time 1 and Time 2. Scales from the PANAS X (Watson & Clark, 1994), an adjective
based checklist, were used to assess: fear (afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery,
shaky); guilt (guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self, disgusted with self,
dissatisfied with self; self-assurance (proud, strong, confident, bold, daring, fearless).
Safety was assessed with the PANAS X serenity subscale (calm, relaxed, at ease) plus
“safe” “relieved, “accepted by others,” and “connected with others.”
The PANAS-X can be used to assess both state and trait affects. At Time 1
participants were instructed to indicate to what extent they “feel these emotions in
general.” At Time 2 the instructions were, “indicate to what extent you feel these
emotions right NOW before meeting your fellow group members face-to-face.” Response
options were on a 5-point scale from not at all (1) to extremely (5). For the present
sample the internal consistency of all affect scales were satisfactory both for Time 1 and
Time 2 (see Table 8).
Dissonance was assessed with a three-item measure of psychological discomfort
(Elliot & Devine, 2000). Similar to the PANAS-X this instrument is also written as an
adjective checklist and consists of: uneasy, uncomfortable, and bothered. The three items
were averaged with higher scores indicating higher level of dissonance (M = 2.15, SD =
.82, α = .82).
Fear of isolation was measured with Ho and McLeod’s (2008) six-item composite
measure. On a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants
indicated their level of agreement with six statements (“I worry about being isolated if
people disagree with me.”). The six items were averaged to create a scale, with higher
scores indicating higher level of fear of isolation (M = 3.76, SD = 1.12, α = .77).
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Communication apprehension was assessed in the same manner as Ho and
McLeod (2008). On a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree),
participants indicated their level of agreement with four statements (e.g., “I’m afraid to
speak up in conversations”). The four items were averaged to create a scale, with higher
scores indicating greater communication apprehension (M = 3.04, SD = 1.15, α = .75).
Time 2 Participants
One hundred forty-two participants returned to participate at Time 2. Ten cases
were discarded because the participant held no position on the issue (indicated
“uncertain” on the attitude measure), the participant took the Time 1 survey twice before
coming into the lab, or the participant could not enter the online chat room due to
technical difficulties. The final sample (N = 132) consisted of 32 (24 %) males and 100
(76 %) females.
Time 2 Procedures
Participants reported to a laboratory in groups of four to six. They were greeted
by an experimenter and told a cover story that they would be participating in a study that
(ostensibly) examines the effect of technology on group decision making. Participants
were told that they would first meet fellow group members over the computer, where
they would share their opinions with one another. The experimenter explained that the
purpose of the computer interaction was for group members to meet each other and learn
each other’s opinions prior to a face-to-face discussion. After this initial interaction over
the computer, each group would be escorted to a second location where they would hold
their discussion and draft a short position statement about the issue. See Appendix C for
the research protocol.
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All sessions were run by two experimenters – the primary researcher and one of
three research assistants. To increase the believability of the study regardless of how
many attended any given session, participants were told that there were other groups
participating in the study in rooms “upstairs” and that their group might consist of people
from those other rooms. To make this story more convincing Experimenter A would tell
Experimenter B, that he/she had to go check on the groups upstairs. Experiment B would
respond, “Go ahead, I know we have a lot of people today.”
After hearing this overview, participants were led to private computer carrels.
They were instructed to initiate the computer program and follow the prompts.
Participants were first prompted to enter their username (initials, month and day of birth).
The program then directed participants to enter the opinion sharing room.
Once in the opinion sharing room the program displayed the usernames of the
other (fake) group members and presented text that the group would share their opinions
in a randomly determined order. However participants were always assigned to share
their opinion last (see normative influence induction in Appendix B). The opinions of the
other members were displayed on the computer screen at 10 to 20 second intervals. The
four other group members always indicated that they held the opposing position
(determined by matching usernames to Time 1 responses). Participants who opposed the
issue at Time 1 were sent to an opinion sharing room where the other group members
expressed their opinion regarding lowering the legal drinking age to 18 in the following
order, strongly support, moderately support, slightly support, and strongly support.
Participants who supported the issue at Time 1 were directed to an opinion sharing room
where the other members expressed their opinions in the following order, strongly
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oppose, moderately oppose, slightly oppose, and strongly oppose. The opinions of the
other members as well as order of presentation were held constant.
After viewing the other members’ opinions, participants were told, “(username)
now it’s you’re your turn, do you support or oppose lowering the legal drinking age to
18?” and provided with the same 7-point scale used at Time 1. In addition they were
provided with a “prefer not to share” option. After doing so, they were instructed to exit
the opinion sharing room.
The program then informed participants that they had completed the first part of
the study, and would shortly be taken upstairs to meet their groups (this page was in large
font to make it clear that there was an upcoming face-to-face meeting). They were then
instructed to complete a final set of surveys (affect measures and manipulation checks)
on the computer before being taken to the discussion room.
In reality, after completing the final surveys participants did not participate in
face-to-face discussions. Participants were verbally debriefed. The true purpose of the
study was revealed and participants were asked to not discuss the study with other
potential participants until the end of the semester as it would affect results.
Time 2 Measures
Time 2 attitude was assessed with the same attitude item used at Time 1 (To what
extent do you support or oppose lowering the legal drinking age to 18?). In addition to
the response options provided at Time 1 (a 7-point scale anchored by strongly oppose and
strongly support) an additional response option was provided: “I prefer not to answer this
question.”
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Affect (fear, safety, guilt, self-assurance, fear of isolation, communication
apprehension and dissonance) were assessed with the same instruments used at Time 1
(see Appendix B).

CHAPTER EIGHT
STUDY 2 RESULTS
Data Preparation
Attitude direction was created by transforming participants’ attitude position (-3
to +3) into support, oppose, and uncertain. Uncertain cases were discarded. Oppose was
coded as 0 and support coded as 1.
Speaking out was assessed by comparing participants’ Time 1 and Time 2
attitudes. Abandoning one’s stance by switching from oppose at Time 1 to support at
Time 2 (or vice versa), or moving to “uncertain” at Time 2 was coded as 0 (conform).
Maintaining one’s original stance by not switching sides or moving to “uncertain” was
coded as 1 (speak out). This study procedure was adopted because it replicates the
procedure used by prior research (See Chapter 6, Overview of Study 2,
Operationalization of Speaking Out). This procedure assumes that individuals who move
to “uncertain” at Time 2 do not differ from individuals who move to the opposite opinion.
Supplementary analyses were performed that do not make this assumption. Two
approaches were considered to examine whether results differ if participants who move to
“uncertain” are not treated as “conform.” One approach involves trichotomizing speaking
out with “uncertain” treated as the baseline group to which “speak” (not switch sides) and
“move” (switch sides) participants could be contrasted. A dummy-coded model was set
up and preliminary analyses were conducted. However, it became clear that since there
66
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were only seven cases in the “uncertain” group statistical assumptions of
moderated regression were being violated. Thus, another approach to examining the
effect of the “uncertain” cases was taken. Instead of the “uncertain” cases being coded as
“conform” as in the original model they were recoded as “speak out.” To do this a new
variable was created called “Speak Out New” (SON). In SON speak out was coded 1 and
included participants who did not switch sides or move to “uncertain” (N = 81); conform
was coded 0 and included participants who switched sides or moved to “uncertain” (N =
81). Supplementary analyses using SON in place of the original measure of speaking out
are presented in Appendix E.1
Three additional affect variables were created: Negative - a measure of general
negative emotion - was created by averaging the fifteen items from the fear, dissonance,
and guilt scales (α = .93 at Time 1; α = .90 at Time 2). Positive - a measure of general
positive emotion - was created by averaging the thirteen items from the safety and selfassurance scales (α = .93 at Time 1; α = .90 at Time 2). Net positive was created by
subtracting the negative scores from the positive scores (α = .93 at Time 1; α = .90 at
Time 2). Negative Affect and Positive Affect indices were created was and included in
analyses because several researchers argue that emotion is structured in terms of these
two dimensions (e.g., Abelson et al., 1982; Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; and Ottati,
Steenbergen, & Riggle, 1982). The Net Positive Affect Index was created and included in
analyses because this approximates Russell’s Evaluative Dimension score in his well-

1

To be thorough, the Stage 2 analyses were conducted using a continuous operationalization of speaking
out as well. The continuous analysis failed to yield any effects that were not already present in the
dichotomous analysis, and therefore the continuous analyses will not be reported.
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known “core affect” model (Russell, 2003). Therefore, the Positive Affect, Negative
Affect, and Net Positive Affect analyses do not test effects on novel outcome variables.
Following Wuensch (2009), for measures consisting of more than two items cases
with only one missing value were treated as follows: the missing value was replaced with
the mean of the non-missing responses for that case on the items within that scale.
Distributions were examined and outliers identified by boxplots. No cases were
deleted because either (a) they were not extreme; and/or (b) there were multiple outliers
and removing them would change the distribution dramatically.
Preliminary Data Analysis
Some preliminary statistical analyses were conducted. Specifically, the factor
structure of the pre and post affect items were examined to see if (a) pride and strength in
the self-assurance measure are separate dimensions or one dimension, and (b) guilt and
shame in the guilt measure are separate or one dimension. Principal components factor
analyses were conducted to examine the factor structure of variables at Time 1 and Time
2. Guilt (six items): Factor analyses revealed a one factor solution for guilt at both Time
1 (62.68% of variance explained) and Time 2 (57.45% of variance explained). This
suggests that for this sample guilt and shame are not separate dimensions and guilt will
be treated as a single construct for hypothesis testing. Self-assurance (five items): A two
factor solution was found for self-assurance at Time 1. The first factor consists of strong,
confident and proud; daring and fearless loaded on the second factor. A one factor
solution was revealed for self-assurance at Time 2. This suggests that for this sample
pride and strength are not separate dimensions.
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Results of the Normative Influence (Pre–Post Differences in Position)
The normative influence manipulation was considered effective if there was a
mean position shift toward the norm after the normative influence in the chat room.
Paired sample t-tests were conducted to examine changes in attitude position at Time 1
(pre-test, private) and Time 2 (in public). The paired samples t-test conducted on the
oppose sample showed a significant change in attitude position toward the group norm
between Time 1 (M = -2.00, SD = .784) and Time 2 (M = -.49, SD = 1.761); t(52) = -6.62,
p < .001). The paired samples t-test conducted on the support sample also showed a
significant change in position toward the group norm from Time 1 (M = 1.97, SD = .773)
to Time 2 (M = .33, SD = 1.723); t(78) = 9.47, p < .001). In sum, participants’ private
attitude positions tended to be different from the positions they espoused to the group.
This suggests that the normative influence was effective; participants’ position on the
issue shifted toward the group norm.
Manipulation Checks
Twelve participants failed the manipulation check by indicating “yes” to both the
first (“Did you notice anything strange about the online interaction?”) and second (“Did
you know the interaction was not with other participants DURING the online
interaction?”) manipulation check items.
Those who failed the manipulation check were compared to those who passed. It
was found that 66% of participants who failed the manipulation check spoke out
compared to 55% of participants who passed, a difference that was not statistically
significant (p = .549, FET). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the pass/fail
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participants on the Time 2 affect variables and on the measures of moral conviction,
certainty, extremity, and religious conviction; no significant differences were found
between those who failed the manipulation check and those who passed on any of the
variables. Finally the two groups were compared on attitude direction and no significant
difference was found (p = .429, FET). It was decided to not discard the manipulation
failed cases because (a) the two groups did not differ significantly on the key variables;
and (b) discarding cases would reduce power to detect effects.
Descriptive Statistics
Speaking out
The majority of participants (56%) spoke out by not switching sides when faced
with what they believed was a group of peers holding the opposing position. Forty-four
percent conformed by switching sides or choosing the middle option (uncertain).
Attitudes
Sixty percent of participants (N = 79) indicated support for lowering the legal
drinking age and 40% (N = 53) indicated opposition (degree of support or opposition is
represented by the extremity variable). The descriptive statistics for moral conviction,
certainty, extremity, and religious conviction are shown in Table 7. All attitude variables
were on a scale of 1-5 with the exception of extremity (1-3 scale). As can be seen
participants’ mean moral conviction scores were on the low side (a score of 3 indicates a
moderate level of moral conviction); certainty was higher with a mean of 3.24, and
religious conviction was quite low with a mean of 1.79, indicating that participants’
attitudes toward lowering the drinking age were not generally held with high religious
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conviction. The mean for extremity was 1.98 on a scale of 1-3. Taken as whole these
results suggest people held their attitudes toward lowering the drinking age with more
extremity and certainty than with moral conviction; and more moral than religious
conviction.
Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of the Attitude Variables for Study 2
Attitude Variable
Mean
Median
Moral conviction: Is your attitude reflective of your
core moral values and convictions?
Certainty: How certain are you about your attitude?
Religious conviction: To what extent is your position a
reflection of your religious beliefs?
Extremity: folded over from -3 to +3 attitude position
item

SD

2.85

3

1.184

3.24

3

1.057

1.79

1

1.274

1.98

2

0.751

Note: N = 132

Affect
Mean scores for the positive affect variables were higher than the mean scores for
the negative affect variables. The means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients for each scale are presented in Table 8. As can be seen the affect measures
were highly reliable at both Time 1 and Time 2.
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Table 8. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD), and Cronbach’s Alpha (α) for the Affect
Variables at Time 1 and Time 2, Study 2
Time 1
___________________

Time 2
____________________

α

M

SD

Α

M

SD

Fear

.87

2.13

.77

.82

1.51

.58

Dissonance

.82

2.16

.82

.73

1.59

.64

Guilt

.88

1.95

.80

.84

1.33

.50

Fear of isolation

.77

3.76

1.12

.78

3.54

1.10

Communication
apprehension

.75

3.04

1.15

.76

3.21

1.12

Self-assurance

.79

3.09

.67

.86

2.66

.77

Safety

.83

3.34

.63

.84

3.18

.77

Negative

.93

2.07

.69

.90

1.45

.47

Positive

.87

3.23

.60

.88

2.99

.68

1.16

1.10

1.54

.91

Net positive

Note. Paired-sample t-tests show that these pre-post normative influence affect
differences are significant.
Stage 1 Results: Regarding Speaking Out
For the first stage of analysis the predictor variables were moral conviction and
need for uniqueness; speaking out was the dependent variable. Hypothesis 1 predicted a
significant positive association between moral conviction and speaking out. Hypothesis 2
predicted a significant positive association between need for uniqueness and speaking
out. Since data were collected on certainty, extremity, and religious conviction these
variables were also examined as possible predictors of speaking out.
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Table 9 presents the correlations between speaking out, moral conviction,
extremity, certainty, religious conviction, and need for uniqueness. The correlation
between speaking out and moral conviction was in the predicted positive direction but not
significant (r = .14, p = .110). As can be seen the attitude variables were generally
moderately positively correlated with each other. Extremity is notable as it had a weak
positive correlation with moral conviction and religious conviction, yet was moderately
positively correlated with certainty. Extremity was also the only variable that had a
significant positive correlation with speaking out (r = .27, p = .002). Need for uniqueness
was not significantly correlated with speaking out or with any of the attitude variables.
Table 9. Correlations Among Study 2, Stage 1 Study Variables
SO

MC

CERT

EXT

RC

Speak out (SO)

___

Moral conviction (MC)

.14

___

Certainty (CERT)

.15†

.42**

___

Extremity (EXT)

.27**

.21*

.48**

___

Religious conviction (RC)

.06

.49**

.30**

.17*

___

Need for uniqueness (NFU)

.07

.14

.06

.01

.01

NFU

___

Note. N = 132; † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01.

Stage 2 Results: Predicting Affect
Hypotheses 3-7 predicted main effects of speaking out and moral conviction on
affect. Specifically, it was predicted that speaking out would be positively associated with
self-assurance, fear, fear of isolation, and communication apprehension, and negatively
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associated with safety. No specific predictions regarding main effects of speaking out on
guilt, dissonance, negative, positive, or net positive were made. It was also predicted that
people with high moral conviction would have higher self-assurance than people with
low moral conviction. No significant main effect of moral conviction on the other affect
variables was expected. Hypotheses 8-12 predicted that moral conviction would buffer
the negative emotions that might be aroused by speaking out as well as enhance the
positive effects of speaking out.
To test hypotheses 3-12 several sets of moderated regression analyses were
conducted. Speaking out was treated as the predictor and moral conviction as the
moderator. The dependent variables were: self-assurance, guilt, dissonance, fear,
communication apprehension, fear of isolation, and safety, negative, positive and net
positive2. To be thorough, after using moral conviction as moderator, the analyses were
repeated using the other attitude variables (certainty, extremity, religious conviction) as a
moderator. Then speaking out, moral conviction, certainty, extremity and the speaking
out by moderator (moral conviction/certainty/extremity) interaction terms were entered
each regression simultaneously to see what effects were sustained, disappeared and
emerged (religious conviction was not included as it is considered a type of moral
conviction).
Organization of Stage 2 Results
The regression results are broken up into two sections. The first section describes
2

I am presenting results that include not only the original dependent variables in Hypotheses 8-12, but also
general indices of Positive Affect, Negative Affect, and Net Positive Affect. As noted earlier in the “data
preparation” section these three indices include the same items used in the specific Affective indices and as
such do not test effects on novel outcome variables.
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the main effects of speaking out. Then the moderated regressions are presented in full.
As noted in the methods section the single item measure of moral conviction was used in
these regressions (core moral values and convictions). 3
Main Effects of Speaking Out
A correlation analysis was first conducted to allow an examination of the effects
of speaking out on affect without any controls. Then the main effects of speaking out
were examined in the speaking out by moral conviction regression analyses. It was found
that speaking out was not significantly associated with any of the affect variables. Details
of the main effects of speaking out as well as the main effects of moral conviction are
discussed in Section 2.
Moderated Regression Analyses
Four sets of two-way moderated regression analyses were conducted. First, the
hypothesized main and interactive effects of speaking out and moral conviction on each
of the ten affect variables were examined (Table 10). These analyses were repeated
replacing moral conviction with certainty, extremity, and religious conviction.4 For each
set of analyses the regressions were first run with only Time 1 affect in the models as
3

To be thorough all regressions were conducted with the two-item measure as well. In some instances
significant results were found in the regressions using the two-item measure that were not seen in the
regressions conducted with the single item measures. A summary of these are described in Appendix D.
4

While not included in the original hypotheses the main and interactive effects of speaking out and need
for uniqueness on the affect variables were also examined with a series of moderated regressions. Time 1
affect, speaking out and need for uniqueness were entered in step 1; the interaction term, speaking-out x
need for uniqueness was entered in step 2. The speaking out by need for uniqueness interaction term was
not significant in any of the analyses. The regressions did reveal that need for uniqueness significantly
predicts fear of isolation in the full sample, B = -.39, t = -5.34, < .001, such that participants with high need
for uniqueness tended to experience less fear of isolation than participants with low need for uniqueness.
The same was found in the support sample (B = -.37, t = - 4.20, p < .001) and in the oppose sample (B = .46, t = -3.72, p = .001) suggesting that the negative relation between need for uniqueness and fear of
isolation is independent of attitude direction.
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controls. Then, since moral conviction, extremity, and certainty were moderately
intercorrelated (Table 9) for each regression the two attitude variables not included in the
initial regression model were added as controls along with each two-way interaction term
to see which associations emerged as significant and which disappeared. Religious
conviction was treated as a type of moral conviction and so a separate series of
regressions were conducted in which speaking out was entered simultaneously with
religious conviction, certainty and extremity.
To prevent the stability of the regression analyses from being influenced by
multicollinearity between the predictor variables and the interaction terms, all of the
interaction terms were based on normalized scores. In all regressions speaking out was
coded such that conform=0, speak out=1. As prescribed by Cohen and Cohen (1983),
“main effects” of speaking out and moral conviction [certainty/extremity] were tested in
the second to last step, whereas the interaction effect was tested at the final step. Where
the interaction term was significant, simple slopes analysis was performed. Simple slopes
were tested by examining the effects of speaking out for respondents with high (-1 SD) or
low (+1 SD) moral conviction [certainty/extremity]. In all analyses, the effects of the
Time 1 affect were controlled for.
Speaking out by moral conviction. To examine the main and interactive effects
of speaking out and moral conviction on the ten affect variables a series of regression
analyses were conducted: the Time 1 affect variable, speaking out, and moral conviction
were entered at step 1 and the speaking out by moral conviction interaction term was
entered in step 2. See Table 10 for summaries of these analyses. Each row represents one
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of the ten affect variables. Significant regression coefficients are in bold-face font. As
seen in Table 10 no significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and moral
conviction were found for the following affect variables: fear, communication
apprehension, self-assurance, positive, and net positive. Regression analyses in which
significant effects were found are described in detail below.
Table 10. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Moral Conviction (MC), Study 2
SO

MC

SO x MC

Fear

-.14

.09†

.12

Dissonance

.01

.09†

.22*

Guilt

-.10

.09*

.11

Negative

-.10

.09*

.13

Communication apprehension

.05

-.09

.19

Fear of isolation

-.25†

.15*

-.07

Self-assurance

.18†

.01

-.02

Safe

-.08

-.04

-.32**

Positive

.10

-.02

-.13

Net positive

.18

-.08

-.25†

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables are provided in Appendix F.

Dissonance. No significant main effects predicting dissonance were found
although there was a significant moral conviction by speaking out interaction, Β = .22, t
= 2.09, p = .039. See Regression Table 1 in Appendix F. As seen in Figure 7 speaking
out was associated with a non-statistically significant increase in dissonance for those
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with high moral conviction and a non-statistically significant decrease in dissonance for
those with low moral conviction.

Figure 7. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on dissonance,
Study 2.
Since these simple slopes were not significant when using moral conviction as a
moderator, the nature of the interaction was explored further by conducting simple slopes
testing with speaking out as the moderator of moral conviction (speaking out is
theoretically the main predictor but it functions here as a moderator mathematically). The
file was split by speaking out and regressions were conducted. These tests revealed that
for people who spoke out dissonance was significantly positively associated with moral
conviction, B = .182, t = 2.40, p = .019. However, for participants who conformed there
was a non-significant negative relation between dissonance and moral conviction, B = .04, t = -.61, p = .546. These findings suggest that among participants who spoke out
those with high moral conviction had higher levels of dissonance compared to
participants with low moral conviction; among participants who conformed there was no
relation between moral conviction and dissonance.
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Guilt. The main effect of moral conviction predicting guilt was significant, B =
.09, t = 2.14, p = .034; suggesting that an increase in moral conviction is associated with
an increase in guilt. The main effect of speaking out and the interaction term were nonsignificant.
Negative. A significant main effect of moral conviction was found, B = .09, t =
2.24, p = .027, suggesting increased moral conviction is associated with increased
negative affect. The main effect of speaking out and the speaking out by moral conviction
interaction were non-significant.
Fear of isolation. The regression analyses revealed a significant positive main
effect of moral conviction predicting fear of isolation, Β = .15, t = 2.10, p = .038;
suggesting increased moral conviction is associated with increased fear of isolation. The
main effect of speaking out and the speaking out by moral conviction interaction term
were non-significant See Regression Table 4 in Appendix F.
Safety. The main effects of speaking out and moral conviction on safety were not
significant. However the interaction term, speaking out x moral conviction, was
significant, B = -.32, t = -2.69, p = .008. As seen in Figure 8 for those with high moral
conviction speaking out was associated with a statistically significant decrease in sense of
safety, B = -.42, t = -.2.47, p = .015, whereas for those with low moral conviction
speaking out was associated a non-significant increase in sense of safety, B = .21, t =
1.38, p = .172. This suggests that for those with high moral conviction conforming feels
safer than speaking out.
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Figure 8. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on
safety, Study 2.
Speaking out by certainty. To examine the main and interactive effects of
speaking out and certainty on the ten affect variables a series of regression analyses were
conducted: the Time 1 affect variable, speaking out, and moral conviction were entered at
step 1 and the speaking out by certainty interaction term was entered in step 2. As can be
seen in Table 11 only one significant effect was found. There was a significant positive
main effect of certainty predicting fear of isolation, B = .14, t =.2.02, p = .045,
suggesting an increase in certainty is associated with increased fear of isolation.
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Table 11. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Certainty, Study 2
SO

Certainty

C x SO

Fear

-.11

.01

-.16

Dissonance

-.24†

.02

.01

Guilt

-.09

.06

-.01

Negative

-.08

.02

-.05

Communication apprehension

.00

.02

.02

Fear of isolation

-.25†

.14*

.01

Self-assurance

.19†

.01

-.02

Safe

-.09

.00

-.06

Positive

.09

.01

-.01

Net positive

.14

.03

.04

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Speaking out by extremity. To examine the main and interactive effects of
speaking out and extremity on affect a series of regression analyses were conducted: the
Time 1 affect variable, speaking out, and extremity were entered at step 1 and the
speaking out by extremity interaction term was entered in step 2. As seen in Table 12 no
significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and extremity were found.
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Table 12. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Extremity, Study 2
SO

Extremity

SO x E

Fear

-.11

.00

-.15

Dissonance

.06

-.01

-.04

Guilt

-.10

.04

-.10

Negative

-.08

.01

-.11

Communication apprehension

.02

-.02

.29†

Fear of isolation

-.21

-.01

.22

Self-assurance

.16

.05

-.14

Safe

-.14

.09

-.06

Positive

.04

.09†

-.09

Net positive

.12

.06

.02

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Speaking out by religious conviction. The main and interaction effects of
speaking out and religious conviction were examined: Time 1 affect, speaking out and
religious conviction were entered at step 1 and the speaking out x religious conviction
term was entered in step 2. No significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and
religious conviction on: fear, communication apprehension, fear of isolation, selfassurance, safe, positive, or net positive were found (Table 13).
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Table 13. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Religious Conviction (RC), Study 2
SO

RC

RC x SO

Fear

-.13

.09†

.07

Dissonance

.05

.11*

.03

Guilt

-.09

.11*

.01

Negative

-.09

.09*

-.03

Communication apprehension

-.22

.14†

-.21

Fear of isolation

.02

-.04

.18

Self-assurance

.19†

.03

-.14

Safe

-07

-.08

-.18

Positive

.10

-.02

-.13

Net positive

.18

-.09

-.02

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Dissonance. The regression analysis revealed a significant effect of religious
conviction predicting dissonance, B = .11, t = 2.13, p = .04; such that increased religious
conviction was associated with an increase in dissonance (Regression Table 7 in
Appendix F). The speaking out by religious conviction term was not significant
suggesting that the effect of speaking out on dissonance does not depend on level of
religious conviction.
Guilt. A significant main effect of religious conviction predicting guilt was found,
B = .11, t = 2.39, p = .02, suggesting that an increase in religious conviction is associated
with an increase in guilt. The main effect of speaking out and the speaking out by
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religious conviction interaction term were not significant (Regression Table 8 in
Appendix F).
Negative. A significant positive main effect of religious conviction predicting
negative affect was revealed in the regressions, B = .11, t = 2.39, p = .02; suggesting that
increased religious conviction is associated with an increase in negative affect. The main
effect of speaking out and the speaking out by religious conviction interaction term was
not significant (Regression Table 9 in Appendix F).
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Moral Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity
To be thorough, since moral conviction, certainty, and extremity correlate
moderately with each other, a series of regression analyses was conducted in which these
moderators were entered into the models simultaneously. For each affect variable: Time 1
affect, speaking out, moral conviction, certainty, and extremity were entered at step 1,
speaking out by moral conviction, speaking out by certainty, and speaking out by
extremity were entered in step 2. See Table 14 for a summary of these results.
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Table 14. Summary of Regressions Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out (SO) with
Moral Conviction, Certainty, and Extremity, Study 2
SO

MC

C

E

SO x
MC

SO x C

SO x E

-.14a

.09†

-.02

.00

.23*

-.24*

-.11

Dissonance

.02

.09

.00

-.02

24*

.01

-.10

Guilt

-.11

.01†

.04

.00

.14

-.002

-.13

Negative

-.10

.09*

-.01

.01

.19*

-.09

-.11

Fear of isolation

-.24†

.11

.14

-.07

-.09

-.09

.26

Communication
Apprehension

.06

-.11

.07

-.04

.19

-.18

.35*

Self-assurance

.15

-.02

.00

.06

.05

.02

-.18

Safe

-.13

-.05

-.03

.12†

-.33*

.10

-.05

Positive

.04

-.04

-.02

.11*

-.12

.08

-.11

Net positive

.14

-.11

.04

.06

-.31*

.14

-.02

Fear

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
MC=moral conviction; C=Certainty; E=Extremity
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.

Comparing the results from the regressions conducted without controls to the
regressions conducted with moral conviction, certainty, and extremity entered
simultaneously as moderators revealed that some significant effects were sustained, some
disappeared, and others emerged.
Effects involving moral conviction. Three effects that were significant in the
initial analyses survived when all moderators were added to the model. The main effect
of moral conviction on negative remained significant, B = .19, t = 2.20, p = .030;
suggesting increased moral conviction is associated with an increase in negative affect.
The speaking out by moral conviction term predicting dissonance survived the addition of
controls, B = .24, t = 1.99, p = .049. Simple slopes tests found that for participants high in
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moral conviction speaking out was associated with a non- significant increase in
dissonance, B = .27, t = 1.63, p = .106. For participants low in moral conviction speaking
out was associated with a non-significant decrease in dissonance, B = -.21, t = -1.32, p =
.189. This is the same pattern plotted in Figure 6 in the previous section.
The speaking out by moral conviction term predicting safety also survived the
addition of controls, B = -.33, t = -2.56, p = .012, suggesting this effect is not spurious.
Simple slopes tests found that for participants high in moral conviction speaking out was
associated with a statistically significant decrease in safety, B = .49, t = 2.72, p = .008.
For participants low in moral conviction there was no relation between speaking out and
safety, B = .18, t = 1.05, p = .296. This is the same pattern plotted in Figure 7 in the
previous section.
Two significant findings disappeared. The positive main effect of moral
conviction on guilt was significant in the model without controls but was only marginally
significant when controls were added, B = .01, t = 1.73, p = .086. The positive main
effect of moral conviction on fear of isolation also disappeared when controls were
added, B = .11, t = 1.35, p = .180
Three significant interactions emerged that were not found in the regressions
without controls. The speaking out by moral conviction term predicting fear emerged as
significant, B = .23, t = 2.15, p = .033. Simple slopes testing found that for participants
high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with a non-significant increase in
fear, B = .07, t = .51, p = .611; for participants low in moral conviction speaking out was
associated with a decrease in fear, B = -.39, t = -2.69, p = .008. See Figure 9.

87

Figure 9. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on fear with
controls in model, Study 2.
The speaking out by moral conviction term predicting negative emerged as
significant, B = .19, t = 2.20, p = .030. Simple slopes tests revealed that for participants
high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with a non-significant increase in
negative, B = .08, t = .65, p = .513; for participants low in moral conviction speaking out
was associated with a decrease in negative, B = -.30, t = -2.63, p = .010 (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on negative with
controls in model, Study 2.
Speaking out by moral conviction on net positive emerged as significant when
controls were added, B = -.31, t = -2.18, p = .031. For participants high in moral
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conviction speaking out was associated with a non-significant decrease in net positive, B
= -.18, t = -.90, p = .371; for participants low in moral conviction speaking out was
associated with an increase in net positive, B = .45, t = 2.36, p = .020 (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on net positive
with controls in model, Study 2.
Effects involving certainty. The significant positive main effect of certainty on
fear of isolation disappeared when the controls were added, B = .14, t = 1.59, p = .115,
suggesting that the initial finding may be spurious. The speaking out by certainty term
predicting fear emerged as significant when controls were added, B = -.24, t = -2.01, p
=.047. As seen in Figure 12 for those with high certainty speaking out was associated
with a decrease in fear, B = -.39, t = -2.49, p = .014; for those with low certainty speaking
out was associated with a non-statistically significant increase in fear, B = .08, t = .57, p =
.547 (opposite pattern seen in oppose sample interaction).
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Figure 12. Interaction between speaking out and certainty (CERT) on fear with controls in
model, Study 2.
Effects involving extremity. The speaking out by extremity regressions
conducted without controls revealed no significant main or interactive effects. However,
in the model with controls a significant main effect of extremity on positive affect
emerged, B = .11, t = 2.12, p = .036, suggesting increased extremity is associated with an
increase in positive affect. Additionally, the interaction term predicting communication
apprehension was marginally significant in the regression without controls, B = .29, t =
1.96, p = .053; but in the model with all moderators entered simultaneously it emerged as
significant B = .35, t = 2.12, p =.036. As seen in Figure 13, for those with high extremity
speaking out was associated with an increase in communication apprehension, however
this effect was only marginally significant, B = .44, t = 1.90, p = .060. For those with low
extremity speaking out was associated with a non-statistically significant decrease in
communication apprehension, B = -.27, t = -1.22, p = .225.
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Figure 13. Interaction between speaking out and extremity (Ext) on communication
apprehension with controls in model, Study 2.
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Religious Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity
Religious conviction is considered a type of moral conviction and so regressions
containing both moral conviction and religious conviction would not yield meaningful
results. To fully explore the main and interactive effects of speaking out and religious
conviction on affect, the same procedure use above with moral conviction was conducted
with religious conviction replacing moral conviction. Time 1 affect, speaking out,
religious conviction, certainty, and extremity were entered in step 1. Speaking out by
religious conviction; speaking out by certainty; and speaking out by extremity were
entered in step 2 (Table 15). In the model without controls religious conviction
significantly predicted dissonance, guilt, and negative. When all the moderators were
entered these three main effects remained significant; increased religious conviction was
associated with increased dissonance, B = .12, t = 2.07, p =.041, guilt, B = .10, t = 2.12, p
=.036, and negative affect, B = .09, t = 2.23, p = .028.
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Table 15. Summary of Regressions Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out (SO) with
Religious Conviction, Certainty, and Extremity, Study 2
SO

RC

C

E

SO x RC

SO x C

SO x E

Fear

-.12

.09†

-.01

-.001

-.01

-.15

-.10

Dissonance

.04

.12*

.01

-.02

.01

.09

-.08

Guilt

-.10

.10*

.04

.01

.02

.04

-.12

Negative

-.09

.09*

.00

.00

-.00

-.02

-.10

Fear of isolation

-.23

.11

.15†

-.07

-.25

-.08

.29†

Communication
Apprehension

.03

-.05

.04

-.04

.15

-.13

.35*

Self-assurance

.16

.03

-.03

.07

-.12

.05

-.16

Safe

-.13

-.08

-.04

.12

-.14

-.02

-.06

Positive

.05

-.02

-.04

.12*

-.11

.05

-.10

Net positive

.14

-.10

.01

.07

-.02

.05

-.02

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
RC=religious conviction; C=certainty; E=extremity
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.

Summary of Moderated Regressions
Speaking out by moral conviction. No significant main effects of speaking out
on affect were found. However, positive main effects of moral conviction on negative,
guilt, and fear of isolation were revealed in the regressions without controls. The
significant main effect of moral conviction on negative affect survived the addition of
controls but the main effect on guilt and fear of isolation disappeared when controls were
added. Significant interactions between moral conviction and speaking out were found
for dissonance and for safety, however, these interactions were not in the predicted
direction; for participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with an
increase in dissonance and a decrease in safety. These significant findings survived the
addition of controls. Thus, hypotheses 3-12 were not supported.
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Three significant interactions emerged when controls were added. The speaking
out by moral conviction interaction term predicting fear and negative emerged as
significant: for participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with a
non-significant increase in fear and negative affect; for participants low in moral
conviction speaking out was associated with statistically significant decreases in fear and
negative affect. Speaking out by moral conviction on net positive also emerged as
significant when controls were added. For participants high in moral conviction speaking
out was associated with a non-significant decrease in net positive; for participants low in
moral conviction speaking out was associated with an increase in net positive.
Speaking out by certainty. No significant main or interactive effects of
speaking out or certainty were found in this set of regressions. The significant positive
main effect of certainty on fear of isolation disappeared when the controls were added,
suggesting that the initial finding may be spurious. The speaking out by certainty term
predicting fear emerged as significant when controls were added. For those with high
certainty speaking out was associated with a decrease in fear; for those with low certainty
speaking out was associated with a non-statistically significant increase in fear.
Speaking out by extremity. No significant main effects of speaking out were
found in this set of regressions. A main effect of extremity predicting positive affect
emerged as significant in the with controls model; suggesting extreme attitudes about
lowering the drinking age may be associated with an increase in positive affect.
Additionally, the interaction term predicting communication apprehension was
marginally significant in the regression without controls, but in when controls were added
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it emerged as significant; for those with high extremity speaking out was associated with
a marginally significant increase in communication apprehension; for those with low
extremity speaking out was associated with a non-statistically significant decrease in
communication apprehension.
Speaking out by religious conviction. The main and interactive effects of
speaking out and religious conviction on affect were examined. No main effects of
speaking out were found. However significant main effects of religious conviction
predicting dissonance, guilt, and negative affect were revealed such that participants high
in religious conviction tended to experience greater dissonance, guilt, and negative affect.
These findings survived the addition of controls.

CHAPTER NINE
STUDY 2 RESULTS SPLIT BY ATTITUDE DIRECTION
During debriefing when it was revealed that the normative influence chat room was fake,
participants who said they supported the issue expressed less surprise about the deception
than participants who opposed the issue. For example, one support participant said, “I
believed I was really in a chat but I thought it was strange that everyone in my group was
against it because most people I know would not think that.” Those types of comments
were not elicited and are purely anecdotal. However, it is plausible participants’ were
aware that the larger group of students at their university likely support lowering the legal
drinking age (as found in the present study). University students tend to believe other
students drink more than they do (Baer, Stacy & Larimer, 1991). It is possible that
participants may have extrapolated from their beliefs about drinking norms to normative
attitudes about lowering the drinking age. Thus, the oppose participants may have felt
themselves to be the minority not only with respect to the small group in the experiment
but to the larger group of their peers as well. They could in fact be considered a super
minority. Conversely, the support participants may have considered themselves to be the
minority only within the confines of the group in the experiment but not within the larger
group of their peers (small group minority)1

1

It is conceivable that the support/oppose groups may differ on other relevant characteristics including
religious affiliations. Some religious affiliations may be more opposed to drinking than others. Future
research using the “lowering the legal drinking age” issue should consider assessing religious affiliation.
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Because of these theoretical differences between the two samples a series of
exploratory post hoc analyses were conducted and are presented here. The analyses using
the oppose sample (the super minority) are theoretically a better test of the study’s
hypotheses (that speaking out has both negative and positive affective consequences, and
that moral conviction and the other attitude variables will moderate the effects of
speaking out on affect) than analyses using the support sample or the full sample. The
oppose participants are the ones for whom speaking out is theoretically the most difficult.
Unfortunately, the sample size of oppose participants is small (N = 53), making the
detection of effects more difficult. Additionally, because of the large number of statistical
tests performed, a number of “significant” effects may simply reflect Type-I errors (1/20
significant effects are expected to emerge merely by chance when using a .05 pvalue). Therefore, any effect obtained in these exploratory analyses should be replicated
in a separate sample before it is considered a “real” effect.
Organization of Results
The results in this chapter are organized into five sections. The first section
compares the main effects of speaking out for the oppose and support samples. The
second section presents the results of the regressions using the oppose sample (the super
minority). Third, the results for the support sample (the small group minority) are
presented. The fourth section presents the main and interactive effects of speaking out
and direction. Finally, the fifth section presents the results of three-way interactions.
Main Effects of Speaking Out for the Oppose and Support Samples
Table 16 presents the correlations between speaking out and each affect variable
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for each sample. Below each correlation coefficient is the corresponding regression
coefficient found in the speaking out by moral conviction regression analyses.
In the oppose sample speaking out was significantly positively correlated with
dissonance and negative affect and significantly negatively correlated with safety;
however the regressions revealed that speaking out was not a significant predictor of any
of the ten affect variables (possibly due the small sample size of the oppose group).
Table 16. Main Effects of Speaking Out on the Affect Variables, Study 2
Oppose (N = 53)

Support (N = 79)

Fear

.15

-.32*

Dissonance

.31†

-.20

Guilt

.05

-.21†

Negative

.11

-.25*

Fear of isolation

-.28

-.20

Communication
apprehension

.29

-.10

Self-assurance

.21

.18

Safety

-.30

.05

Positive

-.02

.17

Net positive

-.10

.38*

Note: Entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1.
† p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

In the support sample speaking out was significantly negatively correlated with
fear and negative affect, and positively correlated with net positive affect. The regression
analyses revealed significant negative main effects of speaking out on fear, B = -.32, t = -
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2.56, p = .012, and negative, B = -.25, t = -2.55, p = .013. A significant positive main
effect of speaking out on net positive was found, B = .38, t = 2.58, p = .012. This
suggests that for people who support lowering the drinking age speaking out is associated
with decreased fear and negative affect and an increase in net positive affect. In contrast,
for those who oppose the issue speaking out is associated with an increase in dissonance
and negative affect and a decrease in sense of safety. Details of the main effects of
speaking out as well as the main effects of moral conviction are discussed in the
following section.
Moderated Regression Analyses Using the Oppose Sample
Four sets of two-way moderated regression analyses were conducted. First, the
hypothesized main and interactive effects of speaking out and moral conviction on each
of the ten affect variables were examined. These analyses were repeated replacing moral
conviction with certainty, extremity, and religious conviction. For each regression Time 1
affect was included as a control.
Speaking out by moral conviction. As seen in Table 17 no significant main or
interactive effects of speaking out and moral conviction were found for the following
affect variables: fear; dissonance; fear of isolation; communication apprehension; selfassurance; positive; and net positive. Regression analyses in which significant effects
were found are described below.

98
Table 17. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions With Speaking Out
(SO) and Moral Conviction (MC) Using Oppose Sample, Study 2
SO

MC

MC x SO

Fear

.15

.11

.01

Dissonance

.31†

.11

.10

Guilt

.05

.17*

.09

Negative

.11

.12*

.03

Communication apprehension

.29

-.09

.29

Fear of isolation

-.28

.15

-.29

Self-assurance

.21

-.04

-.24

Safe

-.30

-.07

-.37*

Positive

-.02

-.06

-.20

Net positive

-.10

-.13

-.20

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Guilt. The main effect of moral conviction on guilt was significant, B = .17, t =
2.58, p = .013; suggesting that for those who oppose the issue increased moral conviction
is associated with an increase in guilt. The main effect of speaking out and the speaking
out x moral conviction interaction term were non-significant.
Negative. The main effect of moral conviction on negative affect was significant,
B = .12, β =.25, p = .036, suggesting that for people who oppose lowering the drinking
age an increase in moral conviction is associated with an increase in negative affect. The
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main effect of speaking out and the speaking out x moral conviction term were nonsignificant, suggesting that the effect of speaking out on overall negative affect does not
depend on moral conviction.
Safety. No significant main effects were found. However the interaction term,
speaking out x moral conviction, was significant in the oppose sample, B = -.37, t = 2.07, p = .044 (as it was in the full sample). As seen in Figure 14 there is a positive
relation between speaking out and safety for participants with low moral conviction and a
negative relation between speaking out and sense of safety for participants with high
moral conviction. Simple slopes tests revealed that for participants high in moral
conviction the relation between speaking out and safety was significant, B = -.54, t = 1.61, p = .015. However, the relation was not significant for participants with low moral
conviction, B = .19, t =.65, p = .52. This suggests that among participants who oppose
the issue those with high moral conviction feel safer conforming than speaking out.

Figure 14. Interaction between speaking out and moral conviction (MC) on safety using
the oppose sample, Study 2.
Speaking out by certainty. To examine the main and interactive effects of
speaking out and certainty on affect moderated regressions were conducted: Time 1
affect, speaking out, and certainty were entered at step 1 and the speaking out by
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certainty interaction term was entered in step 3. As seen in Table 18 no significant main
or interactive effects of speaking out and certainty were found for the following affect
variables: guilt; negative; communication apprehension; fear of isolation; safety; selfassurance; positive; and net positive. Regression analyses in which significant effects
were found are described below.
Table 18. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Certainty Using Oppose Sample, Study 2
SO

Certainty

C x SO

Fear

.22

-.04

-.29*

Dissonance

.38*

-.01

-.06

Guilt

.05

.08

-.07

Negative

.15

.01

-.16

Communication apprehension

.18

.09

.05

Fear of isolation

-.27

.11

-.19

Self-assurance

.19

.04

-.03

Safe

-.26

-.10

-.01

Positive

-.02

-.03

.04

Net positive

-.15

.01

.20

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Fear. There were no significant main effects of speaking out or certainty on fear.
A significant speaking out by certainty interaction was revealed however, B = -.29, t = 2.37, p = .022 (See Regression Table 11 in Appendix F). This suggests the effect of
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speaking out on fear depends on how certain one is about the issue. As seen in Figure 15
for those with low certainty speaking out is associated with a statistically significant
increase in fear B = .54, t = 2.81, p = .007; for those with high certainty speaking out is
unrelated to fear, B = -.05, t = -.29, p = .776.

Figure 15. Interaction between speaking out and certainty on fear in the oppose sample,
Study 2.
Dissonance. The main effect of speaking out on dissonance in the oppose sample
was significant, B = .38, t = 2.22, p = .031; suggesting speaking out is associated with
increased feelings of dissonance for those who are in the super minority (the oppose
group). The main effect of certainty and the speaking out by certainty interaction were
non-significant.
Speaking out by extremity. Time 1 affect, speaking out, and extremity were
entered at step 1 and the speaking out by extremity interaction term was entered in step 2.
As seen in Table 19 no significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and
extremity were found for the following affect variables: fear, guilt, negative, fear of
isolation, self-assurance, safety, positive, and net positive. Regression analyses in which
significant effects were found are described below.
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Table 19. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Extremity Using Oppose Sample, Study 2
SO

Extremity

E x SO

Fear

.22

.04

-.17

Dissonance

.37*

.02

-.08

Guilt

.04

.07

-.10

Negative

.14

.02

-.12

Communication apprehension

.23

-.02

.55*

Fear of isolation

-.26

.10

.24

Self-assurance

.22

-.01

-.09

Safe

-.33†

.03

-.09

Positive

-.04

.03

-.08

Net positive

-.14

.00

.05

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Dissonance. A significant main effect of speaking out on dissonance was found,
B = .37, t = 2.14, p = .038, suggesting that among people who oppose lowering the
drinking age, speaking out is associated with an increase in dissonance. The main effect
of extremity and the interaction term were non-significant in all analyses.
Communication apprehension. No significant main effects of speaking out or
extremity were found. However, the extremity by speaking out interaction term was
significant, B = .55, t = 2.69, p = .010. As seen in Figure 16 high extremity is associated
with a statistically significantly increase in communication apprehension when speaking
out, B = .83, t = 2.69, p = .010. For those with low extremity, there was non-significant
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negative relation between speaking out and communication apprehension, B = .23, t =
1.02, p = .311.

Figure 16. Interaction between speaking out and extremity on communication
apprehension in the oppose sample, Study 2.
Speaking out by religious conviction. The main and interaction effects of
speaking out and religious conviction on affect were examined with a series of regression
analyses. Time 1 affect, speaking out and religious conviction were entered in step 1 and
the speaking out by religious conviction term was entered in step 2. The regression
analyses revealed no significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and religious
conviction on fear, fear of isolation, self-assurance, positive affect, or net positive affect.
Regressions that revealed significant effects are described in detail below.
Dissonance. The analysis conducted on the oppose sample revealed a significant
main effect of religious conviction, B = .16, t = 2.37, p = .02; suggesting that increased
religious conviction is associated with an increase in dissonance for those that oppose
lowering the drinking age (See Regression Table 14 in Appendix F). The speaking out
by religious conviction term was not significant.
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Guilt. As can be seen in Regression Table 15 in Appendix F, a significant main
effect of religious conviction predicting guilt was found, B = .16, t = 2.80, p = .008,
suggesting that increased religious conviction is associated with an increase in guilt for
the oppose sample. The speaking out by religious conviction interaction term was not
significant.
Communication apprehension. No significant main effects predicting
communication apprehension were found. However, the speaking out by religious
conviction interaction predicting communication apprehension was significant, B = .43, t
= 2.30, p = .026 (Figure 17). Simple slopes testing revealed that speaking out was
significantly positively associated with communication apprehension for people with
high religious conviction, B = .67, t = 2.55, p = .026. For those with low religious
conviction, there was no relation at all between speaking out and communication
apprehension, B = -.18, t = -.59, p = .555.

Figure 17. Interaction between speaking out and religious conviction (RC) on
communication apprehension in the oppose sample, Study 2.
Negative. A significant main effect of religious conviction predicting negative
affect was found in the oppose condition, B = .10, t = 2.07, p = .044. The speaking out by
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religious conviction term was not significant suggesting that the effect of speaking out on
negative affect is not moderated by religious conviction.
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Moral Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity Using the Oppose Sample
Speaking out, moral conviction, certainty, extremity and the speaking out by
moral conviction/certainty/extremity interaction terms were entered into each regression
simultaneously to see what effects were sustained, disappeared and emerged (religious
conviction was not included as it is considered a type of moral conviction). See Table 20
for a summary of these results.
Table 20. Summary of Regressions Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out (SO) with
Moral Conviction, Certainty, and Extremity Using Oppose Sample, Study 2
SO

MC

C

E

SO x MC

SO x C

SO x E

.19

.15†

-.07

-.04

.22

-.41*

-.06

Dissonance

.31†

.13

-.06

.04

.21

-.12

-.16

Guilt

.05

.16*

.01

.01

.18

-.07

-.13

Negative

.12

.13*

-.05

.01

.18

-.21

-.09

Fear of isolation

-.32

.11

.04

.06

-.24

-.41

.53†

Communication
Apprehension

.27

-.15

.18

-.09

.31

-.52*

.85**

Self-assurance

.18

-.09

.11

-.02

-.23

.05

-.07

Safe

-.30

-.04

-.13

.12

-.52*

.33

-.13

Positive

-.04

-.07

-.02

.08

-.27

.23

-.15

Net positive

-.14

-.18

.08

.01

-.44†

.42†

.00

Fear

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
MC=moral conviction; C=certainty; E=extremity
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.

Speaking out by moral conviction. The significant main effect of moral
conviction on guilt and negative remained significant in the regressions with controls, B =
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.16, t = 2.15, p = .037 and B = .13, t = 2.15, p = .037, respectively. This suggests that for
the oppose sample increased moral conviction was associated with an increase in both
fear and negative affect. The speaking out by moral conviction interaction term
predicting safety also survived the addition of controls, B = -.52, t = -2.49, p = .017. For
participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant decrease in safety, B = -.65, t = -2.80, p = .008. For participants low in moral
conviction speaking out was associated with a non-significant increase in safety, B = .39,
t = 1.15, p =.258. This is the same pattern revealed in the regression without controls
(Figure 14).
Speaking out by certainty. The main effect of speaking out on dissonance was
significant in the regression without controls but this significant effect became only
marginally significant when controls were added, B = .31, t = 1.74, p = .089. The
speaking out by certainty interaction term predicting fear was significant in the regression
without controls and this effect remained significant when controls were added, B = -.41,
t = -2.52, p = .016. Simple slopes testing revealed that for participants high in certainty
the relation between speaking out and fear was not significant, B = -.29, t = -1.28, p =
.207, but for participants low in certainty speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant increase in fear, B = .53, t = 2.49, p = .017. See Figure 15 in the previous
section for a plot of these results without controls.
The speaking out by certainty interaction term predicting communication
apprehension emerged as significant when controls were added, B = -.52, t = -2.08, p =
.044. For participants high in certainty speaking out was associated with a non-significant
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decrease in communication apprehension, B = -.24, t = -.69, p = .491; for participants low
in certainty speaking out was associated with an increase in communication
apprehension, B = .80, t = 2.45, p =.019.
Speaking out by extremity. The main effect of speaking out on dissonance was
significant in the regression without controls but this effect was only marginally
significant when controls were added, B = .31, t = 1.74, p = .089. The speaking out by
extremity interaction term predicting communication apprehension remained significant
when controls were added, B = .85, t = 3.68, p = .001. For participants high in extremity
speaking out was associated with an increase in communication apprehension, B = 1.14, t
= 3.25, p = .002. For participants low in extremity speaking out was associated with a
marginally significant decrease in communication apprehension, B = -.57, t = -2.69, p =
.055. This suggests that for the oppose sample having an extreme attitude increased one’s
communication apprehension.
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Religious Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity Using the Oppose Sample
No significant main effects of speaking out on affect were found in this set of
regressions with or without controls. However significant main effects of religious
conviction were revealed; for those who oppose lowering the legal drinking age religious
conviction was associated with an increase in dissonance, guilt, and negative. These
positive main effects of religious conviction on dissonance and guilt remained significant
with controls, however the main effect of religious conviction on negative affect became
only marginally significant when controls were added, B = .11, t = 1.97, p = .055.

108
Additionally there was a significant religious conviction by speaking out
interaction for communication apprehension (without controls); simple slopes tests
revealed that speaking out was significantly associated with communication apprehension
for people with high religious conviction. However, this interaction was not significant
when controls were added, B = .27, t = 1.32, p = .194. The religious conviction by
speaking out interaction on fear of isolation was not significant without controls B = -.37,
t = -1.67, p = .101, but emerged as significant with controls, B = -.53, t = -2.07, p = .045.
For participants high in religious conviction speaking out was associated with a
marginally significant decrease in fear of isolation, B = .65, t = -1.98, p = .055. For
participants low in religious conviction speaking out was associated with a nonsignificant increase in fear of isolation, B = .41, t = .99, p = .330
Summary of Moderated Regressions Using the Oppose Sample
Speaking out by moral conviction. For the oppose sample no significant main
effects of speaking out were found, however moral conviction was associated with a
statistically significant increase in guilt and negative affect and these effects survived the
addition of the controls. This suggests that for the oppose sample increased moral
conviction was associated with an increase in both fear and negative affect. Additionally
the moral conviction by speaking out interaction was significant for safety (both with and
without controls); for participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated
with a statistically significant decrease in safety; for participants low in moral conviction
speaking out was associated with a non-significant increase in safety.
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Speaking out by certainty. For the oppose sample no significant main effects of
certainty on affect were found. A significant positive main effect of speaking out on
dissonance was found in the regression without controls but this effect was only
marginally significant when controls were added. The certainty by speaking out
interaction was significant for fear (both with and without controls); for participants high
in certainty the negative relation between speaking out and fear was not significant, but
for participants low in certainty speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant increase in fear. This finding is notable as the pattern is opposite from what
was found for moral conviction. The speaking out by certainty interaction term predicting
communication apprehension emerged as significant when controls were added. For
participants high in certainty speaking out was associated with a non-significant decrease
in communication apprehension; for participants low in certainty speaking out was
associated with an increase in communication apprehension.
Speaking out by extremity. A significant positive main effect of speaking out
on dissonance was found (without controls) but this effect was only marginally
significant when controls were added. The extremity by speaking out interaction was
significant for communication apprehension (both with and without controls); for those
with high extremity speaking out was associated with a statistically significant increase in
communication apprehension. For participants low in extremity speaking out was
associated with a marginally significant decrease in communication apprehension. This
suggests that for the oppose sample having an extreme attitude increased one’s
communication apprehension.
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Regressions with religious conviction, certainty, and extremity as
moderators. No significant main effects of speaking out were found. However
significant main effects of religious conviction were revealed; for those who oppose
lowering the legal drinking age religious conviction was associated with an increase in
dissonance, guilt, and negative. The positive main effects of religious conviction on
dissonance and guilt remained significant with controls, however the main effect of
religious conviction on negative affect became only marginally significant when controls
were added. The religious conviction by speaking out interaction for communication
apprehension was significant without controls (speaking out was significantly associated
with communication apprehension for people with high religious conviction); however,
this interaction was not significant when controls were added. The religious conviction
by speaking out interaction on fear of isolation emerged as significant with controls; for
participants high in religious conviction speaking out was associated with a marginally
significant decrease in fear of isolation, for participants low in religious conviction there
was no relation between speaking out and fear of isolation.
Moderated Regression Analyses Using the Support Sample
Four sets of two-way moderated regression analyses were conducted using the
support sample. First the hypothesized main and interactive effects of speaking out and
moral conviction on each of the ten affect variables were examined. Then these analyses
were repeated replacing moral conviction with certainty, extremity, and religious
conviction.
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Speaking out by moral conviction in the support sample. In this set of
regressions the Time 1 affect variable, speaking out, and moral conviction were entered
at step 1 and the speaking out by moral conviction interaction term was entered in step 2.
See Table 21 for summaries of these analyses.
Table 21. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Moral Conviction (MC) Using Support Sample, Study 2
SO

MC

MC x SO

Fear

-.32*

.01

.18

Dissonance

-.20

.01

.18

Guilt

-.21†

.05

.03

Negative

-.25*

.02

.07

Communication apprehension

-.10

-.15

.01

Fear of isolation

-.20

.05

.16

Self-assurance

.18

.02

.25

Safe

.05

.10

-.22

Positive

.17

.06

-.01

Net positive

.38*

.08

-.10

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

No significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and moral conviction
were found for the following affect variables: guilt; dissonance; fear of isolation;
communication apprehension; self-assurance; safety; and positive.
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Fear. A significant main effect of speaking out was found, B = -.32, t = -.2.56, p
= .012. See Regression Table 18 in Appendix F for a summary of the regression results.
This finding suggests that for people who support the issue those who speak out feel less
fear than those who conform. The main effect of moral conviction and the speaking out
by moral conviction term were non-significant.
Negative. The main effect of speaking out on negative affect was significant, B =
-.25, t = -2.55, p = .013; suggesting that for people who support the issue those who
speak out feel less negative affect than those who conform. The main effect of moral
conviction and the speaking out by moral conviction interaction term were nonsignificant.
Net positive. The main effect of speaking out on net positive was significant, B =
.38, t = 2.58, p = .012. This suggests that speaking out is associated with increased net
positive affect for those who support the issue. The main effect of moral conviction and
the speaking out by moral conviction term were non-significant.
Speaking out by certainty. The main and interactive effects of speaking out and
certainty were examined with a series of regression analyses. Time 1 affect, speaking out
and certainty were entered at step 1 and the speaking out by moral conviction term was
entered in step 2. See Table 22 for summaries of these analyses.
As can be seen in Table 22 no significant main or interactive effects of speaking
out and moral conviction were found for the following affect variables: guilt; dissonance;
communication apprehension; fear of isolation; safety; self-assurance; and; positive.
Regression analyses in which significant effects were found are described below.
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Table 22. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Certainty Using Support Sample, Study 2
SO

Certainty

C x SO

Fear

-.32*

.01

-.13

Dissonance

-.20

.02

.17

Guilt

-.20†

.04

.04

Negative

-.25*

.02

.00

Communication apprehension

-.13

-.04

.00

Fear of isolation

-.21

.14

.17

Self-assurance

.19

-.02

.00

Safe

.15

.11

-.12

Positive

.17

.05

-.05

Net positive

.39*

.07

-.05

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Fear. Speaking out emerged as a significant predictor of fear, B = -.32, t = -2.58,
p = .012. This suggests that among people who indicate support for lowering the drinking
age, speaking out is associated with lower levels of fear than conforming. The main effect
of certainty and the interaction term were not significant. See Regression Table 18 in
Appendix F for a summary of this regression.
Negative. The main effect speaking out on negative affect was significant, B = .25, t = -2.55, p = .013, suggesting that among people who indicate support for lowering
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the drinking age, speaking out is associated with decreased negative affect. The main
effect of certainty and the interaction term were not significant, suggesting that the effect
of speaking out on overall negative affect does not depend on certainty.
Net positive. The main effect speaking out on net positive affect was significant,
B = .39, t = 2.63, p = .010; suggesting that among people who indicate support for
lowering the drinking age, speaking out is associated with increased net positive affect.
The main effect of certainty and the interaction term were non-significant suggesting that
the effect of speaking out on net positive affect does not depend on certainty.
Speaking out by extremity. The main and interactive effects of speaking out and
extremity were examined with a series of regression analyses. Time 1 affect, speaking
out, and extremity were entered at step 1 and the speaking out x extremity term was
entered in step 2. As seen in Table 23 no significant main or interactive effects of
speaking out and extremity were found for the following affect variables: dissonance,
guilt, fear of isolation, communication apprehension, self-assurance, or safety.
Regression analyses in which significant effects were found are described below.
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Table 23. Summary of Regressions Predicting Affective Reactions with Speaking Out
(SO) and Extremity Using Support Sample, Study 2
SO

Extremity

E x SO

-.34**

.05

-.12

Dissonance

-.18

-.01

-.02

Guilt

-.21†

.02

-.10

Negative

-.26*

.02

-.09

Communication apprehension

-.13

.00

.10

Fear of isolation

-.15

-.05

.23

Self-assurance

.13

.09

-.24

Safe

-.01

.12

-.09

Positive

.10

.13*

-.14

Net positive

.35*

.09

-.10

Fear

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2. For
regressions containing significant effects, complete regressions tables depicting step 1 and step 2 results
are provided in Appendix F.

Fear. A significant main effect of speaking out on fear was found, B = -.34, t = 2.68, p = .009 (see Regression Table 22 in Appendix F). This suggests that among the
support sample speaking out is associated with a decrease in fear. The speaking out by
extremity interaction term was not significant suggesting that the effect of speaking out
on fear does not depend on extremity.
Negative. A significant main effect of speaking out on negative affect was found,
B = -.26, t = -2.54, p = .013 (See Regression Table 23 in Appendix F). This suggests that
among the support sample speaking out is associated with a decrease in negative affect.
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The speaking out by extremity interaction term was not significant suggesting that the
effect of speaking out on negative affect does not depend on extremity.
Positive. A significant main effect of extremity on positive affect was found, B =
.13, t = 2.17, p = .034. This suggests that among the support sample extremity is
associated with an increase in positive affect. The speaking out by extremity interaction
term was not found to be significant suggesting that the effect of speaking out on overall
positive is not moderated by extremity.
Net positive. A significant main effect of speaking out on net positive affect was
found, B = .35, t = 2.30, p = .025 (Regression Table 25 in Appendix F). This suggests
that among the support sample speaking out is associated with an increase in net positive
affect. The interaction term was not significant.
Speaking out by religious conviction. The regression analyses conducted on the
support sample revealed no significant main or interactive effects of speaking out and
religious conviction on: dissonance, guilt, communication apprehension, fear of isolation,
safety, or positive. Regressions that revealed significant effects are described in detail
below.
Fear. Speaking out emerged as a significant predictor of fear, B = -.31, t = -2.52,
p = .014, suggesting that for the support participants speaking out is associated with a
decrease in fear (Regression Table 26 in Appendix F). The speaking out by religious
conviction term was not significant suggesting that the effect of speaking out on fear does
not depend on level of religious conviction.
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Negative. A main effect of speaking out predicting negative affect was found, B =
-.24, t = -2.47, p = .016, suggesting that for the support participants speaking out is
associated with a decrease in negative affect (Regression Table 27 in Appendix F). The
speaking out by religious conviction term was not significant suggesting that the effect of
speaking out on negative affect is not moderated by religious conviction.
Net positive. A significant main effect of speaking out predicting net positive
affect was found, B = .44, t = 3.04, p = .003, suggesting that for participants who support
lowering the drinking age speaking out was associated with an increase in net positive
affect. The main effect of religious conviction and the speaking out by religious
conviction interaction term were not significant. See Regression Table 28 in Appendix F.
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Moral Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity Using the Support Sample
Speaking out, moral conviction, certainty, extremity and the speaking out by
moral conviction/certainty/extremity interaction terms were entered into each regression
simultaneously to see what effects were sustained, disappeared and emerged (religious
conviction was not included as it is considered a type of moral conviction). See Table 24
for a summary of these results.
As seen in Table 24 three significant main effects of speaking out were revealed:
fear (B = -.35, t = -2.63, p = .010), negative (B = -.26, t = -2.52, p = .014), and net
positive (B = .34, t = 2.15, p = .035). These results suggest that for the support sample
speaking out is associated with a decrease in fear and negative affect an increase in net
positive affect. These same significant main effects were found in the speaking out by
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moral conviction, speaking out by certainty, and speaking out by certainty regressions
conducted without controls.
Table 24. Summary of Regressions Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out (SO) with
Moral Conviction, Certainty, and Extremity Using Support Sample, Study 2
SO

MC

C

E

SO x MC

SO x C

SO x E

Fear

-.35*

.01

-.01

.05

.11

-.13

-.08

Dissonance

-.19

.01

.03

-.03

.13

.18

-.10

Guilt

-.22†

.04

.03

.01

.01

.09

-.14

Negative

-.26*

.02

.01

.02

.08

.02

-.11

Fear of isolation

-.14

-.005

.20†

-.13

.06

.13

.12

Communication
Apprehension

-.10

-.15

-.001

.01

.02

-.05

.11

Self-assurance

.12

.03

-.08

.12

.31

-.02

-.24

Safe

-.02

.07

.04

.10

-.19

-.05

-.07

Positive

.09

.05

-.02

.13*

.03

-.02

-.13

Net positive

.34*

.06

.02

.07

-.07

-.01

-.09

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001. MC=moral conviction; C=certainty; E=extremity.
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.

Effects involving moral conviction. As in the regressions conducted without
controls the main effects of moral conviction and the speaking out by moral conviction
interaction term were not significant predictors of any of the affect variables in the
support sample.
Effects involving certainty. As in the regressions conducted without controls the
main effects of certainty and the speaking out by certainty interaction term were not
significant predictors of any of the affect variables in the support sample.
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Effects involving extremity. The significant main effect of extremity on positive
affect and this effect survived the addition of controls, B = .13, t = 2.01, p = .048. This
suggests that increased extremity is associated with an increase in positive affect.
Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out with Religious Conviction, Certainty, and
Extremity Using the Support Sample
The main and interactive effects of speaking out and religious conviction on affect
were examined with the other moderators entered simultaneously into the regressions.
Time 1 affect, speaking out, religious conviction, certainty, and extremity were entered in
step 1. Speaking out by religious conviction; speaking out by certainty; and speaking out
by extremity were entered in step 2. The main effect of speaking out on fear and negative
affect survived the addition of controls, B = -.34, t = -2.60, p =.011; and B = -.25, t = 2.46, p = .017; respectively. This suggests that for the support sample speaking out is
associated with a decrease in fear and negative affect. The main effect of speaking out on
net positive also remained significant when controls were added, B = .37, t = 2.45, p =
.017; suggesting that for the support sample speaking out is associated with an increase in
net positive affect.
The main effect of religious conviction on self-assurance and positive affect was
not significant without controls, but emerged as significant when controls were added, B
= .20, t = 1.99, p = .050 and B = .16, t = 2.05, p = .045, respectively. This suggests that
for the support sample increased religious conviction may be associated with an increase
in self-assurance and positive affect.
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Summary of Moderated Regressions Using Support Sample
Regressions with moral conviction, certainty, and extremity as moderators.
For the support sample, speaking out was associated with a statistically significant
decrease in fear and negative affect and an increase in net positive affect (in the
regressions without controls and in the regressions with controls). For the support sample
speaking out has positive emotional consequences. There was a significant main effect of
extremity on positive. This effect was seen in both the regression without controls and the
regression with moral conviction and certainty as additional controls.
Regressions with religious conviction, certainty, and extremity as
moderators. For the support sample, speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant decrease in fear and negative affect and an increase in net positive affect.
These effects were found in the regressions without controls as well as in the regressions
with speaking out entered simultaneously with religious conviction, certainty, and
extremity. For the support sample speaking out has positive emotional consequences. The
main effect of religious conviction on self-assurance and positive affect was not
significant without controls, but emerged as significant when certainty and extremity
were added as controls. This suggests that for the support sample increased religious
conviction may be associated with an increase in self-assurance and positive affect. The
religious conviction by speaking out interaction term was not significant in any of the
analyses.
Speaking Out and Attitude Direction
The following set of regression analyses present the main and interactive effects
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of speaking out and direction on the affect variables. For each regression, Time 1 affect,
direction, and speaking out were entered in step 1, the speaking out x direction term was
entered in step 2. The regression analyses revealed no significant main or interactive
effects of speaking out and direction on guilt, communication apprehension, selfassurance, or positive affect. Analyses that revealed significant effects are described in
detail below. Support was coded as 1; oppose as 0; thus positive coefficients indicate a
positive association of the variable for the support sample and vice versa.
Fear. The main effects of speaking out and direction on fear were not significant.
However, the interaction term was significant, B = -.53, t = -2.82, p = .006. See
Regression Table 29 in Appendix F. As seen in Figure 18 for those who oppose the issue
speaking out is associated with an increase in fear; for those who support the issue
speaking out is associated with a decrease in fear. Simple slopes tests revealed that the
effect of speaking out is only significant for participants who support lowering the
drinking age, B = -.31, t = -2.60, p = .011. For the oppose group speaking out did not
significantly predict fear, B = .20, t = 1.47, p = .148.

Figure 18. Interaction between speaking out and direction on fear, Study 2.
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Dissonance. No significant main effects of speaking out or direction predicting
dissonance were found. However the interaction term was significant suggesting that the
relation between speaking out and dissonance depends on attitude direction, B = -.58, t =
-2.82, p = .006 (Regression Table 30 in Appendix F). As seen in Figure 19 for the oppose
sample speaking out was associated with a statistically significant increase in dissonance,
B = .42, t = 2.26, p = .029. For the support sample, speaking out was associated with a
non-significant decrease in dissonance, B = -.19, t = -1.59, p = .115.

Figure 19. Interaction between speaking out and direction on dissonance, Study 2.
Fear of isolation. The regression revealed that the effect of speaking out on of fear
of isolation was not significant. However the effect of direction emerged as significant, B
= -.35, t = -2.47, p = .015; suggesting that participants in support of lowering the
drinking age experienced less fear of isolation than participants who oppose the issue.
The interaction between direction and speaking out on fear of isolation was not
significant, B = .02, t = .051, p = .959.
Negative affect. No significant main effects on negative affect were found.
However, there was a significant speaking out by direction interaction predicting negative
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affect, B = -.43, t = -2.87, p = .005 (Regression Table 31 in Appendix F). As seen in
Figure 20 for the oppose participants speaking out was associated with a non-significant
increase in fear, B = .15, t = 1.38, p = .175. For the support participants speaking out
was associated with a statistically significant decrease in fear, B = -.24, t = -2.53, p =
.013.

Figure 20. Interaction between speaking out and direction on negative affect, Study 2.
Safety. The effect of speaking out on of sense of safety was not significant.
However the effect of direction emerged as significant, B = .30, t = 2.65, p = .009. This
suggests that participants who supported lowering the legal drinking age felt safer than
participants who opposed the issue. The interaction between speaking out and direction
was not significant. See Regression Table 33 in Appendix F.
Net positive. The regression analysis revealed that the main effect of speaking out on
net positive was not significant. However the main effect of direction was significant, B
= .28, t = 2.25, p = .026; suggesting that the support participants felt more net positive
than the oppose participants. Additionally the interaction term was significant suggesting
that the relation between speaking out and net positive affect depends on attitude
direction, B = .64, t = 2.58, p = .011 (Regression Table 34 in Appendix F). As seen in
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Figure 21 for the oppose sample speaking out was associated with a non-significant
decrease in net positive affect, B = -.14, t = -.70, p = .490. For the support sample
speaking out was associated with a statistically significant increase in net positive affect,
B = .41, t = 2.78, p = .007.

Figure 21. Interaction between speaking out and direction on net positive affect, Study 2.
The results found in this series of regressions suggest that for participants who
oppose lowering the drinking age speaking out is associated with an increase in negative
affect (fear, dissonance, negative) and a decrease in positive affect (net positive). For the
support participants, speaking out is associated with a decrease in negative affect (fear,
dissonance, negative) and an increase in positive affect.
Three-Way Interactions
A series of regressions were conducted to explore the three-way interaction of
speaking out x moral conviction x direction out on the affect variables. These analyses
included the other attitude variables as controls: Time 1 affect, extremity, and certainty
were entered in step 1, speaking out, direction, and moral conviction in step 2; all two
way interaction terms were entered in step 3, and three way term was entered in step 4.
One significant 3-way interaction was revealed: Speaking out x moral conviction x
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direction (SO x MC x D) was found to significantly predict self-assurance B = .51, t =
2.09, p = .039. The regression results are shown in Table 25.
The results of the interaction were plotted separately for the oppose and support
samples (Figure 22). Simple slopes tests were then conducted to break down the nature of
this interaction. For participants who support the issue and have high moral conviction
the relation between speaking out and self-assurance was marginally significant, B = .53,
t = 1.964, p = .052; suggesting that for participants who support the issue and have high
moral conviction, speaking out may be associated with an increase in self-assurance. For
participants who support the issue and have low moral conviction there was no relation
between speaking out and self-assurance, B = .03, t = .152, p = .880.
For participants who oppose the issue and have high moral conviction the relation
between speaking out and self-assurance was not significant, B = .03, t = .139, p = .889.
For participants who oppose the issue and have low moral conviction the relation
between speaking out and self-assurance was marginally significant, B = .54, t = 1.82, p =
.071; suggesting that for participants who oppose the issue and have low moral
conviction, speaking out may be associated with an increase in self-assurance.
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Table 25. Regressing Self-Assurance on Controls, Moral Conviction, Speaking Out,
Direction, Their Two-Way Interactions (SO X MC, MC X D, D X SO), and Their
Three-Way Interaction (SO X MC X D), Study 2
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Predictor
a
B
B
B
B
Controls
Self-assurance Time 1

.50***

.50***

.50***

.49***

Certainty

-.01

.00

.01

-.01

Extremity

.08

.06

.07

.07

Moral conviction

-.03

-.08

.09

Speaking out

.15

.16

.26

Direction

-.05

-.05

-.08

SO x MC

.02

-.25

MC x D

.06

-.25

SO x D

-.01

-.02

Main effect variables

Two-way interactions

Three-way interaction
SO x MC x D

.51*

∆F

28.48***

.67

.09

4.341*

R2

.41***

.42***

.42***

.45***

∆R2

.41***

.01

.001

.02*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; †p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<001.
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Figure 22. Three-way interaction of speaking out, moral conviction and attitude direction
on self-assurance, Study 2.
Three additional sets of regressions were conducted to explore the three way
interactions of: speaking out x direction x extremity; speaking out x direction x certainty;
and speaking out x direction x religious conviction. No significant three-way interactions
were found in these analyses.

CHAPTER TEN
STUDY 2 DISCUSSION
The results of study 2 were complex and required a multitude of post-hoc
analyses. The a priori hypotheses were not supported. Moral conviction was not
significantly associated with speaking out (replicating the findings in Study 1). Need for
uniqueness was not associated with speaking out (in contrast to Study 1 findings). The
hypothesized interactions between moral conviction and speaking out on affect were not
supported; while two interactions between moral conviction and speaking out emerged as
significant (on dissonance and safety) the results were opposite to what was predicted.
However, three interesting findings emerged from the post-hoc analyses: (a) the main and
interactive effects of the attitude variables and speaking out on affect depends on attitude
direction; (b) simply being exposed to the normative influence feels bad (negative
emotional consequences) when attitudes are held with conviction (moral or religious) but
not with extremity; and (c) moral conviction enhances rather than buffers negative
feelings when speaking out if participants are in the super minority (the oppose sample).
Each of these findings will be discussed after briefly reviewing the results.
Predicting Speaking Out
Hypothesis 1 was not supported; the correlation between moral conviction and
speaking out was in the predicted positive direction but was not significant. Of the other
attitude variables tested (certainty, extremity, and religious conviction) only extremity
128
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was significantly correlated with speaking out (r = .27, p = .002). Similar results were
found when the sample was split by attitude direction. In the oppose sample all attitude
variables correlated with speaking out in the predicted positive direction, however none
of these correlations were significant. In the support sample all the attitude variables
were correlated with speaking out in the predicted positive direction but the only
correlation to reach significance was extremity (r = .32, p <.001). In sum, these results
indicate that with respect to lowering the legal drinking age people with high moral
conviction about the issue are not any more likely to publicly maintain their initial stance
when faced with a unanimous opposing group of peers than people with low moral
conviction. These results replicate Study 1 findings but are inconsistent with prior
research (Hornsey, Smith, & Begg, 2007; Lytle, Aramovich, & Skitka, 2009).
The Hornsey, Smith, and Begg study differs from the present study in several
ways; the measure of speaking out consisted of three items on a nine-point scale; the
normative influence paradigm was different (students shown charts of others’ opinions),
the reference group was a large group and speaking out was operationalized as a
willingness to have opinion shared in paper. In that study extremity (intensity) was
marginally correlated with speaking out and moral conviction significantly correlated
with speaking out. The Lytle, Aramovich, and Skitka (2009) study is more similar to the
present study. The same measure of moral conviction and the same operationalization of
speaking out were used. Both studies used a small group conformity paradigm. However,
in the Lytle, Aramovich, and Skitka study both extremity and moral conviction
significantly predicted conformity (B = - .74; B = -.46 respectively). It could be that
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participants in the present study, students at a private Jesuit university, differed in some
relevant way from the participants in the Lytle, Aramovich, and Skitka study, who were
recruited from a large public university. More likely however, is that the difference in
target issues may explain the different findings. The target issue in the Lytle, Aramovich,
and Skitka study was one that plausibly arouses more emotion – torture of suspected
terrorists. Attitudes about “lowering the legal drinking age to 18” are not likely to elicit
the same degree of emotional response. This suggests that when choosing a target issue
the emotional component should also be assessed in conjunction with assessing moral
conviction.
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive association between need for uniqueness and
speaking out. This prediction was not supported; the correlation between need for
uniqueness and speaking out was not significant in either the full, support, or oppose
samples. This finding is in contrast to Study 1 results and prior research (Imhoff & Erb,
2009; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). This could be because the need for uniqueness
personality trait is simply not as powerful a predictor of speaking out as the other
determinants of speaking out in this study (e.g., unanimous opposition, group size, group
attractiveness).
In addition to the overall low predictive power of the attitude variables and need
for uniqueness, no association between gender and speaking out was found. The Time 1
measures of fear of isolation and communication apprehension (treated as trait variables)
were also not significantly associated with speaking out in either the full, support, or
oppose samples. Attitude direction, which emerges as a factor in post-speaking out affect,
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is not correlated with speaking out (r = .02, p = .801). Other factors known to influence
conformity behavior were however not assessed in the present study and may have
influenced speaking out; in particular personality traits such as individual differences in
predisposition to conform would have been a useful addition to the study (Goldsmith,
Clark, Lafferty, 2006).
Main Effects of Speaking Out on Affect
The underlying assumption of the main hypothesis – that moral conviction would
moderate the effect of speaking out on affect – was that there would be certain main
effects of speaking out to moderate (hypotheses 3-7). However, no significant main
effects of speaking out on affect were found in the full sample. When the sample was
split by attitude direction it was seen that for the oppose sample speaking out was
associated with an increase in dissonance and overall negative affect, and a decrease in
feelings of safety (supporting hypothesis 7). In contrast, for the support sample speaking
out was associated with a decrease in fear and overall negative affect and an increase in
net positive affect. Thus, speaking out had different effects depending on one’s original
attitude position. For the support participants speaking out to a group of opposing others
felt good. However, for those who opposed the issue sharing one’s minority opinion to a
peer group felt decidedly bad. Interestingly, the oppose group was not significantly less
likely to speak out than the support group (54.7%, 57%, p = .469; FET).
The lack of significant main effects of speaking out on affect found in the full
sample is likely a result of the pattern noted above - the main effects of speaking out in
the support sample were opposite to the main effects of speaking out found in the oppose
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sample. The main effects in the oppose and support samples canceled each other out in
the full sample. Another consideration is that there was a mean shift in affect,
independent of the predictor variables. Affect was overall more positive (higher means
on the positive affect variables and lower means on the negative affect variables) at Time
2 than at Time 1. This overall improvement in affect may be due to a confounding
variable(s) associated with Time 2 taking place in the laboratory as opposed to the
unknown setting at which Time 1 affect was assessed. Future research should control the
environment at which Time1 and Time 2 attitudes are assessed.
Main Effects of the Attitude Variables on Affect
While no predictions were made regarding the main effects of the attitude
variables (moral conviction, certainty, extremity, and religious conviction) on affect
significant effects did emerge. These effects may be important in understanding why the
pattern of the interactions found in the moderated regressions were opposite from what
was predicted. In the full sample moral conviction was positively associated with guilt,
negative affect, and fear of isolation; and religious conviction was positively associated
with dissonance, guilt, and negative affect. In contrast, extremity was positively
associated with positive affect. No main effects of certainty on affect were found in the
full sample. In the oppose sample moral conviction was positively associated with guilt
and negative affect; religious conviction was positively associated with dissonance and
guilt; and there were no significant main effects of extremity or certainty. In the support
sample, religious conviction was associated with an increase in self-assurance and
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positive affect; extremity was positively associated with positive affect; and there were
no significant main effects of moral conviction or certainty.
In general holding attitudes with moral or religious conviction was associated
with several negative affective consequences whereas holding attitudes with extremity
was associated with a host of positive consequences. In general stronger attitudes (of any
sort) for the support sample were associated with positive affective consequences
whereas stronger attitudes (of any sort) for the oppose sample were associated a host of
negative affective consequences. These results, while not providing support for the
study’s hypotheses, lend support to the assertion made by researchers (e.g., Skitka and
colleagues) that moral conviction has properties that distinguish it from other measures of
attitude strength (e.g., certainty and extremity).
As noted above the main effects of speaking out and attitude on affect differs by
attitude direction. This suggests the oppose sample differs in relevant ways from the
support sample. For this reason the interactions between speaking out and moral
conviction [certainty/extremity/religious conviction] on affect were examined not only
using the full sample but also using the oppose sample and support sample separately.
Results of these analyses are discussed below.
Moderated Regressions Using the Full Sample
The speaking out by moral conviction analyses revealed a significant positive
main effect of moral conviction on negative affect. Positive main effects of moral
conviction on guilt and fear of isolation were found in the regressions without controls
but these effects disappeared when controls were added. Additionally, significant
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interactions between moral conviction and speaking out were found for dissonance and
safety but the pattern of the interactions were not as predicted. For those with high moral
conviction speaking out was associated with an increase in dissonance whereas for those
with low moral conviction speaking out was associated a decrease in dissonance. For
those with high moral conviction speaking out was associated with a decrease in sense of
safety whereas for those with low moral conviction speaking out was associated an
increase in sense of safety.
Additionally, the speaking out by moral conviction interaction term predicting
fear, negative, and net positive emerged as significant when certainty and extremity were
added as controls; for participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated
with non-significant increases in fear and negative affect; for participants low in moral
conviction speaking out was associated with statistically significant decreases in fear and
negative affect. For participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated
with a non-significant decrease in net positive; for participants low in moral conviction
speaking out was associated with an increase in net positive. Thus, hypotheses 8-12 were
not supported. Moral conviction did not buffer the negative effects of speaking out but
rather enhanced the negative effects.
The main and interactive effects of speaking out and the other attitude variables
were also examined. There was a significant positive main effect of certainty on fear of
isolation but this effect disappeared when the controls were added, suggesting that the
initial finding may be spurious. The speaking out by certainty term predicting fear
emerged as significant when controls were added. For those with high certainty speaking
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out was associated with a decrease in fear; for those with low certainty speaking out was
associated with a non-statistically significant increase in fear. This finding is opposite to
that found for moral conviction.
Two significant findings emerged in the speaking out by extremity set of
regressions with certainty and extremity as controls (no significant findings in the
regressions without controls). A main effect of extremity predicting positive affect
emerged suggesting increased extremity is associated with an increase in positive affect.
Additionally, the interaction term predicting communication apprehension emerged as
significant; for those with high extremity speaking out was associated with a marginally
significant increase in communication apprehension; for those with low extremity
speaking out was associated with a non-statistically significant decrease in
communication apprehension.
Religious conviction was treated in this study as a type of moral conviction. As
such it was not included in the same moderated regressions with moral conviction.
Instead the main and interactive effects of speaking out and religious conviction on affect
were examined in a separate set of regressions without controls as well as in a set of
regression with all moderators (except for moral conviction) entered simultaneously.
Significant main effects of religious conviction predicting dissonance, guilt, and negative
affect were revealed such that increased religious conviction was associated with
increases in dissonance, guilt, and negative affect. These findings survived the addition of
controls.
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Moderated Regressions Using the Oppose Sample
The speaking out by moral conviction analyses revealed positive main effects of
moral conviction on guilt and negative affect. Additionally the moral conviction by
speaking out interaction was significant for safety (both with and without controls); for
participants high in moral conviction speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant decrease in safety; for participants low in moral conviction speaking out was
associated with a non-significant increase in safety. For the oppose sample moral
conviction enhanced rather than buffered the negative effects of speaking out.
The speaking out by certainty analyses using the oppose sample revealed a
significant positive main effect of speaking out on dissonance in the regression without
controls; however this effect was only marginally significant when controls were added.
The certainty by speaking out interaction was significant for fear (both with and without
controls); for participants high in certainty the negative relation between speaking out and
fear was not significant, but for participants low in certainty speaking out was associated
with a statistically significant increase in fear. Additionally, the speaking out by certainty
interaction term predicting communication apprehension emerged as significant when
controls were added. For participants high in certainty speaking out was associated with a
non-significant decrease in communication apprehension; for participants low in certainty
speaking out was associated with an increase in communication apprehension. These
interactions are notable as the pattern is opposite from what was found for moral
conviction; certainty seems to protect against fears associated with speaking out – at least
for the oppose sample.
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The speaking out by extremity analyses revealed a significant extremity by
speaking out interaction on communication apprehension (both with and without
controls); for those with high extremity speaking out was associated with a statistically
significant increase in communication apprehension. For participants low in extremity
speaking out was associated with a marginally significant decrease in communication
apprehension. This suggests that for the oppose sample having an extreme attitude
increased one’s communication apprehension.
The speaking out by religious conviction analyses using the oppose sample
revealed that religious conviction was associated with an increase in dissonance, guilt,
and negative affect. Additionally there was a significant religious conviction by speaking
out interaction for communication apprehension in the regression without controls; for
participants with high religious conviction speaking out was associated with an increase
in communication apprehension. For those with low religious conviction, there was no
relation at all between speaking out and communication apprehension. However, this
interaction was not significant when controls were added. A religious conviction by
speaking out interaction on fear of isolation emerged as significant with controls; for
participants high in religious conviction speaking out was associated with a marginally
significant decrease in fear of isolation, for participants low in religious conviction there
was no relation between speaking out and fear of isolation.
In sum, for the oppose group there was a positive relation between strongly held
attitudes (high in moral conviction, extremity, or religious conviction) and negative
emotional responses after exposure to the normative influence. Oppose participants with
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strongly held attitudes who spoke out experienced an increase in communication
apprehension and a reduced sense of safety. Two findings deviate from this pattern – the
interactions between speaking out and certainty suggest that for participants with low
levels of certainty speaking out may be associated with increased fear and
communication apprehension
Moderated Regressions Using the Support Sample
The speaking out and moral conviction analyses conducted on the support sample
revealed that speaking out was associated with a statistically significant decrease in fear
and negative affect and an increase in net positive affect. The speaking out by certainty
analyses found that speaking out was associated with a decrease in fear and negative
affect and an increase in net positive affect in both the regressions with controls and the
regressions without controls. The speaking out by extremity set of analyses revealed that
speaking out was associated with a statistically significant decrease in fear and negative
affect and an increase in net positive affect as well as a significant main effect of
extremity on positive affect. These effects were seen in both the regressions with
controls and the regressions without controls. The speaking out by religious conviction
set of regressions revealed that speaking out was associated with a decrease in fear and
negative affect and an increase in net positive affect. Religious conviction was associated
with an increase in positive affect. Positive main effects of religious conviction on selfassurance and positive affect emerged when controls were added; suggesting that for the
support sample increased religious conviction may be associated with an increase in selfassurance and positive affect.
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In sum, for the support sample several significant main effects were found.
Speaking out was associated with decreased fear and negative affect, and increased net
positive affect. Extremity was associated with an increase in positive affect. Religious
conviction was associated with an increase in self-assurance, positive, and net positive.
No significant interactions were found in the regressions conducted using the support
sample. For the support sample speaking out had positive affective consequences.
In addition to examining the support/oppose samples separately the main and
interactive effects of speaking out and direction were examined directly in a series of
moderated regressions. Three significant main effects of direction emerged: oppose
participants experienced more fear of isolation, and less safety and net positive affect
compared to the support participants. For oppose participants speaking out was associated
with an increase in fear, dissonance, and negative affect and a decrease in net positive.
For the support participants, speaking out was associated with a decrease in fear,
dissonance, and negative affect and an increase in positive affect. As noted earlier the
oppose participants were just as likely to speak out as the support participants. This is
surprising since simple exposure to the normative influence aroused negative emotional
consequences for this group (as seen in the main effects of direction). Did the oppose
group not anticipate the negative emotional reactions that would be aroused after they
spoke out? Research shows that they may in fact have anticipated this and spoke out
regardless; Aramovich, Lytle, and Skitka (2010) found that speaking out was associated
with an increase in positive emotions as well as an increase in negative expectations for
the group discussion. In that study all participants opposed the issue (torture of suspected
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terrorists) and it is not known if they believed the larger group of their peers supported or
opposed the issue. The affect variable “communication apprehension” in Study 2 is a
similar construct to “negative expectations for the group discussion” in the Aramovich,
Lytle, and Skitka study. In the present study the oppose group however did not
experience any positive emotion to possibly offset the anticipated negative consequences.
Moderated Regressions and the Support/Oppose Difference
The results suggest that the normative influence manipulation was a
psychologically different experience for the support and oppose participants. In general,
supporters of lowering the drinking age experienced an increase in positive emotions and
a decrease in negative emotions; whereas this pattern was reversed for participants who
oppose the issue. The lack of significant interaction effects found in the full sample is
likely due to the interaction effects in the oppose and support samples canceling each
other out in the full sample. There are several possible explanations for these differences
between the groups.
Individual Differences
There are likely numerous individual differences between participants who
oppose lowering the drinking age and those who support it. Some of these individual
differences may also have influenced participants’ affective responses to speaking out.
One possibility, since the target issue involves a change in policy, is that the oppose
participants are more resistant to change (ideologically conservative) than the support
participants. Conservatism has been found to be associated with conformity (e.g., Jost,
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2009). If this group has high needs for conformity then speaking out would not
surprisingly elicit negative emotions.
Oppose Group as Super-Minority
It is possible that participants were aware that the larger group of students at their
university support lowering the legal drinking age (as found in Study 2). Additionally,
research has found that university students tend to believe other students drink more than
they do (Baer, Stacy, & Larimer, 1991). It is possible that participants may have
extrapolated from their beliefs about drinking norms to normative attitudes about
lowering the drinking age. Thus the oppose participants in Study 2 could be considered a
“super-minority;” they may have believed themselves to be not only a minority within the
small group in the experiment but within their larger group of peers. Support participants
may have felt themselves to be a minority only within the confines of the small group but
holding the majority opinion within the larger group of their peers.
Perceptions of the Group Members
It is plausible that the fake chat room members were viewed by the oppose
participants as (a) more representative of the larger student population; and (b) more in
line with descriptive and prescriptive (the desired direction) norms for college students.
Conversely, the support participants may have viewed the fake chat room members (who
oppose the issue) as diverging from both descriptive and prescriptive norms and therefore
speaking out to that group results in more positive affective responses. Morrison and
Miller (2008) define “descriptive deviants” as people who hold attitudes that differ from
the average group attitude in a direction consistent with the desirable group attitude
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(toward the prescriptive norm); “prescriptive deviants” hold attitudes that differ from the
average group attitude in a direction inconsistent with the desirable group attitude (away
from the prescriptive norm). Morrison and Miller found that descriptive deviants reported
feeling more comfort and pride expressing descriptive deviant opinions; descriptive
deviance induced feelings of superior conformity (i.e., being "different but good"). It is
possible that those who support lowering the legal drinking age viewed themselves as
descriptive deviants within the normative influence chat room.
Oppose Sample as Derogated Group/Out-Group
The “oppose lowering the drinking age group” could even be considered a
derogated group by the support participants. If so, then for the support participants
speaking out would be associated with an increase in self-esteem as speaking out
distinguishes them from the derogated group (Pool, Wood & Leck; Regen & Morrison,
2011). Regen and Morrison found that non-drinkers (and the support group may assume
the oppose group are non-drinkers) are viewed as an outgroup due to non-participation in
normative behavior. According to Regen and Morrison “it is possible that a state of
negative affect maybe present by being regarded as a non-drinker; a state that can be
terminated by alcohol consumption" (or in this case by conforming to reduce negative
affect since alcohol consumption was not an option during the experiment). This is an
important confounding variable that was unfortunately not considered prior to choosing
the target issue in this study.
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Limitations of Study 2
Sample Size
Sample sizes may have been too small to detect effects in the regressions
conducted on the support sample (N = 79) and oppose sample (N = 53). According to
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) the minimum sample size for two predictor variables
(speaking out and moral conviction), one control variables (pretest affect), and one
interaction term (speaking out x moral conviction) is 108.
Uncontrolled Data Collection Environment
In this study at Time 1 participants completed the study online, including baseline
affect measures, at a time and location of their choice; at Time 2 participants completed
the study, including the affect measures, in a laboratory environment. Future research
should control the environment at which Time 1 and Time 2 attitudes are assessed to
increase internal validity.
Perceptions about Speaking Out/Conforming
During the oral debriefing it was noted that many participants denied conforming
even though the data showed 44% were doing so. Participants made comments such as, “I
didn’t conform and I was kind of looking forward to the group discussion.” The question
arose: were participants aware they were conforming? Additional items were added
halfway through the study to the follow-up questionnaire to specifically address that
question. Participants (N = 64) were asked directly whether they changed their Time 2
opinion to conform to the group norm. These responses were compared to actual changes
in Time 1 and Time 2 attitudes. It was found that participants who believed they spoke
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out were incorrect 28.8% of the time and participants who believed they conformed were
incorrect 33.3% of the time. These misperceptions may explain the lack of support for the
hypotheses; participants who conformed but believed they spoke out (or vice versa) are
likely to have different post-behavior affect than those who correctly interpreted their
behavior. It is logical it assume that perceptions matter more than reality when looking at
affect. Future research on the consequences of speaking out should include perception of
speaking out as a predictor variable.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research project used two different paradigms to explore the affective
consequences of expressing moral convictions. In Study 1 participants were asked how
willing they were to share their attitudes about torture in the online school paper along
with their full name (large group normative influence). In Study 2 participants
participated in an online chat with a group of peers holding the opposite opinion on
lowering the legal drinking age (small group normative influence). In contrast to Study 1
the majority of participants spoke out (by not conforming to the group norm).
Some findings in Study 1 and Study 2 converged. In both studies moral
conviction was positively but non-significantly associated with speaking out.
Additionally, in both studies there were main effects of moral conviction on affect. This
suggests that simply having the minority status of one’s moral convictions made salient
(through the normative influence induction) is enough to elicit certain feelings. Overall,
strong moral conviction was associated with an increased sense of strength in Study 1.
However, this was moderated by subjective minority status – for those who believed they
were truly in the minority among their peers having strong moral convictions about
torture was associated with increased guilt. These findings are analogous in some ways to
the findings in Study 2. In Study 2 moral conviction was associated with negative
feelings for those who opposed lowering the legal drinking age. It is not known, but is
145

146
likely that the oppose participants in Study 2 also had subjective minority status (see
earlier discussion regarding super minority). Likewise the support participants in Study 2
– who may have believed they held the minority opinion only within the small group in
the experiment - could be considered analogous to the to the non-subjective minority
status participants in Study 1.
In both studies the hypothesized interactions between moral conviction and
speaking out on affect were also not supported; while several interactions emerged in
Study 2 as significant results were opposite to what was predicted. Moral conviction
enhanced rather than buffered negative feelings when speaking out for participants in the
super minority (the oppose sample) in Study 2.
There may also be other differences between Study 1 and 2 that account for the
differences in findings between Study 1 and Study 2 that emerge when pooling across
“attitude direction” in Study 2. One such difference is the abstractness of the speaking
out options in the two studies. In Study 1 participants had the option to speak out to a
faceless large group. They could only guess who would read their opinion if published in
the school paper – it could read by their close friends, teachers, family – or perhaps no
one they knew. However, it could also live on forever online, accessible to future
employers, etc. In contrast, in Study 2 participants exchanged opinions with a group of
opposing others who they fully expected to meet face-to-face. According to Deutsch &
Gerard (1955) studies comparing face-to-face groups with those allowing anonymous
answers have found less conformity when anonymity is permitted. In this case
participants in Study 1 knew that speaking out would not be anonymous – this may
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explain the low rates of speaking out. However, speaking out in Study 2 was also not
anonymous – and the majority of participants in that study spoke out. Unlike Study 1
participants in Study 2 believed they would meet the group in the study face-to-face but
did not know if actual names would be exchanged. This raises the question of which
aspects of confidentiality participants consider when making the decision to speak out– is
it the size of the audience (small group versus large); the mode of speaking out (written
and possibly permanent versus oral)? If participants in Study 1 were allowed to have their
opinions published anonymously it is likely (based on conformity studies) that speaking
out rates would have been substantially higher.
Future Directions
Assessments Prior to Normative Influence
In future studies it would be useful to assess prior to the normative influence
participants’ perceptions of the larger population’s attitudes about the issue. This would
enable researchers to either control for perceptions or selectively recruit super minority
participants (thus avoiding small sample size issues). Participants in both studies were
told they were in the minority during the experiment. However, this is not necessarily
what they perceived (see the analyses involving Subjective Minority Status in Chapter 4).
The affective consequences of speaking out should be more pronounced for people who
perceive they are in the minority than for those who don’t have that perception.
Additionally future research should assess participants’ attitudes toward people
who hold the opposing stance on the target issue prior to the normative influence. As seen
in Study 2, attitude direction was an important factor with respect to affect. Krassa (1998,
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cited in Glynn & Park, 1997) suggest that people value the opinions of some people more
highly than others, and, therefore, the impact of the group norm is determined by how
valued the opinions of those others are to the individual.
Other Dependent Variables
The present research focused on self-conscious emotions (e.g., guilt, pride,
dissonance). These emotions were chosen as likely candidates for the emotional
consequences of going against the group norm or being untrue to oneself. However, other
affective responses worth exploring are feelings toward the opposing group. Participants
could have believed that the opposing group was committing a moral violation simply by
holding a morally dissimilar opinion. Three emotions are commonly linked to threats to
moral beliefs: anger, disgust, and contempt (Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, &
Haidt, 1999; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). This triad of emotions has been referred
to as other focused moral emotions (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) or othercondemning emotions (Haidt, 2003). Thus, future examinations of the affective
consequences of speaking out on matters held with strong moral conviction should
consider including measures of anger, disgust, and contempt. The PANAS-X (used in the
present research to assess fear, etc.) contains a “hostility” scale (angry, hostile, irritable,
scornful, disgusted, loathing) and may be a useful instrument. Again, target issue will
likely determine the extent these three emotions are aroused. Haidt and Kesebir (2010)
identify five categories of moral violation. These involve harm/care, fairness/justice, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Disgust is associated with purity
violations (e.g., immoral sexual practices), whereas anger is associated with justice
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violations (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). The issue in Study 1 – torture of suspected
terrorists – is relevant to the harm domain or concerns related in-group/loyalty depending
on one’s stance on the issue, thus anger toward opposing group members could be
aroused. The issue in Study 2 - lowering the legal drinking age may – may be relevant to
the moral domain of fairness or perhaps authority/respect depending on one’s stance on
the issue. Other target issues could have a different pattern of results – for example sexual
promiscuity could be relevant to the purity domain and according to some researchers
(Rai & Fiske, 2012) elicit feelings of disgust (cf. Cheng, Ottati, & Price).
In addition, including self-esteem as a dependent variable should be considered,
particularly for issues in which participants on one side of the issue could be considered
an outgroup. The oppose group in Study 2 is an example of such a group. Research by
Regen and Morrison (2011) suggests students who are non-drinkers are sometimes
viewed as members of an outgroup due to non-participation in normative behavior.
According to Pool, Wood, and Leck (1998) groups to which individuals do not want to
belong represent negative referent groups. Pool, Wood, and Leck found that participants
who wished to differentiate themselves from a derogated minority group (not a goal of all
participants) and who learned that the derogated minority group held attitudes similar to
theirs experienced reduced self-esteem. Thus, it is plausible that participants who support
lowering the legal drinking age could experience an increase in self-esteem (independent
of degree of moral conviction) after speaking out. Speaking out for the support group
differentiates them from the oppose group who may be perceived as non-drinkers and
members of an outgoup.
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Oversampling for High and Low Moral Conviction
In the present research moral conviction and speaking out were measured. As
noted by McClelland and Judd (1993), the power to detect interactions in a regression
using measured variables is far less than with experimental designs. In a 2 x 2
experimental design the researcher can assign participants to each condition thus ensuring
observations are in the extreme four corners of the joint distributions of the two predictor
variables. According to McClelland and Judd interaction effects are most readily found if
observations fall equally in the extreme “four corners” of the two-way interaction
quadrants (high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low) as this maximizes the variance of the
component and product predictors. However, in the present case the variables were
measured and since moral conviction is normally distributed this optimal joint
distribution between moral conviction and speaking out is not possible (the observations
cluster in the center). It is therefore not surprising that relatively few significant
interaction effects were found. According to Judd, Yzerbyt, and Muller (in press) if the
goal is to test an interaction between measured predictors then oversampling the extreme
four corners of the joint distribution of the predictors is a powerful alternative to random
sampling. Thus, to truly test the speaking out by moral conviction interactive hypothesis
future research could oversample participants whose attitudes are held with extremely
high and extremely low moral conviction. Additionally in Study 2 the number of
participants in each quadrant (regardless of how far from the corner) was not equal.
Moral conviction was split at the median resulting in 50 “low moral conviction”
participants and 82 “high moral conviction” participants (42 out of 132 participants fell

151
on the median so it was not possible to do a more even split). A cross tabulation analysis
revealed there were twice the number of participants with high moral conviction who
spoke out (N = 47) than participants with low moral conviction who conformed (N = 23).
Similarly, there were more participants with high moral conviction who conformed (N =
35) than participants with low moral conviction who spoke out (N = 27). To test
interactions there should be a relatively equal number of observations per cell.
Modifying the Moral Conviction Measure
Since moral conviction is considered to have an emotional component (Skitka &
Bauman, 2008; Skitka, 2010) it might be useful to add to the two-item measure used in
the present study an item that captures this aspect such as, “How upset would you be if a
close friend told you she holds the opposing opinion on this issue? Would it make you
feel upset (angry, sad, outraged) if you overheard people supporting the other side on this
issue?
Alternatively, changing the task to fully allow the target issue to be processed
might be useful. In the present study participants simply read and responded to, “to what
extent do you support or oppose . . .” To allow for more thoughtful consideration
participants could be asked to first write a brief paragraph about why they support or
oppose the target issue. After writing the paragraph they can then be presented with the
moral conviction items. After writing about the issue participants may respond more
thoughtfully whether or not their attitude toward the issue is held with moral conviction.
Additionally, this would allow the researcher to code the open-ended responses to add
to/contrast with the self-report measure.
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Behavioral and Cognitive Consequences
According to the tripartite theory of attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) attitudes
consist of three components: cognitive, affective, and behavioral; attitudes can form
based on any or all of the three types of processes and can be expressed via any or all of
the three types of responses (Eagly & Chaiken). The focus in the present research was on
affective responses to speaking out when attitudes are held with moral conviction.
However, in addition to affective responses, participants also likely developed beliefs
about their group members and about what would happen when they met with the group
face to face (e.g., thoughts of confrontation or rejection). There also may have been
behavioral responses after speaking out in the experiment (e.g., talking to people about
the issue after the study). Thus, future research should investigate potential behavioral
and cognitive responses to expressing moral convictions.
Distinction Between Moral Conviction And Other Measures Of Attitude Strength:
The Emotional Component
The findings of this research lend support to the argument that moral conviction
has a larger emotional component than other indices of attitude strength (Skitka, 2010).
This was most notably seen in the main effects of moral conviction on guilt. There was a
positive main effect of moral conviction on guilt in both the full sample and in the
exploratory testing conducted on the oppose/super minority sample. There were no
significant main effects of extremity or certainty on guilt in the full sample or in the post
hoc analyses. These findings suggest moral conviction does have a larger emotional
component than extremity or certainty. Being told one holds the minority opinion on an
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attitude one is certain about or an attitude which one has an extreme position on is not as
emotionally arousing as being told one holds the minority opinion on an attitude one
holds with high moral conviction.
While a positive main effect of moral conviction on guilt was not predicted there
are some theories that may explain this relation. First it is necessary to understand how
“guilt” was operationalized in this research. Items from the PANAS-X were used. These
items tap both “guilt” and “shame” (guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self,
disgusted with self, dissatisfied with self). Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek (2007) classify
shame, guilt and embarrassment as “self-conscious emotions” evoked by self-reflection
and self-evaluation. Guilt is generally considered a result of negative evaluations about
one’s actions whereas shame is result of negative evaluations about oneself as a person.
The PANAS-X items certainly capture “shame” when defined in this manner. According
to Scheff (1994) shame has powerful social and psychological functions and is aroused
by threats to the social bond. The normative influence in the present study certainly
presented a threat to social bonds.
Studies have found (reviewed in Skitka 2010) that participants with high moral
conviction expressed what seems to be disgust or contempt for morally dissimilar others
(refusal to sit near; unwilling to be friends with). Both shame and guilt are related to
anger (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). It is possible people with high moral
conviction about an issue who are exposed to morally dissimilar others experience both
other-directed negative emotions (anger, contempt, disgust) in addition to (or in
consequence of or as an antecedent to) self-directed negative emotions (shame and guilt).
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It is possible participants with high moral conviction experienced more shame than
people high in certainty or extremity because one’s moral convictions are by definition
tied to one’s fundamental beliefs about right and wrong. The questioning of one’s
fundamental moral beliefs (by an opposing majority) could lead to negative selfevaluations – “are my fundamental beliefs wrong? What is wrong with me?” It is possible
these feelings of guilt and shame occur simultaneously with feelings of disgust or
contempt toward the morally dissimilar others. In any case further research is needed to
fully investigate all the affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses (including speaking
out) of people with high moral conviction exposed to morally dissimilar others.

APPENDIX A
STUDY 1 NORMATIVE INFLUENCE, SPEAKING OUT MEASURE, AND
AFFECT MEASURE
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Normative Influence
For those who oppose torture:
You indicate you OPPOSE the torture of suspected terrorists. Did you know that a
majority of your fellow Loyola students disagree with you? We have found that 85% of
Loyola students SUPPORT the torture of suspected terrorists.
For those who support torture:
You indicate you SUPPORT the torture of suspected terrorists. Did you know that a
majority of your fellow Loyola students disagree with you? We have found that 85% of
Loyola students OPPOSE the torture of suspected terrorists.
Speaking Out Measure
**Special Opportunity**
Writers for the Loyola Phoenix have asked researchers in the psychology department to
present students with an opportunity. The writers are working on an article on terrorism.
They would like to include some student opinions on torture. No further work would be
required if you nominate your opinion on torture to be published. The Phoenix can
simply use the statements you provided earlier in this experiment. They are not seeking
anonymous opinions; your opinion would be published along with your full name and
major.
You will have an opportunity to provide your name, major, and contact information at the
end of this survey. You will be contacted by the Phoenix if your opinion is selected and
you will be given the opportunity to edit your comments.
1. How willing are you have your opinion regarding torture, supportive statements, full
name, and major to be published in the Loyola Phoenix?
1 = Very unwilling; 2 = Somewhat unwilling; 3 = Not sure; 4 = Somewhat willing; 5 =
Very willing
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Affect Measures
You just answered a question about having your opinion regarding torture published. You
likely experienced some emotions when answering that question.
Please reflect on your current feelings. To what extent do you feel the following?
1 = not at all; 2 = slightly; 3 = moderately; 4 = very; 5 = extremely
Note: the order of the items below were randomized by SurveyMonkey.
Powerful
Strong
Assertive
Happy
Proud
Excited
Authentic
Good
Weak
Reluctant
Afraid
Nervous
Embarrassed
Ashamed
Fake
Guilty
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Need for Uniqueness (Time 1)
The following statements concern your perceptions about yourself in a variety of
situations. Your task is to indicate the strength of your agreement with each statement.
1 = Strong Disagreement; 2 = Moderate Disagreement; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Moderate
Agreement; 5 = Strong Agreement
1. When I am in a group of strangers, I am not reluctant to express my opinion openly.
2. People frequently succeed in changing my mind. (R)
3. I am unable to express my feelings if they result in undesirable consequences. (R)
4. If I disagree with a superior on his or her views, I usually do not keep it to myself.
5. It bothers me if people think I'm being too conventional.
6. I speak up in meetings in order to oppose those whom I feel are wrong.
7. Feeling "different" in a crowd of people makes me feel uncomfortable. (R)
8. I would rather be just like everyone else rather than to be called a freak. (R)
9. It is better to always agree with the opinions of others than to be considered a
disagreeable person. (R)
10. I do not like to say unusual things to people. (R)
11. I tend to express my opinions publicly, regardless of what others say.
12. As a rule, I strongly defend my own opinions.
13. I do not like to go my own way. (R)
14. When I am with a group of people, I agree with their ideas so that no arguments arise.
(R)
15. I tend to keep quiet in the presence of persons of higher rank, experience, etc.
16. Whenever I take part in-group activities, I am somewhat of a nonconformist.
Attitudes (Time 1)
For each of the items below please indicate your position on the issue and to what extent
your position about that issue reflects something about your core moral values:
1. Do you support or oppose lowering the legal drinking age to 18? [7-pt scale (-3 to 3)]
strongly oppose, moderately oppose, slightly oppose, uncertain, slightly support,
moderately support, strongly support
[Is your attitude on this issue. . . . ][5pt Not at all, Slightly, Moderately, Very, Extremely]
1. Reflective of your core moral values and convictions?
2. Deeply connected to your beliefs about fundamental questions of 'right' and
'wrong'?
3. How certain are you about your attitude?
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4. To what extent is your position a reflection of your religious beliefs?
2. Do you support or oppose medical testing on animals if it may save human lives?
3. Do you support or oppose a federal ban on the ownership of assault weapons?
4. Do you support or oppose the use of torture when interrogating suspected terrorists in
order to obtain important information?
*This set of questions was asked for all of the issues.
Group Norm Influence (Time 2)

Participants first provide their usernames and are then taken to screen page 1.
Screen page 1:
Welcome to the Social Issues Study opinion sharing room. You will meet your fellow
participants shortly. Unlike a traditional “chat” room this will be a brief controlled
exchange only. You will not be able to exchange any information other than your opinion
on one issue.
Please wait while your group is being formed. This should take no longer than 30
seconds.
AQ1013
KD26
RR0912
KI0321
CR0622
Your group has been assigned to share your thoughts on the following issue:
Lowering the legal drinking age to 18
Take a moment to consider your attitude about this issue. Then please press continue Once everyone in your group has pressed continue your group will begin sharing
opinions with each other.
continue
Screen page 2:
You have been assigned to share your opinions in the following order. Please answer the
question as soon as it is presented to you.
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AQ1013 - - -1st
RR912 - - - 2nd
KI321- - - 3rd
CR622 - - - 4th
KD26 - - - 5th
Updating
Screen page 3:
AQ1013 --- Strongly Supports lowering the legal drinking age to 18
RR912--- Slightly Supports lowering the legal drinking age to 18
KI321 --- Moderately Supports lowering the legal drinking age to 18
CR622--- Strongly Supports lowering the legal drinking age to 18

Screen page 4:
Your turn KD26: Do you support or oppose lowering the legal drinking age to 18?
Strongly oppose
Moderately oppose
Slightly oppose
Uncertain
Slightly support
Moderately support
Strongly support
Prefer not to answer this question
Screen pages presented after leaving chat room; prior to Time 2 survey
Screen page 1:
Social Issues Study
You have exited the chat room. Your group members CANNOT see any further
responses you make on this computer.
Screen page 2:
Please answer these questions once more. Make sure you enter your responses
*carefully* and take a moment to make sure you entered them correctly.
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1. Enter your initials (first letter of your first name and first letter of your last name).
2. In what MONTH were you born?
3. On what DAY of the month were you born?
Screen page 3:
Please read the following carefully. It explains what happens next in this study.
1. You will complete some brief surveys on this computer.
2. You will go upstairs to meet your chat room group members face-to-face.
3. Your group will draft a short position paper (one paragraph) about "lowering the legal
drinking age to 18."
3. You will be debriefed by the Experimenter.
Screen page 4:
As you complete the following surveys keep in mind that your group members CANNOT
see your answers.
Affect Measures (Time 1 and Time 2)
Time 1 instructions: This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe
different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in
the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you generally feel:
Time 2 instructions: “This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe
different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in
the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel right NOW before meeting
your fellow group members face-to-face):
(1= very slightly or not at all; 2= a little; 3= moderately; 4= quite a bit; 5=extremely)
Fear: Afraid, Scared, Frightened, Nervous, Jittery, Shaky
Guilt: Guilty, Ashamed, Blameworthy, Angry at self, Disgusted with self, Dissatisfied
with self
Self-assurance: Proud, Strong, Confident, Bold, Daring, Fearless
Safety: Safe, Relieved, Calm, Relaxed, At ease, Accepted by others, Connected with
others
Dissonance: Uneasy, Uncomfortable, Bothered
Fear of isolation (1-6)/ Communication apprehension (7-10)
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Time 1 instructions: Read each statement and rate your level of agreement with the
following statements:
Time 2 instructions: Thinking about how you feel right NOW, before meeting your
fellow group members face-to-face, rate your level of agreement with the following
statements:
(1= strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree)
1. I worry about being isolated if people disagree with me.
2. I avoid telling other people what I think when there’s a risk they’ll avoid me if they
knew my opinion.
3. I do not enjoy getting into arguments.
4. Arguing over controversial issues improves my intelligence.
5. I enjoy a good argument over a controversial issue.
6. I try to avoid getting into arguments.
7. I like to get involved in group discussion.
8. I’m afraid to speak up in conversations.
9. I enjoy talking at a small group meeting.
10. My body feels relaxed when I speak during a small group meeting.
Manipulation Check (Time 2)
What do you think this study was about? [open-ended response]
Check 1. Did you notice anything strange about the online interaction?
IF YES: What did you think was strange about the online interaction? Please be specific.
Check 2. This interaction was actually not with real participants. Did you know this was
the case DURING the online interaction? (In other words, even though you might have
realized it later, AT THE TIME that you were sending comments to your group members,
did you realize they were not real?)
IF YES: What made you suspect that the online interaction was not real? Please be
specific.
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Protocol for running Study 2, Time 2 experiment
Experimenter A:
1. Greet the participants in waiting area. Wait till all arrive (unless more than five
minutes late then just start).
2. Consent process in hall/waiting area:
1. Explanation of study [read this verbatim to participants]. “This study consists
of three main parts:
a. The first part takes place over the computer. You will be randomly
assigned by the computer program to a group of four other
participants. We are running multiple sessions of the study today. Your
group could consist of some of the people sitting next to you out here
or it could consist entirely of people from sessions the other
experimenters are running.
b. There will be a brief chat room where you and the other members of
your group will exchange opinions on a social issue. Unlike regular
chat rooms you will not be allowed any other interaction other than
sharing your opinion.
c. After this brief exchange you will exit the chat room and complete
confidential surveys. The other members of your group will NOT be
able to see your responses to those surveys.
d. After the surveys you will get to meet your group face-to-face in a
room upstairs and draft a short position statement on the issue you
exchanged opinions about in the chat room.”
2. Have participants read and sign consent forms. Keep the forms.
3. Escort participants to the lab “Hi [Experimenter B], here is your group. I need
to run upstairs and check on our other group.” Don’t leave until Experimenter
B responds (see below).
Experimenter B:
1. While Experimenter A is greeting the participants set up computers in lab:
a. Go to the study website.
b. Enter username and password
c. Caution: don’t go to the program until the participants have arrived
and Experimenter A is in the consent process. The program times out
very quickly.
2. When Experimenter A brings them to you seat the participants at carrels.
Check that the computer for each participant is set to the first page of the
study [username questions: initials, etc.].Tell them to ahead and start.

3.

4.
5.
6.
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Respond to Experimenter A’s comment [Experimenter A is standing at door]
about needing to check on the group upstairs “Go ahead, I know we have a lot
of participants today. I’m okay down here.” Say this loud enough for all
participants to hear.
Sit with participants during study. If all computers are being used put a chair
out in the hall and sit outside the door where you can be seen.
Assist participants who have trouble or questions.
When participants are done whisper “please come out here to the hall” (we
don’t want the other participants to hear about the deception until they are
done)

Debriefing
1. Experimenter A (who will be waiting in the hall) will keep a written list and
collect names for Experimetrix credit.
2. Experimenter A will hand participants debriefing form and ask each
participant to wait until the whole group is done participating.
3. Experimenter B will join Experimenter A and the participants in the waiting
area.
4. Experimenter B will go over the key points in the debriefing form:
a. “As you know from the computer program there will not be a face-to-face
meeting;
b. You were also deceived about the chat room. You did not interact with
real participants. The program was set up based on your responses to the
earlier study two weeks ago. If you indicated ‘support’ for lowering the
legal drinking age the chat room was set up to look like all the other
participants opposed the issue and vice versa.
c. In this study we had to use deception in order to get natural reactions. I
hope you are okay with that? [if anyone has a problem with being
deceived let me know right away]
d. The goal of this study was to see if having moral conviction about an issue
would protect people who are faced with group pressure. Most people will
go along with the group if it’s not an issue that is very important to them.
So, if you went along with the group that is a very common response.
e. One final thing: It is really important that you do not talk to future
participants (people in your 101 class who have not yet participated) about
this study. If people know in advance what the study is about they won’t
respond in a natural way [pause so this sinks in].
f. Do you have any questions or concerns? Thank you so much for your
time.”
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After study the Experimenters can work together to:
1. Update completed session on master participant list
2. Discuss any problems that occurred during session
Note: If person hits ‘back’ button it will lock the chat. Have SurveyMonkey survey
bookmarked on all computers so participants can complete affect measures even if they
mess up on the chat by going back.

APPENDIX D
COMPARISON OF REGRESSIONS CONDUCTED WITH MCM, MC1, AND
MC2
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The moral conviction by speaking out regression analyses predicting affect were
conducted using the two-item averaged measure of moral conviction (MCM), as well as
each individual moral conviction item separately; the core moral values and convictions
item (MC1); and the right and wrong item (MC2). For each regression Time 1 affect,
moral conviction (MCM/MC1/MC2), and speaking out were entered at Step 1 and the
moral conviction by speaking out interaction term (MCM x SO/MC1 x SO/MC2 x SO)
was entered at Step 2. See Table below

Comparison of MCM, MC1, And MC2 In The Regressions Conducted Using The Full
Sample
MCM

MC1

MC2

MCM

SO

MCM
X SO

MC1

SO

MC1
X SO

MC2

SO

MC2
X SO

Fear

.11*

-.15

.04

.05†

.08

.12

.10*

-.14

-.04

Dissonance

.08

.02

.13

.10†

.01

.22*

.06

.03

.01

Guilt

.10*

-.10

.08

.09*

-.10

.11

.09*

-.10

.05

Negative

.10*

-.11

.07

.09*

-.10

.13

.09*

-.10

.00

.12*

-.24†

-.18

.15*

-.25†

-.07

.07

-.22

-.24

-.10

.05

.13

-.09

.05

.19

-.08

.04

.04

.01

.18†

-.06

.01

.18†

-.02

.02

.18

-.12

Safe

-.03

-.08

-.17

-.04

-.08

.32**

-.00

-.09

.00

Positive

-.01

.09

-.09

-.02

.10

-.13

-.00

.09

-.03

Net
positive

-.08

.18

-.12

-.08

.18

-.25†

-.06

.17

.03

DV

Fear of
isolation
Comm.
App.
Selfassurance

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01.
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Comparison of MCM, MC1, And MC2 In The Regressions Conducted Using The
Oppose Sample
MC

MC1

MC2

MCM

SO

MCM
X SO

MC1

SO

MC1
X SO

MC2

SO

MC2
X SO

Fear

.13†

.13

-.12

.11

.15

.01

.12†

.14

-.19

Dissonance

.13

.29†

.01

.11

.31†

.10

.12

.29†

-.06

Guilt

.19**

.03

.10

.17*

.05

.09

.18**

.03

.11

Negative

.14**

.09

-.01

.12*

.11

.03

.13**

.09

-.04

.07

-.26

-.39

.15

-.28

-.29

-.01

-.23

-.42

.09

.30

.17

-.09

.29

.29

-.07

.29

.03

.003

.19

-.26

-.04

.21

-.24

.04

.17

-23

Safe

-.06

B-.30

-.21

-.07

-.30

-.37*

-.03

-.30

-.05

Positive

-.041

-.02

-.15

-.06

-.02

-.20

-.01

-.03

-.10

Net positive

-.12

-.09

-.10

-.13

-.10

-.20

-.10

-.09

-.01

DV

Fear of
isolation
Comm.
App.
Selfassurance

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01.
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Comparison of MCM, MC1, And MC2 In The Regressions Conducted Using The
Support Sample
MCM

MC1

MC2

MCM

SO

MCM
X SO

MC1

SO

MC1
X SO

MC2

SO

MC X
SO

Fear

.02

-.32*

-.02

.01

-.32*

.05

.02

-.32*

-.08

Dissonance

-.04

-.18

.04

.01

-.20

.18

-.08

-.18

-.12

Guilt

.04

-.20†

-.04

.05

-.21†

.03

.01

-.20†

-.10

Negative

.01

-.24*

-.02

.02

-.25*

.07

-.00

-.24*

-.09

DV

Fear of
isolation
Comm.
App.
Selfassurance

.06

-.19

.004

.05

-.20

.16

.04

-.19

-.15

-.18

-.10

-.06

-.15

-.10

.01

-.15

-.12

-.10

.01

.19

.14

.02

.18

.25

-.01

.19

-.02

Safe

.15†

.04

-.02

.10

.05

-.22

.14†

.05

.19

Positive

.07

.17

.06

.06

.17

-.01

.05

.18

.11

Net positive

.11

.38*

.10

.08

.38*

-.10

.09

.39**

.26

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01.
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Speaking out was assessed in Study 2 by comparing participants’ Time 1 and
Time 2 attitudes. Switching from oppose at Time 1 to support at Time 2 (or vice versa),
or moving to “uncertain” at Time 2 was coded as 0 (conform). Not switching sides or
moving to “uncertain” was coded as 1 (speak out). This study procedure was adopted
because it replicates the procedure used in prior research (Lytle, Aramovich, & Skitka,
2009; Aramovich, Lytle & Skitka, 2010). The following supplementary analyses were
conducted to examine whether results would differ if the seven participants who moved
to “uncertain” were not coded as “conform.” A new variable was created: “Speak Out
New” (SON). “Speak out” includes participants who did not switch sides (N = 81).
“Conform” includes participants who switched sides or moved to “uncertain” (N = 51).
The main and interactive effects of speaking out and moral conviction, certainty, and
extremity on affect were tested with a series of moderated regression analyses (see Table
14 in Chapter 8 for results of the analyses using original models). For each affect
variable: Time 1 affect, speaking out, moral conviction, certainty, and extremity were
entered at step 1, speaking out by moral conviction, speaking out by certainty, and
speaking out by extremity were entered in step 2. The regression model is as follows:
Y = b0 + b1(Time 1 affect) + b2 (SOU)+ B3(MC)+ B4(Cert)+ B5(Ext)+ B6(MC x SOU) +
B7(Cert x SOU) + B8(Ext x SOU).
The results of these regressions are shown in Appendix E Table 1 below.
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Appendix E Table 1: Summary of Regressions Simultaneously Entering Speaking Out
(SOU) with Moral Conviction(MC), Certainty (C), and Extremity (E), Study 2
SOU

MC

C

E

MC x
SOU

Cx
SOU x

Ex
SOU

.001a

.09

-.02

-.02

.18

-.18

-.09

Dissonance

.09

.09

.002

-.03

23†

-.02

-.02

Guilt

.01

.08

.03

-.01

.11

.004

-.07

Negative

.01

.08†

-.01

.01

.15†

-.08

-.06

Fear of isolation

-.19

.10

.13

-.06

-.09

-.16

.36*

Communication
Apprehension

.04

-.11

.07

-.04

.15

-.23

.37*

Self-assurance

.23*

-.02

.01

.04

.01

.06

-.17

Safe

-.01

-.06

-.03

.10

-.38**

.15

.01

Positive

.15

-.04

-.02

.09†

-.16

.14

-.08

Net positive

.15

-.11

.04

.06

-.31*

.24

-.03

Fear

Note. † < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
SOU: speak out = not switch sides; conform = switch sides or move to uncertain
MC=moral conviction; C=Certainty; E=Extremity
a
Direct effect entries are the unstandardized regression coefficients and p-values obtained at step 1. The
two-way interaction entries are the unstandardized coefficient and p-value obtained at step 2.

The results of these regressions were compared to the results of the regressions
conducted with the original speaking out measure. Three significant effects were
sustained, one effect emerged, and several disappeared. The speaking out by moral
conviction interaction term predicting safety and the speaking out by moral conviction
interaction term predicting net positive were significant in both the original and new
models and the direction of effects were the same.
The main effect of speaking out on self-assurance was non-significant in the
original model but emerged as significant when the “uncertain” cases were included in
“speak out.”
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The positive main effect of moral conviction on negative affect was significant in
the original model but was only marginally significant in the new model. The speaking
out by moral conviction interaction term predicting fear, dissonance, and negative affect
were all significant in the original models but were non-significant in the new models
when the “uncertain” cases were included in “speak out.” The speaking out by certainty
interaction predicting fear and the speaking out by extremity interaction predicting fear of
isolation were significant in the original models but were not significant when the
“uncertain” cases were coded with “speak out” instead of conform.
In sum, a greater number of significant effects were found in the original
regression models than in the new regression models.

APPENDIX F
REGRESSION TABLES FOR STUDY 2
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Regression Table 1.
Speak out x Moral Conviction Predicting Dissonance Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.59

.08

1.56

.08

.30***

.05

.27***

.05

MC1

.09†

.05

-.05

.08

Speak out

.01

.10

.03

.10

.23*

.11

Dissonance T1

SO x MC
2

R
F for change in R2

.21***
12.358***

.23***
4.359*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 2
Speak out x Moral Conviction Predicting Guilt Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.38

.06

1.37

.06

Guilt T1

.15***

.04

.15**

.04

MC1

.09*

.04

.03

.07

Speak out

-.10

.09

-.09

.09

.11

.09

SO x MC
R2
F for change in R2

.14***
6.684***

.15***
1.495*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 3
Speak out x Moral Conviction Predicting Negative Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.51

.06

1.50

.06

.21***

.04

.21***

.04

MC1

.09*

.04

.01

.06

Speak out

-.10

.08

-.09

.07

.13

.08

Negative T1

SO x MC
2

R
F for change in R2

.26***
14.094***

.27***
2.652*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 4
Speak Out x Moral Conviction Predicting Fear of Isolation Using Full Sample
Model 1
Model 2
Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.66

.11

3.67

.11

.77***

.07

.77***

.07

MC1

.15*

.07

.19†

.12

Speak out

-.25†

.14

-.26†

.14

-.07

.15

Fear of Isolation T1

SO x MC
2

R
F for change in R2

.51***
42.535***

.51***
.214

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=Speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 5
Speak Out x Moral Conviction Predicting Safety in Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.23

.09

3.27

.09

Safety T1

.43***

.06

.41***

.06

MC1

-.04

.06

.15

.09

Speak out

-.08

.12

-.10

.11

-.32**

.12

SO x MC
2

R
F for change in R2

.32***
19.497***

.36***
7.243**

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out
(0=conform;1=Speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 6
Speak Out x Certainty Predicting Fear of Isolation in Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.65

.11

3.65

.11

FOI T1

.80***

.07

.80***

.07

Certainty

.14*

.07

.14

.12

Speak out

-.25

.14

-.25

.14

.01

.15

SO x C
2

R
F for change in R2

.51***
42.855***

.51***
.001

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=Speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 7
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Dissonance Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.59

.076

1.58

.08

.29***

.05

.29***

.05

Religious Conviction

.11*

.05

.10

.09

Speak out

.03

.10

.03

.10

.03

.12

Dissonance T1

SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.241***
12.820***

.242***
.067

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform; 1=
speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001..

Regression Table 8
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Guilt Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.38

.06

1.38

.06

Guilt T1

.14**

.04

.14**

.04

.11

.04

.10

.07

-.09**

.08

-.09

.09

.01

.09

Religious Conviction
Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.15***
7.021***

.15***
.012

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 9
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Negative Affect Using Full Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.50

.06

1.51

.06

Negative T1

.21***

.04

.21***

.04

Religious Conviction

.09**

.04

.11*

.06

-.09

.07

-.09

.07

-.03

.08

Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.24***
14.001***

.23***
.001

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 10
Speak Out x Moral Conviction Predicting Safety Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.19

.14

3.14

.14

Safety T1

.49***

.10

.47***

.09

MC1

-.07

.09

.15

.14

Speak out

-.30

.19

-.17

.19

-.37**

.18

SO x MC
2

R
F for change in R2

.45***
12.136***

.50***
4.294*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 11
Speak Out x Certainty Predicting Fear Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.52

.10

1.54

.10

Fear T1

.36**

.09

.37

.08

Certainty

-.04

.07

.12

.09

Speak out

.22

.14

.24

.14

-.29*

.12

SO x C
R2
F for change in R2

.32**
6.969***

.40***
5.594*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 12
Speak Out x Extremity Predicting Dissonance Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.49

.126

1.50

.13

.42***

.09

.42***

.09

Extremity

.02

.08

.07

.12

Speak out

.37*

.17

.37*

.18

-.09

.17

Dissonance T1

SO x E
R2
F for change in R2

.41***
10.233***

.41***
.258

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 13
Speak Out x Extremity Predicting Communication Apprehension Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.11

.16

3.03

.16

.80***

.11

.76***

.11

Extremity

-.02

.11

-.31**

.15

Speak out

.23

.23

.28

.21

.55**

.20

CA T1

SO x E
2

R
F for change in R2

.562***
19.260***

.624***
7.213**

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 14
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Dissonance Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.52

.12

1.52

.12

Dissonance T1

.43***

.08

.44***

.09

Religious Conviction

.16**

.07

.22*

.12

.26

.16

.28

.17

-.08

.14

Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.49***
14.184***

.50***
.341

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 15
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Guilt Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.26

.10

1.26

.10

Guilt T1

.14*

.07

.14

.07

Religious Conviction

.16**

.06

.15

.09

.04

.13

.04

.13

.00

.11

Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.33**
7.121**

.33**
.001

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 16
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Negative Affect Using Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.45

.08

1.45

.08

Negative T1

.29***

.06

.29***

.06

Religious Conviction

.10**

.05

.13*

.08

.10

.11

.11

.11

-.06

.09

Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.45***
13.632***

.44***
.356

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 17
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Communication Apprehension Using
Oppose Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.07

.16

3.08

.15

.80***

.11

.79***

.11

Religious Conviction

-.11

.09

-.39*

.15

Speak out

.32

.22

.24

.22

.43*

.19

Communication Apprehension T1

SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.590***
21.099***

.635***
5.288*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform; 1=
speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 18
Speak Out x Moral Conviction Predicting Fear Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.63

.10

1.61

.11

Fear T1

.20**

.06

.20**

.06

.01

.07

-.02

.12

-.32*

.12

-.30*

.14

.05

.15

MC1
Speak out
SO x MC
R2
F for change in R2

.22***
6.87***

.22***
.12

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform; 1=
speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 19
Speak Out x Certainty Predicting Fear Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.63

.09

1.65

.10

Fear T1

.20

.06

.20

.06

Certainty

.01

.07

.10

.12

Speak out

-.32*

.12

-.34**

.13

-.13

.14

SO x C
2

R
F for change in R2

.22***
6.883***

.23**
.767

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform; 1=
speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 20
Speak Out by Certainty Predicting Negative in Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.55

.07

1.55

.08

Negative T1

.16**

.05

.16**

.05

Certainty

.02

.06

.02

.10

Speak out

-.25*

.10

-.25*

.10

.00

.11

SO x C
2

R
F for change in R2

.23***
7.253***

.23**
.000

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;1=
speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 21
Speak Out x Certainty Predicting Net Positive Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.44

.11

1.45

.12

.52***

.07

.52***

.07

Certainty

.07

.08

.10

.15

Speak out

.39*

.15

.38*

.15

-.05

.17

Net Positive T1

SO x C
2

R
F for change in R2

.48***
22.39***

.48***
.10

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0 = conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 22
Speak Out by Extremity Predicting Fear Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.64

.09

1.66

.10

Fear T1

.20***

.06

.20***

.06

Extremity

.05

.07

.11

.10

Speak out

-.34**

.13

-.35**

.13

-.12

.13

SO x E
R2
F for change in R2

.22***
7.084***

.23**
.812

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 23
Speak Out x Extremity Predicting Negative Affect Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.56

.07

1.58

.08

.17***

.05

.17***

.05

Extremity

.02

.05

.07

.08

Speak out

-.26**

.10

-.26**

.10

-.09

.10

Negative T1

SO x E
R2
F for change in R2

.23***
7.288***

.24**
.747

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 24
Speak Out x Extremity Predicting Positive Affect Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

2.98

.09

3.01

.09

Positive T1

.43***

.05

.42***

.06

Extremity

.13**

.06

.20**

.09

Speak out

.10

.12

.09

.12

-.14

.12

SO x E
R2
F for change in R2

.48***
22.969***

.50***
1.287

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 25
Speak Out x Extremity Predicting Net Positive Affect Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.45

.11

1.47

.12

.52***

.07

.51***

.07

Extremity

.09

.08

.14

.12

Speak out

.35***

.15

.35***

.15

-.09

.16

Net Positive T1

SO x E
R2
F for change in R2

.48***
22.740***

.47***
.361

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 26
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Fear Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.63

.09

1.66

.09

Fear T1

.20***

.06

.21***

.06

.02

.09

.17

.13

-.31**

.12

-.38***

.13

-.28

.18

Religious Conviction
Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.21**
6.549**

.24**
2.552

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 27
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Negative Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.55

.07

1.56

.08

.17***

.05

.18***

.05

-.01

.07

.09

.10

-.24**

.10

-.28**

.10

-.19

.14

Negative T1
Religious Conviction
Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.22***
6.868***

.24***
1.891

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 28
Speak Out x Religious Conviction Predicting Net Positive Affect Using Support Sample
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.45

.11

1.44

.11

.52***

.07

.52***

.07

.16

.10

.11

.15

.44**

.14

.46**

.15

.09

.21

Net Positive T1
Religious Conviction
Speak out
SO x RC
R2
F for change in R2

.504***
24.417***

.506***
.202

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 29
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Fear
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.66

.09

1.49

.11

Fear T1

.25***

.05

.24

.05

Direction

-.16†

.10

.13

.14

Speak out

-.10

.09

.22

.15

-.53**

.19

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.194***
9.848***

.243***
7.958**

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 30
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Dissonance
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.65

.10

1.46

.12

.30***

.05

.28***

.05

Direction

-.15

.10

.17*

.15

Speak out

.06

.10

.41

.16

-.58**

.21

Dissonance T1

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.219***
11.513***

.267***
7.956**

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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Regression Table 31
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Negative
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.56

.07

1.41

.09

.23***

.04

.21***

.04

Direction

-.11

.08

.13

.11

Speak out

-.07

.07

.19

.12

-.43**

.15

Negative T1

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.238***
12.814***

.286***
8.221**

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 32
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Fear of Isolation
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.84

.13

3.84

.16

.76***

.07

.76***

.07

Direction

-.35*

.14

-.36

.21

Speak out

-.19

.14

-.20

.22

.01

.29

Fear Of Isolation T1

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.519***
44.202***

.519***
.003

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out (0=conform;
1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

193
Regression Table 33
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Safety
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

3.05

.11

3.19

.13

Safety T1

.45***

.06

.43***

.06

Direction

.30**

.11

.07

.17

Speak out

-.10

.11

-.35†

.18

.41†

.23

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.358***
22.838***

.354***
3.237†

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out
(0=conform; 1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.

Regression Table 34
Speak Out x Attitude Direction Predicting Net Positive
Model 1

Model 2

Variable

B

SE

B

SE

Constant

1.30

.12

1.51

.14

.62***

.06

.59***

.06

Direction

.28*

.12

-.07

.18

Speak out

.14

.12

-.25

.19

.64*

.25

Net Positive T1

SO x DIR
R2
F for change in R2

.468***
35.788***

.496***
6.684*

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors. Speak out
(0=conform; 1=speak out). † p<.10. *p<.05. **p<01. ***p<001.
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